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ABSTRACT 
 
While the determinants of low earnings quality (GAAP violation) have been examined 
in prior research, very few studies have been undertaken in firms with concentrated 
ownership. Financial reporting in concentrated ownership firms is important because the 
types of agency conflict shift from the shareholder-agent conflict to the principal-
principal conflict (i.e. a conflict between controlling shareholders and outside 
investors). Against this background, this research aims to reveal the determinants of 
accounting misstatements in concentrated ownership firms and Thai firms form the 
basis of the sample. In addition, the research assesses the economic consequences of 
accounting misstatements – an issue that has received relatively little attention in prior 
research.  
A study was conducted of a sample of 51 misstatement firm-years, compared with 2,452 
non-misstatement firm-years for the financial reports of public companies listed on 
Thailand Stock Exchange during 2001-2009. The results indicate that Thai firms are 
more likely to misstate their financial reports when they are close to debt covenant 
violations and when they need external finance. Corporate governance mechanisms are 
also important factors influencing the likelihood of accounting misstatements. The 
likelihood of accounting misstatements increases when the ultimate owner holds more 
than 25% of the total shares. The determinants of accounting misstatements coincide 
with the institutional settings of the country.  
 
The study of the consequences of accounting misstatements reveals that misstating 
firms are more financially constrained than non-misstating firms after misstatement 
announcements. The net amount of capital supplied by capital providers falls 
significantly, particularly in the net proceeds from share issuances. The examination of 
both the determinants and consequences of accounting misstatements extends our 
understanding on the cost-benefit trade-off in the financial reporting process. The 
insights from this research might also be applicable to other countries where the 
country’s institutions are similar to those of Thailand and where ownership 
concentration is high. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) the primary agency conflict in 
corporations (i.e. the principal-agent conflict) occurs between dispersed shareholders 
and professional managers (Berle and Means 1932). In contrast, in emerging markets 
(e.g. East Asian countries) where their institutional contexts differ from those of 
developed markets (e.g. the U.S. and the U.K.) the agency conflict becomes one 
between large shareholders (who can control the firm’s operations through their 
majority of voting rights) and outside capital providers (i.e. minority shareholders and 
creditors). This has been referred to as a principal-principal conflict (Young et al. 2008). 
Controlling shareholders can exploit private benefits of control, which can be costly to 
outside investors. Companies with a controlling shareholder are the dominant form 
among public firms in many countries (e.g. Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009; Bebchuk and 
Weisbach 2010; La Porta et al. 1999), even in the U.S. where this form is more 
common than it is often assumed (Holderness 2009). Therefore, the principal-principal 
conflict is an important issue for consideration (Young et al. 2008). Unfortunately, the 
literature on this type of conflict is still limited (e.g. Morck et al. 2005); therefore, this 
research aims to shed light on this subject through an empirical study of accounting 
quality in Thailand.  
 
As far as accounting is concerned, accounts manipulation can be exploited in a conflict 
of interest setting (Stolowy and Breton 2004). A certain set of accounting quality 
measures has been determined by previous empirical research (see, for example, the 
summary in Dechow et al. 2010) and one of these measures is GAAP violation (e.g. in 
Beneish 1997; Chen et al. 2006; Dechow et al. 1996). This measure has some 
advantages in showing a problem of agency conflicts (Dechow et al. 2010). The 
measure of GAAP violation is employed in this research in order to show financial 
  
2 
 
reporting when a principal-principal conflict occurs.
1
 A GAAP violation consists of 
both unintentional (i.e. accounting errors) and intentional (i.e. fraud) misstatements 
(Dechow et al. 2010). The term ‘accounting misstatements’ has recently come into use 
and studies into cases of accounting misstatement have of perennial interest (e.g. 
Dechow et al. 2011; Efendi et al. 2007; Ettredge et al. 2010; Firth et al. 2011). 
Following these prior studies, this research uses the term ‘accounting misstatement’ to 
refer to those financial statements that are alleged of fraud or material misstated 
accounting items (which are detected by market regulators) and those financial 
statements that are later restated because of prior accounting errors. One common aim 
of the prior studies and this research into accounting misstatement cases is to discover 
what the exact causes of financial misreporting are and why some firms suffer from 
them while others do not. Managers’ incentives and the weaknesses of corporate 
governance mechanisms are suggested as two primary factors driving an occurrence of 
accounting misstatements (Jiambalvo 1996) and these factors are supported by previous 
empirical evidence (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996; Efendi et al. 2007; Peasnell et al. 2001). 
However, most of the existing findings were derived from samples in diffused 
ownership systems (such as the U.S. and the U.K.) where the principal-agent conflict 
usually appears. An interesting question is whether the results of previous research will 
generalise to firms with a principal-principal conflict.  
 
Recent studies (such as Coffee 2006; Morck et al. 2005; Young et al. 2008) have 
brought up the issue of the relationship between corporate ownership (i.e. diffused and 
concentrated) and a firm’s financial reporting. Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) suggest 
that one of the key elements of the governance arrangement is corporate ownership 
structure; consequently, assessing corporate governance matrices without consideration 
of companies’ ownership structure is discouraged. Therefore, the attribute of ownership 
                                                 
1
This research acknowledges that under the principles-based International Accounting Standards that are 
applied in European and Asian countries there are cases when a firm’s financial reports depart from the 
letter of law and/or accounting standards in order to give a true and fair view of financial reports, such as 
the override cases in the U.K. (Livne and McNichols 2009) which is not considered to be fraudulent 
(Stolowy and Breton 2004, p. 12). However, according to IAS 1 (IASB 2003 paragraph 19) the IASB 
considers this override an extremely rare circumstance and it does not want to initially include an 
override (Benston et al. 2006). Similar to the experience of European countries that is observed in 
Benston et al. (2006), this research is not aware of any override cases in Thailand and, therefore, the 
override case is exempted from the scope of ‘GAAP violation’ term in this research.  
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structure should be taken into account in an examination of the causes of accounting 
misstatements. Accordingly, three prospective determinants of accounting 
misstatements were examined in this research: the controlling shareholders’ incentives, 
corporate governance mechanisms, and ownership structures.  
 
In this thesis, Thai companies were sampled for firms in concentrated ownership 
systems. The principal-principal conflict can be found in Asian firms (Claessens and 
Fan 2002) and the financial reporting quality of firms in this region is generally deemed 
to be low (Ball et al. 2003). Thailand was the origin of the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997 that made the East Asian region become a popular focus of prior research. The 
ownership structure of Thai firms is found to be highly concentrated (Wiwattanakantang 
2001) and there is evidence of an adverse effect of the high ownership concentration on 
the transparency of financial reports (Alba et al. 2003) and on the expropriation 
behaviour of controlling shareholders (Lemmon and Lins 2003; Mitton 2002). The 
principal-principal conflict, therefore, features quite often in Thai firms.  
 
The financial reporting quality of Thai firms has previously been assessed in many 
aspects (such as earnings management and discretionary accruals (Pornupatham 2006), 
earnings smoothness (Charoenwong and Jiraporn 2009), and, accounting conservatism 
(Boonlert-U-Thai and Kuntisook 2009)); however, there is a lack of research into 
GAAP violation. Although there has been some pioneering research which has focused 
on the characteristics of those firms that are subject to enforcement actions by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand (Tummanon 2005b), these studies were 
conducted on a small scale and no comparison was made with a control group. 
Therefore, this research project aims to extend the previous literature. A study into 
accounting misstatements in Thai firms can provide an insight into the causes of 
accounting misstatements in the context of the principal-principal conflict in 
concentrated ownership systems.  
 
In addition to investigating the determinants of accounting misstatements, this research 
will also assess the economic consequences of accounting misstatements in the periods 
after the accounting misstatements are revealed. Reactions of equity investors through 
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share prices have been investigated by many prior studies, while the reactions of lenders 
have recently been revealed by studies, such as Chen et al. (2009) and Graham et al 
(2008). Using a Thai sample allows the research to particularly contribute to the latter 
issue. The financial system of Thai firms are debt-oriented, even though they are listed 
on stock exchanges (Alba et al. 2003). In addition, there is evidence showing personal 
connections between banks and firms (Charumilind et al. 2006). Therefore, Thai firms 
may be less concerned about the capital market participants’ reactions when their 
accounts manipulation is revealed. Since accounts manipulation signals a conflict of 
interest among the parties in the contracting process (as presumed to be the principal-
principal conflict in Thai firms) (Stolowy and Breton 2004), it is interesting to assess 
whether an announcement of accounting misstatements impacts the decision of outside 
capital providers. Corporate external financing activity is given specific attention. 
Moreover, a study of both the determinants and consequences of accounting 
misstatements will facilitate an understanding of the cost and benefit trade-offs in 
financial reporting processes: the research containing both aspects is still limited 
(Dechow et al. 2010).  
 
The remainder of this chapter provides a summary of the contents of this thesis. Section 
1.2 presents the purposes of the study and research questions. Section 1.3 describes the 
scope of the study while Section 1.4 outlines the structure of thesis.   
 
 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
As previously discussed, the evidence on the antecedents of accounting misstatements 
in concentrated ownership systems (where conflicts between controlling shareholders 
and outside investors relatively appear) is limited and the evidence on whether the 
concentrated ownership firms are penalised after the revelation of accounting 
misstatements is even more scarce. This study will provide empirical evidence using a 
sample of Thai firms to fill the gap left by these limitations. Accordingly, the main 
research objectives and research questions are as follows. 
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The objectives of the research are: 
1. To document the occurrence of accounting misstatements in Thailand; 
2. To discover the causes of accounting misstatements in Thailand; and, 
3. To assess the economic consequences imposed on misstating firms in Thailand 
after the revelation of accounting misstatements. 
 
The detailed research questions that constitute the specific interests in the causes and 
consequences of accounting misstatements are:   
1. What are the determinants of accounting misstatements in Thailand?2 
1.1 To what extent is the ownership structure associated with accounting 
misstatements? 
1.2 What are the incentives of the dominant shareholders? 
1.3 To what extent is corporate governance associated with accounting 
misstatements? 
2. What are the economic consequences imposed on misstating firms after the 
announcement of accounting misstatements? 
2.1 Have these firms become more financially constrained? 
2.2 To what extent does the announcement of accounting misstatements 
affect subsequent external financing activity? 
 
By addressing these questions, the research results will contribute to the literature on a 
variety of issues that have been suggested by prior studies as requiring research 
attention, including the incentives of financial statements preparers in East Asian 
countries (Ball et al. 2003), the relationship between corporate governance and earnings 
manipulation in Asia context (Brown et al. 2011), an effect of earnings quality on the 
decision of capital providers (Armstrong et al. 2010), and an explanation why some 
firms violate GAAP and some do not (Wahlen 2004).  
                                                 
2
This research ultimately aims to contribute an insight into the causes of accounting misstatements. 
However, since the data analysis (including in previous studies) has been conducted through logistic 
regression models, the term ‘determinants’ is more appropriately used than the ‘causes’. Accordingly, in 
this thesis the term ‘causes’ is used when the research refers to an understanding why some firms 
experience accounting misstatements but some do not and when it makes an argument on an implication 
of the research findings. The term ‘determinants’ is used when referring to empirical evidence of the 
causes of accounting misstatements.  
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1.3 Scope of the Study 
The scope of this study is accounting misstatements occurring in listed companies in 
Thailand. The focus on Thailand (where corporate ownership is mostly concentrated) is 
a proxy to mirror the opportunistic financial reporting of controlling shareholders that 
costs minority shareholders and lenders. A focus on listed companies can cover those 
who offer public funding (e.g. share investment and public debt) and private funding 
(e.g. bank loans and loans from directors and subsidiaries). In addition, the firms’ 
willingness to invest in corporate governance mechanisms is naturally seen more in 
public firms than in private firms. The research period ranges from 2001 to 2009. The 
year 2001 is the earliest year when the data on corporate ownership is available. The 
sample and data are gathered from public sources and commercial databases. The 
sources of sample collection comprise announcements of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Thailand about fraud and material accounting misstatements of listed 
firms and corporate restated financial reports. The final sample comprises 51 
misstatement firm-years, compared with 2,452 non-misstatement firm-years.
3
 The 
number of observations, however, reduces in the data analysis because of the constraints 
of the model (more details are provided on this issue in Chapters 6 and 7). Regression 
models are the primary techniques used to uncover the causes and economic 
consequences of accounting misstatements in Thailand.  
 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters. This current chapter introduces the study 
and provides a guide to the rest of the thesis. Figure 1.1 shows the schematic diagram of 
the thesis. 
                                                 
3
Since the misstatement cases are only revealed if discovered and/or corrected by restatements, 
unidentified misstatements are likely extant. It is necessary to assume that financial reports of the control 
group do not contain misstated accounting items. 
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the Thesis 
 Literature Review 
                                                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The upper part of Figure 1.1 contains the arrangement of three chapters of the literature 
review, while the lower part (i.e. the grey area) sets out the chapters for research 
methodology and research results.  
 
Chapter 2 clarifies the terms involving accounting manipulation (e.g. earnings 
management, fraud, and accounting errors). The chapter then reviews the literature on 
the relevant theories and types of agency conflicts. After that, empirical evidence on the 
causes of accounting misstatements is presented. Chapter 2 ends with a summary of the 
main factors of accounting misstatements contributed by prior research. 
 
Chapter 3 outlines consequences of accounting misstatements that occurred to 
misstating firms after the accounting misstatements are detected and revealed. The 
chapter also highlights the linkages between the causes and the consequences of 
Hypothesis Development and Research Methodology 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
The Case of 
Thailand 
Chapter 4 
 
Consequences 
Chapter 3 
 
Causes 
Chapter 2 
 
Accounting 
Misstatements 
Data Analysis of the Causes 
Chapter 6 
Data Analysis of the Consequences 
Chapter 7 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Chapter 8 
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accounting misstatements. In addition, some methodological issues in prior research and 
the timeline of accounting misstatements are addressed in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the institutional background of Thailand and the financial reporting 
quality of Thai firms, which are the sample of firms in concentrated ownership systems. 
The financial reporting quality of Thai firms has been criticised since the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997. Although many governance mechanisms have since been 
introduced and form the basis of regulatory action towards Thai firms, because the 
ownership structure has not changed (ownership is concentrated and usually held by a 
single family), it is still questionable whether the financial reporting quality is 
improved. This research, consequently, focuses on the low quality of financial reports 
(i.e. GAAP violation) and will determine its determinants and economic consequences. 
As well as being of academic import, the findings on the antecedents of misstatements 
are beneficial to capital providers and to regulators in Thailand. The discoveries relating 
to the economic consequences might help us to understand how accounting quality 
affects the decision of capital providers in Thailand. These insights are discussed at the 
end of Chapter 4.   
 
Chapter 5 specifies the empirical predictions and the research methodology. The 
research hypotheses are developed according to the literature and empirical prior results. 
The approaches for the hypothesis testing and the sample and data collection are 
presented in Chapter 5, while procedures for the ownership data collection and the 
companies included in the sample are detailed in Appendices A and B. Measures of 
interest for the hypotheses are later described in Chapters 6 and 7.  
  
The structure of Chapters 6 and 7 are similar. Both chapters start with the measures of 
the variables for data analysis, they then describe the results of the data analysis. 
Chapter 6 presents the findings on the determinants of accounting misstatements, while 
Chapter 7 contains the results for the economic consequences. Regression models are 
employed in the analysis, and post-estimation tests for the regression assumptions are 
attached in Appendices C and D. 
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Chapter 8 provides a discussion and conclusion of this thesis. An acknowledgement of 
the research limitations and suggested areas for future research are also included in 
Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON THE CAUSES OF ACCOUNTING 
MISSTATEMENTS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This research aims to shed light on the causes and economic consequences of 
accounting misstatements in concentrated ownership systems, using Thailand as the 
case country. In investigating the causes of accounting misstatements, the thesis aims to 
understand why they occur and what role the incentives of the controlling shareholders 
to mislead financial statements users are. A set of potential determinants of accounting 
misstatements will be examined. The research will then go on to assess the responses of 
capital providers after misstatements have occurred. In this chapter, the theoretical 
background and empirical evidence of the causes of accounting misstatements are 
discussed. The literature on the consequences of accounting misstatements will be 
reviewed in Chapter 3 and the financial and institutional background of Thailand is then 
described in Chapter 4. 
 
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section Two provides a definition of accounting 
misstatements in order to provide an appropriate background to the thesis. Section 
Three discusses the theories aiming to explain the occurrence of accounting 
misstatements. Section Four summarises the evidence of causes of accounting 
misstatements found in prior studies. The final section concludes the chapter.  
 
 
2.2 Definition of Accounting Misstatements  
Existing research has examined many aspects of accounts manipulation, but few of 
these papers provide a comprehensive description of the phenomenon (Stolowy and 
Breton 2004). There are many attributes of financial reporting quality (Dechow et al. 
2010). In the case of low accounting quality, earnings management (e.g. in Dechow and 
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Skinner 2000; Healy and Wahlen 1999), accounting misstatements (e.g. in Dechow et 
al. 2011), accounting errors (e.g. in DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991), and financial 
statement fraud (e.g. in Beasley 1996) have been explored in previous studies. 
However, not many studies carefully define the terms they use. Therefore, it is 
important to discuss them all at this stage and then to define precisely which attribute of 
financial reporting quality this thesis focuses on.  
 
Stolowy and Breton (2004) provide a diagram (Figure 2.1) showing the differences 
between fair presentation and accounts manipulation. 
 
Figure 2.1: Diagram of Accounts Manipulation and Fair Presentation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from: Stolowy and Breton (2004, p. 11) (The terms ‘understatement’ and 
‘overstatement’ are added and the earnings line is changed to a two-way direction). 
 
Compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) is a criterion for 
differentiating types of accounts manipulation. Financial statements should be fairly 
presented and comply with GAAP. According to the recent IASB Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting (IASB 2010b), a fair presentation shows a true and 
fair view of financial position, performance, and changes in the financial position of an 
entity. The financial position involves an expectation that future economic benefits will 
flow to or from an entity, while the performance is a net measure of the increases and 
decreases in economic benefits during an accounting period. In line with the objectives 
of financial statements, a fair presentation should provide useful information for users in 
economic decision-making and should also reveal the results of management 
stewardship.  
Fair 
Presentation 
Manipulation Manipulation Fraud 
Level of Earnings 
Fraud 
Overstatement 
Manipulated > Fair 
 
Understatement 
Manipulated < Fair 
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In respect of earnings, which is one of the main outputs of the financial reporting 
system, manipulation occurs when managers alter financial reports to either mislead 
stakeholders about underlying economic performance or influence contractual outcomes 
that depend on the reported earnings number (Healy and Wahlen 1999). When the 
earnings number does not represent the capacity of a firm to generate earnings, then this 
number falls outside the fair presentation zone (Stolowy and Breton 2004). Earnings can 
be either overstated or understated, so the misrepresentation goes in both directions. 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) further suggest that financial reports engage many laws, 
acts, and accounting standards, some misrepresentation might be in violation of a 
regulation and that fraud occurs. Dechow and Skinner (2000), and Stolowy and Breton 
(2004) both suggest to use a criterion of GAAP to differentiate manipulation from 
fraud. Therefore, the misrepresentation occurring within GAAP is regarded as earnings 
manipulation, while the misrepresentation in violation of GAAP is regarded as fraud. 
They are presented in Figure 2.1. 
 
Earnings manipulation (within GAAP) can be performed through real manipulation 
(e.g. by delaying an investment project or research and development expenditures) and 
accounting manipulation (e.g. change in accounting principles or adjust the estimate of 
bad debt expenses) (Jiambalvo 1996). In light of accounts manipulation, the use of 
accounting discretion is one area of interest in prior research, particularly in the 
measurement of discretionary accruals. Based on the usual accruals basis of preparing 
accounts, accruals are normal. In the case of earnings manipulation, managers may 
opportunistically use a certain set of accounting policies to conceal the real economic 
performance, including recording an unusual level of accruals (Fields et al. 2001). 
Researchers typically assess the unusual level of accruals by assuming that total 
accruals are composed of expected accruals, which are normally occurred in operations, 
and unexpected accruals or discretionary accruals, which occur from an intention to 
misstate earnings. Accordingly, the measurement of discretionary accruals is considered 
to be a measure of earnings management (within GAAP).
4
  
                                                 
4
A statistical approach is normally used, where observations of total accruals from prior years are used to 
estimate what is believed to represent the normal accruals in operation. These estimates are used to 
estimate expected accruals for the current period, with the difference between total accruals and expected 
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A firm’s objectives to use accounting practices to manage earnings (within GAAP) 
include income smoothing and big bath accounting. Income smoothing has a clear 
objective to produce a steadily growing stream of profits (Stolowy and Breton 2004). 
Since a consistent pattern of growing earnings commands a higher price-to-earnings 
ratio (Barth et al. 1999), there is a strong incentive for earnings management to be used 
in order to avoid reporting an earnings decrease (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). Big 
bath accounting (Moore 1973) is an income-decreasing decision (typically associated 
with large losses) made after a change in management. New management gains at least 
two benefits from such accounting treatments: firstly, the reported low earnings are 
blamed on old management; and secondly, future income will be free of these charges 
and an improving earnings trend is more easily achieved, leaving the new management 
with increased potential for increasing future bonuses.  
 
An income-decreasing approach is also employed and potentially useful for firms with a 
debt restructuring plan (Saleh and Ahmed 2005) and firms who have a dividend 
reduction policy (DeAngelo et al. 1994). On the other hand, an income-increasing 
approach is beneficial to firms who want to avoid defaults (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986). Accordingly, what the managers have done to benefit or harm shareholders is 
still unclear (Guay 2008). Earnings management will certainly be harmful if managers 
use accounting discretion to inflate their bonuses or facilitate stock sales at an inflated 
price. In contrast, if the accounting discretion is used to avoid debt covenant violation, 
succeed a debt negotiation plan, or meet a certain forecasting benchmark then all of 
these samples can be beneficial to firms and shareholders (although they may 
sometimes cost creditors and other parties). Supporting this view, Bowen et al. (2008) 
found a positive relationship between accounting discretion (within GAAP) and firm 
performance, as measured by stock returns and ROA. Based on Bowen et al. (2008)’s  
findings the managers did not employ accounting discretion at the expense of the 
shareholders, but it can cost the creditors. Accordingly, earnings manipulation occurs 
                                                                                                                                               
accruals being treated as discretionary accruals. The amount of discretionary accruals, thus, can be either 
negative (expected<actual) or positive (expected>actual) balance. There are many models used to assess 
discretionary accruals. The definitions of total accruals and the independent variables used in creating a 
prediction regression model also vary depending on the researchers’ judgement, such as a pioneering 
model by Healy (1985), a popular Jones’ (1991) model, the modified Jones’ model by Dechow et al. 
(1995), Dechow and Dichev (2002), and McNichols (2002).  
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due to certain purpose(s), but to justify whether it is a good or bad practice depends on 
whom the managers “work for” and whose conflict of interests are in focus. This 
research is interested in the principal-principal conflict. An assumption is that there is 
information asymmetry between insiders (i.e. controlling shareholders) and outsiders 
(i.e. minority shareholders and creditors). Financial reports are one source of 
information that the outsiders can use to determine the economic status of a firm. 
However, it is not simply the earnings number that outsiders are interested in; they also 
take account of other accounting items such as asset and liability accounts. Therefore, 
the quality of the financial reports as a whole is the interest of this research, particularly 
when the financial reports are not in compliance with the GAAP.  
 
The presentation of accounting items that is in violation of GAAP is called an 
accounting misstatement in this research. Except for the true and fair overrides (e.g. in 
Livne and McNichols 2009), GAAP violation can show an agency conflict problem 
(Dechow et al. 2010). The term ‘accounting misstatement’ has been used for a non-
GAAP report in a number of recent studies. The samples in these studies are typically 
firms subject to enforcement actions by independent enforcement agencies, such as the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (e.g. Dechow et al. 2011) and firms that 
later restated their financial reports (e.g. Chen et al. 2006; Firth et al. 2011) . Some of 
the misstatements later become fraud cases when the misstatements are proved 
intentional, while some are errors because they are unintentional. Accordingly, this 
thesis assumes that the term ‘accounting misstatements’ comprises both errors and 
frauds. This view is consistent with paragraph 4 in ISA 240 (IAASB 2006),
5
 which 
accepts that misstatements in financial statements can arise from fraud or error.  
 
Accounting errors are unintentional acts that violate GAAP. They might occur either 
due to the misapplication of GAAP, or an ineffectiveness of financial reporting control, 
and specific standards are in place to deal with them (e.g. IAS 8 (IASB 2010a)) since 
their occurrence is inevitable. There are a number of studies which have examined 
                                                 
5
Thailand adopts the International Standards of Auditing of IAASB, including the ISA 240. The 
accountability of auditors in Thailand for material misstatements is similar to that of the auditors in other 
countries using the ISA. 
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‘accounting errors’ (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991), but the term ‘accounting 
restatements’ might be more familiar. ‘Accounting restatements’ is more often used in 
the literature because the sample is gathered from accounting restatement cases. Both 
terms are used interchangeably, except when accounting restatements later become 
fraud cases. Therefore, the readers of the accounting restatement literature need to be 
aware that the cases may comprise both fraud and accounting errors (e.g. Ettredge et al. 
2010). 
 
In professional context, Dechow and Skinner (2000) regard earnings manipulation that 
is illegal as fraud. In the ISA 240 paragraph 6 (IAASB 2006) “[f]raud refers to an 
intentional act by one or more individuals among management, those charged with 
governance, employees, or third parties, involving the use of deception to obtain an 
unjust or illegal advantage”. Because of the presence of intent, fraud is also classified as 
an intentional misstatement in ISA 240. Fraud was previously referred to as an 
accounting irregularity in SAS No.82 (AICPA 1997). The terms accounting irregularity, 
intentional misstatement and fraud may be used interchangeably (Mulford and 
Comiskey 2002). Since intention is not in itself observable, in academic research the 
term fraud is often reserved for cases where a firm is subject to legal action (e.g. 
Beasley 1996; Lee et al. 1999). 
 
From the distinctions among the terms above, the thesis makes an adjustment to the 
diagram of Stolowy and Breton (2004) (Figure 2.1) and create a new diagram in Figure 
2.2. 
 
The middle zone of Figure 2.2 represents fair presentation; i.e., financial reports present 
real economic performance. Because of their incentives, some managers manipulate 
earnings to mislead financial statement users. The earnings then do not fairly present the 
real economic performance of firms and can be either overstated or understated, 
depending on the managers’ incentives. The earnings manipulation is still within 
GAAP. An accounting error is an unintentional financial reporting mistake that is in 
violation of the GAAP, while fraud refers to an allegation that the error is intentionally 
acted. However, the intention is difficult to prove. A violation of related law is 
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sometimes used to differentiate fraud from accounting errors. An empirical study into 
the U.S. firms by Hennes et al. (2008), for example, indicates that an average amount of 
restatements is significantly greater for fraud cases than for error cases: 11.9% versus 
4% of total assets in the year prior to the restatement announcement.  
 
Figure 2.2: Accounting Misstatements, Earnings Management and Fair Presentation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from: Stolowy and Breton (2004). (The specific terms under the earnings line 
are added). 
 
This research focuses on accounting misstatements and disregards the distinction of 
fraud and error; this is similar to prior studies in the area (e.g. Beneish 1997; Dechow et 
al. 1996). In particular, the sample comprises firms whose financial reports are in 
violation of Thailand Securities and Exchange Act section 312 (SECT 1992), firms that 
have restated their financial reports due to prior period errors, and a control group. Like 
Dechow et al. (2011) this research does not take the directions of misstatements (i.e. 
overstatement and understatement) into account.
6
 The study into the determinants of 
accounting misstatements will help us understand the causes of accounting 
misstatements and that it benefits regulators and financial statements users.  
 
                                                 
6
This research realises the potential loss of power in the analysis that might exist when the sample 
combines both mandatory and voluntary restatements (the cases subject to the SECT’s enforcement 
actions and the restated financial reports, respectively) and when the sample aggregates both fraud and 
error cases; however, because of the small sample size in both aspects of the sample, an additional 
analysis cannot be performed and this issue opens for analysis by future research. This constraint is 
acknowledged again in Chapter 8, Section 8.4. 
 
Fair 
presentation 
Earnings 
Management 
Error Error Fraud 
Accounting Misstatements Accounting Misstatements 
GAAP GAAP Intention/Law Intention/Law 
Level of earnings 
Fraud Earnings 
Management 
Real Economic 
Performance and 
Financial 
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Overstatement Understatement 
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2.3 Theoretical Perspective  
This section describes theory justification and agency theory, which the researcher 
decided to use as the theoretical background for the phenomenon of accounting 
misstatements.  
 
2.3.1 Theory Justification 
Although a comprehensive theory of GAAP violation is absent (Beneish 1997; Wahlen 
2004), agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), which addresses opportunistic 
behaviour of the parties in the contracting process, has been frequently used to explain 
the opportunistic financial reporting. This research agrees to continue using agency 
theory and its details will be described in the next subsection. This subsection aims to 
describe a few of the other theories that have been used in prior studies of financial 
reporting. It will also give the reasons why they are not chosen for use in this current 
research. 
 
In addition to agency theory, other theories that have been used in the study of financial 
reporting include institutional theory, operational legitimacy and signalling theory. 
Institutional theory (Scott 2004) offers a generic framework to analyse corporate 
practices. It posits that organisations adopt or adapt to institutional norms and rules to 
gain stability and enhance their survival aspects. Institutional theory is deemed to point 
out what makes organisations so similar in a country and different among countries, as 
seen in a cross-country study by Rahman et al. (2010), whose research is interested in 
explaining what makes firms in different countries behave differently in terms of 
financial reporting. Institutional theory does not seem to fit this research, where the 
samples are in one country and an objective of the research is to explore why firms 
release varied quality of financial reports (i.e. some financial reports contain accounting 
misstatements, while some do not).  
 
The theory of operational legitimacy offers ‘an assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions’ (Suchman 1995, p. 574). Accordingly, a manager’s 
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decisions are constructed by the same belief systems. Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) find 
that accounting restatements pose a serious threat to organisational legitimacy and, 
therefore, restating firms dismiss their executives after restatement announcements in 
order to recover their reputation and maintain their survival. The concept of legitimacy 
can be used to explain a restating firm’s action after the restatement announcement (e.g. 
executive replacement in Arthaud-Day et al. (2006)) so that the firm can reduce the 
negative effects imposed by a social audience. However, since this research project is 
interested in assessing reactions from outsiders (i.e. the social audience), particularly in 
terms of economic consequences rather than a change in restating firms themselves, the 
analysis is in a reverse direction. Legitimacy proposes that a firm changes itself to be 
consistent with social forces; consequently, it does not exactly match the aims of this 
project. On the other hand, an economic perspective of agency theory is a better fit 
because it addresses a conflict of interests and it can lead to an explanation for capital 
providers’ reactions after the conflict of interests happen. 
 
Signalling theory (Spence 1973, 2002), as emphasised by Connelly et al. (2011), is 
fundamentally concerned with reducing information asymmetry between two parties 
(i.e. controlling shareholders and outside investors), such as attributes of CEOs signal 
unobservable quality of their firms to potential investors via the observable quality of 
financial statements (Zhang and Wiersema 2009). The concept of signalling is that high-
quality firms are motivated to signal and low quality firms are not. The signaller should 
benefit by some actions from the receiver that the receiver would not otherwise have 
done (Connelly et al. 2011). As far as financial reporting is concerned, firms prepare 
and publish financial reports in order to reduce information asymmetry between the 
firms and investors. For instance, some firms pay a higher audit fee and voluntarily 
disclose more information than others so that they can distinguish themselves from 
others (Ball et al. 2012). Signalling theory is deemed to fit financial reporting in a 
situation that a firm gets a benefit from high-level disclosures. In contrast, this thesis 
focuses on the financial reports that have low quality (either subject to the regulators’ 
enforcement actions or later restated). The preparation of this low quality financial 
reports is an unpleasant situation for investors and they react negatively after the 
misstatements are revealed (e.g. Palmrose et al. 2004) while the high-level disclosures 
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are a pleasant policy for outside investors. Therefore, the release of misstated financial 
reports does not signal a good message to investors and as such signalling theory does 
not fit this research very well. 
 
After considering the concept of these theories, this research project has decided to 
employ agency theory as a theoretical background to explain the phenomenon of 
accounting misstatements. The next subsection reviews agency problems and their 
relation to financial reporting. 
 
2.3.2 Agency Problems 
An agency conflict emerges when corporate ownership and control are separated (Fama 
1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976). According to Berle and 
Means (1932) ownership of corporations is dispersed across a large number of public 
shareholders. The shareholders (the principals) delegate powers to a manager (the agent) 
to operate day-to-day activities. Since there is no dominant shareholder, the manager 
has control over the business operations. Such power of control may enable the manager 
to extract private benefits at the expense of the shareholders. This conflict is referred to 
as the shareholder-agent conflict, or the principal-agent conflict (e.g. Young et al. 
2008). The shareholders thus initiate some monitoring activities (e.g. a board of 
directors and some independent directors on the board) to control the managers’ 
operations so that their benefits are protected (Jensen and Meckling 1976). An earnings-
based compensation plan is also initiated to align the interests of the shareholders and 
the manager. 
 
In contrast to the standard agency view of Berle and Means (1932), there are many 
firms where the large shareholders direct the business themselves, such as firms in Asia 
(Claessens et al. 2000; Claessens and Fan 2002), or some having a two-tier relationship 
of the ownership and control involving investors, investment managers and company 
managers (Bricker and Chandar 2000). When the shareholders are also the managers, 
then the shareholder-agent conflict is less likely to occur (Young et al. 2008). A shorter 
distance of ownership and control leads to a reduction in monitoring costs and 
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compensation plans are deemed to be less necessary (Coffee 2006; Jensen and Meckling 
1976). An additional disbursement for extra monitoring costs will occur in the aspect of 
a cost-benefit trade-off (Doidge et al. 2007). For instance, firms are more likely to hire 
Big 4 auditors and pay a higher audit fee when they are raising funds from capital 
markets since these audit firms are often perceived as providing higher quality audit 
work (Fan and Wong 2005). Only large firms implement voluntary corporate 
governance practices (Ananchotikul et al. 2010; Kouwenberg 2010). As a result, 
corporate governance of the firms with large shareholders is potentially suspected: 
whether their corporate governance is effective enough to protect the interests of capital 
providers and to monitor corporate financial reporting is unclear. The weak corporate 
governance mechanisms in concentrated ownership firms can increase the incentive of 
controlling shareholders to exploit private benefits of control (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997), particularly when there is a divergence between cash-flow and voting rights 
(Morck et al. 2005). Therefore, in firms with dominant shareholders, the agency 
problem shifts from the shareholder-agent conflict to a conflict between controlling 
shareholders and outside investors (e.g. minority shareholders and creditors) (Bebchuk 
and Hamdani 2009; Claessens et al. 2000; Young et al. 2008). This type of conflict is 
sometimes called the principal-principal conflict (e.g. in Young et al. 2008), or Type II 
agency problem (Claessens et al. 2000; Setia-Atmaja et al. 2011).  
 
Collectively, there are two main types of agency conflicts, depending on the ownership 
structure. Young et al. (2008) provides a comparative view of the two primary types of 
agency conflicts in the following diagram (Figure 2.3).  
 
In Figure 2.3, it can be seen that the principal-agent conflict is more likely to exist in 
dispersed ownership firms. The managers are professionals from labour markets and 
they do not bear the residual claims that result from their decisions. On the other hand, 
in concentrated ownership systems, managers are affiliated with controlling 
shareholders. They both may cooperate to extract private benefits, which are the 
expenses of outside investors. 
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Figure 2.3: Principal-Principal Conflict versus Principal-Agent Conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Young et al. (2008, p. 200). 
 
In addition to agency conflicts, there are some other attributes that occur differently in 
the two ownership systems, which are presented in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1: Comparative Views of the Ownership Systems 
Dispersed Ownership System Concentrated Ownership System 
Institutional settings: 
- Wide public share ownership 
- Strong securities markets 
- Rigorous disclosure standards 
- High share turnover, and high market 
transparency 
Institutional settings: 
- Controlling shareholders 
- Weaker securities markets 
- High private benefits of control 
- Lower disclosure and market 
transparency standards 
- A possibly role played by large banks 
and non-controlling shareholders 
Financial system: 
- Equity-based system 
- Arm’s-length system 
Financial system: 
- Debt-based system 
- Relational-based transaction 
Expropriation: 
- Aggressive accounting to maximise 
compensation benefits 
Expropriation: 
- Private benefits of control, usually by 
financial transactions 
Controlling 
shareholders 
Professional 
managers 
(Agents) 
Managers affiliated 
with controlling 
shareholders 
(Principals)  
Principal-Agent Conflicts 
Principal-Principal Conflicts 
Widely-dispersed 
shareholders 
(principals) 
Widely-dispersed 
shareholders 
(principals) 
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Dispersed Ownership System Concentrated Ownership System 
- High interest in the day-to-day stock 
prices 
- High propensity to be scrutinised by 
professional services 
- High propensity of restatements  
- Harsh penalty from capital markets  
 
- Less interest in the day-to-day stock 
prices 
- Low propensity to be scrutinised by 
professional services 
- Restatements are rarely occurred 
- Not severe penalty from capital markets 
due to weak capacity of the markets 
Corporate governance: 
- Management dominated 
- Shareholder focused 
- Strong shareholder rights 
- Shareholder litigation culture 
Corporate governance: 
- Controlling shareholder dominated 
- Stakeholder focused 
- Less strong shareholder rights 
- Less strong litigation culture 
Sources: Coffee (2006), Rahman et al. (2010), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Salacuse 
(2006). 
 
By linking the two types of agency conflicts in Figure 2.3 to the two ownership systems 
in Table 2.1, the distinctions of two systems can be described as follows. 
 
An aggregated view for the effect of country institutions on financial systems and 
corporate ownership is in the first two rows of Table 2.1. Pioneering cross-country 
research provides an explanation of why firms are owned and financed differently. 
Country institutional background characteristics, such as legal systems and legal 
protection for minority shareholders, lead to a variety of different types of capital 
market growth (La Porta et al. 1997), and eventually result in a number of different 
corporate capital structures and forms of ownership concentration (La Porta et al. 1998). 
On average, capital markets in common-law countries are larger than capital markets in 
civil-law countries. However, the capital markets in some common law countries, such 
as emerging markets in East Asia, are not as well advanced as the markets in the U.S. or 
the U.K. because they have a low quality of legal enforcement. The weaker legal 
protection for equity investors impedes the growth of capital markets, and firms in such 
an environment are inclined to use debt financing choice more frequently than an equity 
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alternative (La Porta et al. 1998). Consequently, the corporate ownership in Asian 
capital markets is relatively more concentrated (La Porta et al. 1999; La Porta et al. 
1997, 1998). In addition, corporate founders still control a majority of the shares even 
though the company is listed on stock exchanges, and the founders remain dominant 
shareholders (Claessens et al. 2000).   
 
Consequently, there are certain differences between the two main categories of the 
ownership. The dispersed ownership system comprises characteristics of strong security 
markets, rigorous disclosure standards, high share turnover and high market 
transparency. The enhancement of capital markets attracts firms to raise their funds 
from stock markets. External financing activities of the firms in this system are thus 
equity-oriented (Rajan and Zingales 1998) and corporate ownership appears to be 
widely-held. In contrast, the concentrated ownership system consists of controlling 
shareholders, weaker security markets, a higher possibility of private benefits of control, 
and lower disclosure and market transparency standards. The weaker institutional 
settings force the concentrated ownership firms to employ debt finance more frequently 
than equity (Rajan and Zingales 1998).  
 
In addition to the difference in the financial systems between the two systems, the 
characteristics of expropriation risks are also dissimilar. As shown in the third row of 
Table 2.1, Coffee (2006) posits that in dispersed ownership firms, managers are key 
actors and they are the origin of the shareholder-agent conflict, while in concentrated 
ownership firms controlling shareholders are the originator of the conflict between 
themselves and outside investors. In comparison, Coffee (2006) argues that corporate 
managers are more engaged in earnings manipulation, while controlling shareholders 
are inclined to exploit the private benefits of control. The managers’ opportunism 
encompasses an incentive to maximise their earnings-based compensation, or to 
maintain the corporate share prices. The controlling shareholders’ expropriation usually 
occurs through financial transactions (e.g. transferring resources to their privately-
owned companies) and, therefore, the ownership arrangement of pyramids and cross-
holdings can be an important channel for the resource transfer in concentrated-
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ownership firms (e.g. Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009; Brown et al. 2011; Morck et al. 
2005). Transactions with related parties should be subject to the attention of monitors.  
 
With regard to the role of monitors, Salacuse (2006) points out some differences in 
corporate governance between the two ownership systems (the fourth row of Table 2.1). 
Widely held firms are relatively more scrutinised by professional services: monitors in 
the contracting process (e.g. auditors and regulators) and capital market participants 
(e.g. securities analysts and credit rating agencies). In contrast, because of the lower 
number of the financial transactions with capital markets and the under-development of 
the capital markets, concentrated ownership firms are less disciplined by market 
participants. The low quality of legal enforcement actions in the concentrated ownership 
system weakens the litigation culture and shareholders’ rights are less protected. The 
monitoring process in this system is often found to be dominated by controlling 
shareholders. 
 
Since the corporate governance in the concentrated ownership system is relatively 
weaker than that of the dispersed ownership system, a question is raised: what is the 
quality of financial reporting in the concentrated ownership system? The next 
subsection will review the literature on the linkage between the country institutions, 
corporate governance, and financial reporting quality.  
 
2.3.3 Ownership, Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Quality 
Cohen et al. (2004) provide a framework (Figure 2.4) for gathering relevant 
determinants of financial reporting quality. 
 
The Figure 2.4 shows the interrelationships between the various factors and their effects 
on financial reporting quality. The upper level contains the country’s institutions and 
corporate ownership structure. The second level encompasses corporate governance 
mechanisms. All these factors affect financial reporting quality. The study into the 
determinants of financial reporting quality can be divided into two types of research. 
The first category is cross-country research, such as relationships between country 
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institutions and earnings quality (e.g. Boonlert-U-Thai et al. 2006; Leuz et al. 2003). 
The second type is firm-level research. The influences of managers’ incentives and 
corporate governance are emphasised in this second type (e.g. Anderson et al. 2004; 
Dechow et al. 1996; Wang 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cohen et al. (2004, p. 89).  
 
As far as accounting allegations are concerned, Coffee (2006) argues that widely held 
firms will restate their financial reports promptly after a misstatement is found because 
they are more scrutinised and the expected costs imposed by the capital markets are 
high. The incidence for accounting restatements thus tends to be more frequent in 
diffused ownership systems than in concentrated ownership systems. Possible reasons 
include that the possibility to detect accounting allegations can be lower for 
concentrated ownership systems because the governance mechanisms are less effective. 
In addition, the legal protection and enforcement is low in this environment, so a firm 
may not be enthusiastic to correct the accounting allegation themselves. Therefore, the 
proportion of accounting restatements is likely to be lower. However, Coffee’s 
Figure 2.4: Corporate Governance Mosaic and Financial Reporting Quality 
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argument on the restatements in the concentrated ownership systems has not yet been 
proved. The majority of the previous studies have based their samples on dispersed 
ownership systems, such as in the U.S. (e.g. Burns and Kedia 2006; Dechow et al. 2011; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991) and the U.K. (e.g. Peasnell et al. 2001), and they have 
found an increase in the cases of accounting misstatements, particularly in the U.S. 
(Coffee 2006; Efendi et al. 2007). Meanwhile, the occurrence of accounting 
restatements in concentrated ownership systems has rarely been documented.  
 
To summarise, Section 2.3 illustrates the importance of corporate ownership, which can 
vary, types of agency conflicts (i.e. principal-agent conflict and principal-principal 
conflict), financial systems (i.e. debt- or equity-oriented), and corporate governance 
policies (i.e. management dominated or controlling shareholder dominated). To address 
the limitations of the literature, the occurrence of accounting misstatements in the 
environment of principal-principal conflict is the focus of this research. As far as an 
accounting misstatement is concerned, incentives of owner-managers and the 
effectiveness of corporate governance are two potential factors in the occurrence of 
accounting misstatements. The next section will review the empirical findings of these 
two factors in prior studies.  
 
 
2.4 Empirical Evidence on the Causes of Accounting Misstatements 
As described in the previous section, theoretically the managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour can occur when monitoring processes are weak (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Empirical predictions for the antecedents of accounting 
misstatements thus concern the managers’ incentives and the weakness of corporate 
governance (Jiambalvo 1996). Consistent with the predictions, previous research has 
found the effect of managers’ incentives and weak corporate governance to be present 
in misstating firms. Details of the findings in prior studies are categorised into three 
sectors: the managers’ incentives, monitoring activities and the pressure from outside 
parties. 
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2.4.1 Incentives 
The managers’ incentives to manipulate financial reports include maximising their 
earnings-based compensations (e.g. Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007), to 
secure their employment (Watts and Zimmerman 1986), to avoid debt covenant 
violations (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) and to minimise costs of external financing 
(e.g. Dechow et al. 1996). When ownership and control are separated, compensation 
plans are implemented into the contracting process because of shareholders’ desire to 
align the interests of the managers with their own (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts 
and Zimmerman 1986). The compensation-relevant incentive is thus more likely to 
become significant when managers are professional (i.e. hired) managers and they do 
not have to bear the costs of what they have done. The incentive involving 
compensation plans has been found of significance in dispersed ownership firms where 
the shareholder-agent conflict is more likely to exist, such as the U.S. (e.g. Burns and 
Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007). In contrast, in concentrated ownership firms, the 
managers are often affiliated with the controlling shareholders (Claessens et al. 2000), a 
compensation plan is often unnecessary (Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009; Peng and Jiang 
2010; Pornupatham 2006). Likewise, because of the affiliation, the managers are 
unlikely to be concerned about losing their job if the firm performance is poor. This 
thesis does not regard the incentives involving compensation and employment security 
as significant proxies for the antecedents of accounting misstatements in concentrated 
ownership systems and the case of Thailand. Rather, the debt hypothesis and the 
minimisation of the cost of capital are two potential incentives for financial 
misreporting in Thailand. A review on both proxies is presented as follows. 
 
a) Debt Covenant Hypothesis 
The capital structure of Thai firms is based heavily on debt (e.g. Alba et al. 2003; 
Rahman et al. 2010; Wiwattanakantang 1999). In addition, accounting conservatism 
reduces when a firm’s leverage ratio increases (Boonlert-U-Thai and Kuntisook 2009). 
Therefore, the debt-hypothesis is important when assessing the role of the incentives in 
GAAP violation in Thailand.  
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Debt covenants constrain a firm from not doing those things that jeopardise creditors’ 
returns. When debt covenants are tied to accounting numbers, then an accounting 
misstatement is more likely to occur when a firm is close to debt covenant violations. 
Managers select accounting choices (Watts and Zimmerman 1986), or they manage 
their operations and financial reporting (Nikolaev 2010) to avoid the violation. For 
example, a manager does not write off inventory because it reduces the earnings number 
and increases the debt-to-equity ratio, ceteris paribus. This instance results in the firm’s 
financial statements to not fairly present the real economic performance of the firm. 
Firms can also transfer earnings from future periods to the current period (Jiambalvo 
1996; Watts and Zimmerman 1986), and an income-increasing procedure is often used 
for this purpose (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Sweeney 1994). Managers can use 
accounting manipulation and the manipulation approaches include creating early 
recognition of revenues and/or delaying recognition of expenses (Dechow et al. 2011).  
 
Previous studies have used two measures to examine the debt hypothesis: the leverage 
ratio (an ex ante measure) and technical defaults (an ex post measure). 
 
Leverage Ratio 
The first measurement attempts to capture the existence and closeness of accounting-
based covenants. The more frequently used measure is the leverage ratio, in the form of 
either total debt to equity (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) or total debt to total assets 
(Dechow et al. 1996). The larger the ratio, the more likely a firm is to misstate its 
financial reports. The ratio of total debt to total assets is often used in the examination 
of accounting misstatements. This might be because subsequent studies follow the 
measure which was used in pioneering research (Dechow et al. 1996) or because it is 
generally a more stable ratio than debt/equity (as the denominator can be very small 
and/or negative). Some research (e.g. Lee et al. 1999) arrives at the same result as 
Dechow et al. (1996), while other studies do not (e.g. Beneish 1997; Beneish 1999a; 
Dechow et al. 2011).  
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Debt Defaults 
The measure of technical default can exactly indicate that creditors’ interests are 
expropriated by managers owing to accounting misstatements. Dechow et al. (1996) 
compared a proportion of technical default for their sample with a control group during 
the misstatement period, or up to two years after that. They found that the proportion of 
defaults is significantly higher for the misstatement sample than it is for the control 
firms. Dichev and Skinner (2002) argue that the leverage ratio does not represent the 
debt covenant violation and the ex post measure of technical default better indicates the 
expropriation on the creditors’ interests7; however, the issue of data availability limits 
the employment of this measure. Prior studies (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996) manually 
collect the default data from companies’ annual reports. Currently, in the U.S., there is a 
requirement for covenant violation disclosure (Roberts and Sufi 2009, p. 1661) and the 
data are also available in some commercial databases, such as DealScan (Dichev and 
Skinner 2002). Unfortunately, there is no such requirement in some countries, including 
Thailand. The likelihood that Thai firms voluntarily disclose the violation information 
in their annual reports is low because the disclosures of corporate governance in 
Thailand is low (Chuanrommanee and Swierczek 2007); the propensity for the data to 
be missing is therefore high. Hence, after considering costs and benefits of manual 
collection, this research leaves the examination of the effect of debt defaults on 
accounting misstatements to future research where the data are available. Nonetheless, 
the pioneering research by Dechow et al. (1996) did not find the significant relationship 
between the technical default and the likelihood of accounting misstatements. The 
default is only significant when there is an interaction with a low oversight of internal 
monitors in the multivariate model of the likelihood of accounting misstatements. 
 
b) Minimisation of the Cost of Capital  
While the debt hypothesis previously discussed involves pre-existing creditors, the 
financial motive of minimising the cost of capital is relevant to prospective capital 
providers.  
                                                 
7
Dichev and Skinner (2002) found a negative correlation between the leverage ratio and technical 
defaults, while prior empirical research assumes that they are positively correlated and the leverage ratio 
is used to measure for the closeness to debt covenant violation. 
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The pioneering research by Dechow et al. (1996) found evidence of the financing-cost-
minimisation incentive. They developed two proxies for firms’ financing need: one is an 
ex ante measure, a dummy variable indicating negative free cash flow, and the other is 
an ex post measure, a dummy variable of new stock issuance. When a firm has negative 
free cash flow, it is more likely to need financing. Private debt, public debt, and equity 
issuances are preferred orderly alternatives (Myers and Majluf 1984). An accounts 
manipulation might occur at this moment to minimise the cost of capital. These two 
measures were found to be statistically higher in misstating firms than in non-misstating 
firms (Dechow et al. 1996). Subsequent studies have continued using these variables. 
The ex post measure of stock issuance is a significant result in many studies (e.g. Efendi 
et al. 2007; Lee et al. 1999; Peasnell et al. 2001), whereas the ex ante negative free cash 
flow is significant, but in a smaller number of studies (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996; Skousen 
et al. 2008).   
 
The incentive to minimise the cost of capital by account manipulations costs both equity 
and debt holders. Since information asymmetry costs are inherent, capital providers 
charge for the risks. However, if financial reports are misstated, then equity holders may 
face incorrect asset pricing, while debt holders might be unable to be repaid. In 
comparison, lenders tend to have more opportunities to scrutinise firms’ financial 
reports than equity investors do. However, the scrutiny is useless if the financial reports 
are incorrectly presented and firms do not have effective corporate governance in 
monitoring the financial reporting process. For instance, during the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997, fifty-six financial institutions in Thailand were closed down within a 
year and had a dramatic loss on their non-performing loans. One reason for such a 
collapse was the poor quality of financial reporting (Alba et al. 2003; Montreevat 2007). 
Accordingly, creditors are still at risk, particularly when the institutional environment is 
weak. Debt financing is the most frequently used source of funding for Thai firms and 
Thai firms are unlikely to be disciplined by the capital markets (Alba et al. 2003). Also, 
personal relationships informally play a role in obtaining funding from banks 
(Charumilind et al. 2006). These factors can lead to a low incentive to provide high 
quality financial reporting. This argument is in line with the results of a recent study by 
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Rahman et al. (2010) who found an adverse effect of the debt-based financial system on 
financial reporting quality (measured by abnormal accruals). The current thesis will 
further shed light on how capital structure (i.e. leverage ratio and external financing 
need) relates to the appearance of accounting misstatements. 
 
This section has reviewed the financial motives (i.e. the closeness to debt covenant 
violation and the minimisation of cost of capital) which have a propensity to impact on 
the likelihood of accounting misstatements in Thai firms. The next section will present 
the monitoring mechanisms that can reduce the abilities of the managers to misstate the 
financial reports. It will also emphasise how these mechanisms behave in the presence 
of controlling shareholders.  
 
2.4.2 Monitoring Activities 
There are two groups of corporate governance mechanisms in the financial reporting 
process (Cohen et al. 2004): the financial reporting quality of a firm depends on 
country-level governance policies (e.g. legislators, enforcement actions by authorities) 
and firm-level governance policies (e.g. an audit committee, a boards of directors and an 
external auditor). As a firm-level research, this thesis particularly focuses on the firm-
level policies. The roles of monitors are suspected why they are unable to detect 
accounting misstatements before financial statements are released.  
 
a) Internal Monitors 
In the presence of an accounting misstatement, boards of directors and audit committees 
of misstating firms are suspected in two points: firstly, whether boards of directors and 
audit committees exist; and secondly, whether they are qualified and independent of the 
managers. The misreporting firms have significantly weaker governance mechanisms 
than the control firms, such as: boards of directors which are dominated by 
management, a chief executive officer who also serves as chairman of the board, a lack 
of an audit committee, and a lack of financial expertise (Agrawal and Chadha 2005; 
Dechow et al. 1996; Efendi et al. 2007; Skousen and Wright 2006). In contrast, there is 
no evidence of weak board structure in U.K. firms subject to adverse rulings in Peasnell 
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et al. (2001) (e.g. on average a proportion of outside audit committee members and a 
fraction of separating the roles of chief executive officers and chairmen of the board are 
higher for the misstating firms than the non-misstating firms). Beasley (1996) does not 
find a significant effect of an audit committee on the likelihood of fraud. Beasley’s 
investigation also shows that there were on average 1.8 meetings held by the audit 
committee of the firms he analysed, this same number was found in fraudulent and non-
fraudulent firms alike. These results indicate that the existence of a board of directors 
and an audit committee is not an important monitoring activity to control a firm’s 
financial reporting practice, but their competence and independence. 
 
A number of outside directors are included on the boards because the boards of directors 
and audit committees may perform ineffectively (Beasley 1996; Fama 1980; Fama and 
Jensen 1983). However, the presence of outside directors does not determine the 
quality, whereas the outside directors’ qualifications and working experiences may do. 
Neither the number of board meetings nor the inclusion of outside directors is 
associated with the likelihood of an accounting restatement or the lawsuit case of fraud 
(Larcker et al. 2007). Only the boards or audit committees that have an independent 
director with financial expertise can reduce the likelihood of accounting restatements 
(Agrawal and Chadha 2005). In China, the inclusion of outside directors increases the 
opportunity to detect fraud, but it does not impact the point when a firm decides 
whether it will commit fraud (Firth et al. 2011). These last two studies can suggest that 
the role of outside directors and independent members of audit committees is to detect 
ongoing fraud rather than to protect a company from fraud. If correct, then these 
findings help to clarify why the monitors’ competence is more important than their 
presence.  
 
Peasnell et al. (2001) suggest that the inconsistent results in the prior research might 
imply that there may be some complex issues behind the quality of governance 
mechanisms. Ownership structure can be argued to be one of these complex issues. As 
Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) suggest, companies’ ownership structure considerably 
affects the corporate governance arrangements. In dispersed ownership systems 
shareholders elect a board of director and the effectiveness of the board depends on 
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whether the directors are competent and independent from the managers (Armstrong et 
al. 2010). The shareholders’ selection tends to be important; specifically, shareholders 
elect directors whose interest is aligned with that of the shareholders and thereby the 
directors will be motivated to protect the shareholders’ interests. Meanwhile, in 
concentrated ownership systems, corporate governance is dominated by controlling 
shareholders (Salacuse 2006) and the controlling shareholders usually have boards 
follow their preferences (Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009; Cohen et al. 2002). 
Consequently, the independence of internal monitors (i.e. boards and audit committees) 
can be absent. The effectiveness and establishment of corporate governance policies in 
the latter system are thus likely to depend on the owner-managers’ incentives (i.e. 
whether they want to govern or be governed by the monitors). As a result, such matters 
as a majority of voting rights held by controlling shareholders become of importance. 
This research, therefore, proposes to include proxies of corporate ownership structure 
(i.e. ownership concentration, owner identity and an appearance of pyramids and cross-
holdings) into the analysis of the determinants of accounting misstatements. On the 
other hand, following the Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) and Larcker et al. (2007) 
guidance, the researcher considers independent directors and audit committees as 
potentially unimportant determinants of accounting misstatements in firms with a 
controlling shareholder and, therefore, they are excluded in the analysis (more details 
for weaknesses of independent director and audit committee arrangements in Thai firms 
are illustrated in Chapter 4).  
 
b) External Auditors 
The empirical evidence for the role of external auditors on the existence of accounting 
misstatements is inconclusive. Stakeholders expect the monitoring role of external 
auditors because they are not employees of firms. External auditors are contracted with 
shareholders to audit the accuracy of financial reports. Currently, external auditors are 
likely to have more responsibilities: they are required to identify not only material errors 
on financial reports but also risks of material misstatements due to fraud [SAS No.99 
(AICPA 2002) and ISA 240 (IAASB 2006)]. Even so, the question of why accounting 
misstatements remain where financial reports are audited by external auditors is 
important. Possible answers include: firstly, the misstatements are immaterial; or, 
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secondly, the auditors are not able to detect them; or, thirdly, the auditors find them, and 
provide qualified, disclaimer of, or adverse audit opinions.
8
   
 
The auditors’ materiality level is unobservable and it varies among firms. Therefore, it 
is difficult to test the point that the misstatements appeared because they were 
immaterial and the auditors did not correct them. As for the second potential answer, 
one exploratory study from Feroz et al. (1991) found that 45% of audits of the 
misreporting firms have audit deficiencies (such as improper professional conduct and 
the lack of quality control) and, therefore, low audit quality is an important factor of the 
likelihood of accounting misstatement. As for the third presumption, Skousen and 
Wright (2006) find that although some misstated financial statements are reported in the 
qualified audit report, qualified audit opinions are not significantly associated with the 
incidence of fraud. 
 
Another principal focus in the prior literature is the impact of being audited by one of 
the Big 4, or non-Big 4, audit firms on the likelihood of misstatements. Feroz et al. 
(1991) explored the GAAP violators and found that 46% of those were audited by Big 4 
audit firms while 31% were audited by local firms. Meanwhile, the proportion of Big 4 
audit firms is smaller in the population of misreporting companies in the U.K. (Peasnell 
et al. 2001). Thus, the use of a Big 4 auditor was found to have been a significant 
variable to reduce the likelihood of accounting misstatements in Peasnell et al. (2001). 
In contrast, some studies have shown that Big 4 auditors do not reduce the probability 
                                                 
8
The researcher is aware that there can be cases when auditors compromise their independence and agree 
not to disclose accounting misstatements. However, this scenario is hardly likely to be observed and, 
therefore, an assumption must be made that auditors maintain their practices according to the standards 
of auditing but a variation in audit quality happens because of, for example, in-house expertise and audit 
teams (see Francis 2011). The researcher is interested in types of audit firms. In Thailand, the 
respondents in Pornupatham (2006) address that non-Big 4 auditors are less resistant to management’s 
discretion, particularly when firms are highly concentrated. If this is the case, then the audit quality of 
Big 4 and non-Big 4 should be far more different in highly-concentrated firms. The researcher made an 
additional analysis into the roles of auditors in firms with high and low ownership concentration (25% is 
a cut-off point) and the main model which is described in Chapter 6, Section 6.3 was used. The 
regression results show that there is no significant relation between a use of Big 4 auditors and 
accounting misstatements in firms with low ownership concentration (the coefficient of -0.3648, p-value 
of 0.665), but a negative relationship between them significantly appears in the sample with high 
ownership concentration (the coefficient of -1.0367, p-value of 0.046). Accordingly, the results support 
the prior finding of Pornupatham (2006) on the lower resistance of non-Big 4 auditors in firms with high 
ownership concentration. On the other hand, the resistance of auditors in firms with low ownership 
concentration, does not differ for Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms. 
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of accounting misstatements (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996; Lee et al. 1999). One reason to 
explain why the use of a Big 4 auditor is not an important explanatory variable in the 
accounting misstatement model possibly involves the sample’s character. Almost all of 
the studies use listed firms as a sample. Due to the Big 4’s reputations, most listed 
companies are more likely to hire Big 4 auditors; for example, more than 99% of S&P 
500 companies (Wang 2006) and more than a half of listed companies in the U.K. 
(Abidin et al. 2010; Beattie et al. 2003) and in European and Asian countries (Choi and 
Zéghal 1999; Fan and Wong 2005; Narasimhan and Chung 1998) use Big 4 auditors. 
Therefore, there is a high possibility that the proportion of companies hiring Big 4 
auditors in the sample group does not statistically differ from that of the control group 
(such as in Dechow et al. 1996).  
 
It is widely accepted that Big 4 firms provide better audit quality than non-Big 4 firms 
(Becker et al. 1998; Teoh and Wong 1993). In particular, Big 4 auditors in the East 
Asian region play important roles in monitoring activities, especially when firms issue 
new stocks (Fan and Wong 2005). In Thailand Big 4 clients have been shown to have a 
lower amount of discretionary accruals (Pornupatham 2006) and 75% of the misstating 
firms in Thailand during 2003-2005 were audited by local firms (Tummanon 2005b). 
Overall, therefore, Big 4 auditors appear to be a significant monitor in reducing the 
likelihood of accounting misstatements in Thailand. An influence of the usage of Big 4 
auditors on the likelihood of accounting misstatements in Thailand will therefore be 
examined. 
 
2.4.3 External Drivers 
There are two external drivers that prior studies have found to be significant in the 
financial reporting process: capital market participants and regulations. They are 
classified as external drivers because they are not originally initiated by the managers 
but because of these forces from outside parties, the managers are activated to 
manipulate accounting items. 
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a) Capital Markets 
Capital market participants are significant external drivers that can compel some 
managers to misstate financial reports. Firms’ reported earnings numbers are 
constrained by two forces: analysts’ forecasts and market reactions to the reported 
earnings numbers. Previous research has shown that managers care about capital 
markets (Fama 1980). Because accounting numbers have an influence on share 
valuation (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, pp. 15-70), managers are certainly aware of an 
announcement on those numbers (Graham et al. 2005). An earnings announcement can 
influence a market’s valuation of the firm, and stock prices react to the deviation of the 
actual announced earnings and the market’s prior expectation. The growth of stock 
values in capital markets has been found to have a large negative price response to 
negative earnings surprise (Skinner and Sloan 2002). Therefore, managers are forced to 
maintain satisfactory earnings numbers, even by earnings management (Dechow and 
Skinner 2000). The executives accept that earnings numbers and analysts’ forecasts are 
their critical benchmarks (Graham et al. 2005), and fraudulent firms admit that they 
avoid reporting losses and exaggerate financial performance because they are concerned 
of markets’ expectation and reactions (Rezaee 2005). Although the pressure of the 
market on financial reporting quality is supported by previous studies, its measurement 
in empirical research is limited.  
 
Researchers acknowledge the limitations of quantifying capital market pressure. The 
measures that are found in the literature are based on the amounts of market value and 
equity; however, the designation for numerators and denominators varies among studies 
(either book-to-market or market-to-book ratio is used and, although the coefficients are 
in an opposite direction, their interpretation is the same). For example, the book-to-
market ratio is determined as a capital market pressure (e.g. Dechow et al. 2011; 
Ettredge et al. 2010). A lower ratio shows the greater multiple of the market value to the 
book value, and it implies the higher pressure a firm must maintain. Dechow et al. 
(2011) find that the book-to-market ratio is negatively associated with the likelihood of 
accounting misstatements, both in the misstatement year and one year earlier. However, 
the book-to-market ratio is significant only in the case of accounting errors, but not in 
fraud cases (Ettredge et al. 2010). This might imply that a firm can anticipate an 
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extreme negative response from the market if fraud is detected, so the market pressure 
does not relate to the likelihood of fraud. Some studies do not find a significant effect of 
market pressure. For example, Burns et al. (2010) and Burns and Kedia (2006) use a 
market-to-book ratio to determine the market driver, but they do not find a significant 
association between the market-to-book ratio and financial misreporting. A test of this 
determinant on the likelihood of accounting misstatements in other countries is rarely 
witnessed. Although equity financing is not a predominant source of funds in Thai 
firms, Pornupatham (2006) finds that capital market pressure is a significant factor in 
the earnings management for Thai firms. It is thus possible that the capital market 
pressure is one of the determinants of the causes of accounting misstatements in 
Thailand and the measure of market-to-book ratio will be used in this study. 
 
b) Regulations 
Another external driver involves regulations (Healy and Wahlen 1999). Fraud firms 
accept that they mask the reports to prevent being delisted (Rezaee 2005). An empirical 
study into Chinese firms by Chen et al. (2001) find that the companies under the 
profitability regulation of Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) are more 
aggressive in earnings management. The regulation is a command to either suspend 
shares from trading, or delist a company when the company reports losses for three 
consecutive years.  
 
In Thailand, there is one regulation that is akin to the profitability regulation of the 
CSRC. In the Stock Exchange of Thailand, when shareholders’ equity in a listed 
company, as shown in its audited financial statements, is less than zero, or the amount 
of shareholders’ equity, when adjusted according to the qualified opinion of external 
auditors, is less than zero, then, the company is subject to preparing a rehabilitation 
plan. The company’s shares will be suspended from trading for the negotiation period. 
The firm then has 30 days to make a decision on whether it will submit for 
rehabilitation or delisting. If it continues, then the firm’s stock will be transferred to the 
REHABCO sector. Then, the company is required to generate positive shareholders’ 
equity within two years, or ask for a one-time extension, not exceeding one year, to 
resume a normal status; otherwise, the company will be delisted. This rehabilitation 
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status tends to put considerable pressure on the firm and its managers. After the 
financial crisis of 1997, many Thai firms experienced dramatic losses and were subject 
to a rehabilitation plan. Tummanon (2005b) finds that during 2003-2005 the accounting 
enforcement actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand appeared the 
most frequently in REHABCO sector, 30.8%.  
 
Besides the recovery requirement that the firms under profitability regulation have to 
maintain, the financial status of these firms is also in a critical condition. The negative 
amount of the equity indicates the large value of debt and potential liquidity problems. 
There is evidence in previous literature showing a relationship between financial 
difficulties and financial reporting quality. Empirical studies in the earnings 
management area have found that firms with financial distress, defined by two to three 
consecutive years of negative earnings, employ income-decreasing approaches when 
they are going to negotiate debt restructuring (Saleh and Ahmed 2005) and reduce 
dividend payout (DeAngelo et al. 1994). With regard to the area of GAAP violation, the 
financial distress is usually examined in respect of the closeness to bankruptcy or 
Altman’s Z-score. For instance, Malaysian firms are more likely to commit fraud when 
they are close to filing a bankruptcy (i.e. higher Z-score) (Hasnan et al. 2008) and 
Australian firms are more likely to commit fraud when they report at least three annual 
net losses in the six year period preceding the first year of fraud (Sharma 2004). There 
is a higher tendency for highly-levered firms to commit fraud (Maksimovic and Titman 
1991, p. 189)
9
 because their reputation costs after committing fraud are likely to be low 
(Agrawal et al. 1999, p. 313).  
 
The regulation involving a rehabilitation status for the firms in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand can indicate both the pressure from the profitability requirement and a 
financial deficiency. It is, therefore, interesting to assess whether the rehabilitation 
                                                 
9
A hypothesis by Maksimovic and Titman (1991) suggests that highly-levered firms have a tendency to 
cut costs and reduce the quality of their products in order to avoid immediate bankruptcy and maintain 
cash balances. Rational investors can anticipate the lower incoming cash flow due to such unimproved 
product quality. Therefore, they will offer lower amount of funds with a higher cost of capital. The 
distressed firms know at this current period that they will be suffering a high cost of capital in the next 
period, so their incentives to maintain reputation reduce. As a result, there is a tendency to commit fraud 
for by highly-levered firms, even if there is no possibility of financial distress in the next period.  
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status relates to a decision of financial misreporting. Investors can easily notice this 
status because firms under the rehabilitation period are disaggregated into the 
REHABCO sector. This study uses rehabilitation status as a measure for profitability 
and financial distress. Although this measure is dissimilar to the prior studies that have 
employed either the appearance of negative equity or Altman’s Z-score, a research 
result on the rehabilitation status can be beneficial to the investors investing in Thai 
listed companies and securities regulators.   
 
Based on the review of the extant empirical evidence, the determinants of accounting 
misstatements can be summarised in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2: Summary of Determinants of Accounting Misstatements 
Incentives Monitoring Activities External Drivers 
a) Self-interest incentives -
Maximisation personal 
benefits 
- Bonus and compensation 
- Insider trading 
- Employment security 
a) Internal monitors (e.g. 
board of directors, audit 
committee, board 
composition) 
 
a) Capital market 
pressures 
- Analysts’ forecasts 
- Growth in firm value 
 
b) Financial motives 
- Avoid debt covenant 
violations  
- Minimise cost of capital 
b) External auditors  
 
b) Regulations 
 
The determinants include: incentives to violate GAAP, the ineffectiveness of 
monitoring activities, and pressures from external drivers. The incentives comprise the 
managers’ personal motivations, an incentive to avoid debt covenant violations, and an 
incentive to minimise costs of coming capital. The monitoring activities depend on the 
effectiveness of internal and external monitors. Capital market expectations and the 
profitability regulations are both examples of the external drivers that pressure a firm to 
misstate financial reports. 
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In the contexts of principal-principal conflict and concentrated ownership systems, the 
researcher argues that self-seeking incentives of managers are unlikely to occur due to 
the affiliation of managers and controlling shareholders. The likely determinants of 
accounting misstatements in Thailand examined in this research are financial motives, 
monitoring activities and external drivers. The hypotheses for testing whether these 
proxies are significant determinants of accounting misstatements in Thailand are 
presented in Chapter 5. 
 
Evidence on the determinants of accounting misstatements can imply a reason why 
firms release misstated financial reports. The cause of, or a decision to release, 
misstatements may illustrate the benefits that a firm can get from the financial 
misreporting (e.g. minimised cost of capital and maximised firm value). Positivist 
researchers thus believe that there is a cost and benefit trade-off when managers decide 
whether they will manipulate earnings (Beneish 1997; Dechow et al. 1996; Rezaee 
2005). The determinants of accounting misstatements, or an implication for the causes 
of an accounting misstatement, have already been discussed in this chapter. The next 
chapter will illustrate the empirical evidence on the costs imposed to the misstating 
firms after the accounting misstatement is detected and revealed. 
 
 
2.5 Summary 
Managerial opportunism can occur when there is a separation between ownership and 
control. A principal-agent conflict relatively occurs in diffused ownership firms, while a 
principal-principal conflict is more likely to appear in concentrated ownership firms. 
Accounts manipulation can be involved in the expropriation scheme of the agent (i.e. 
the managers) and the majority shareholders. Revelation of the determinants of accounts 
manipulation will consequently be able to provide an insight for investors and 
regulators. However, mainstream research has so far been more concentrated on 
samples in diffused ownership systems. Our understanding of concentrated ownership 
systems is, therefore, limited. This study aims to bring the causes of accounts 
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manipulation in the concentrated ownership systems into light. To do this Thailand is 
selected to serve as a case study. This thesis will examine the determinants of 
accounting misstatements in Thailand, particularly focusing on managers’ incentives, 
governance mechanisms, and corporate ownership structure.  
 
The next chapter discusses the consequences imposed to misstating firms after their 
accounting misstatements are revealed.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
PRIOR EVIDENCE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCOUNTING 
MISSTATEMENTS 
  
3.1 Introduction 
The causes of accounting misstatements were reviewed in the previous chapter. This 
chapter will review the previous literature on the consequences for misstatement firms 
after accounting misstatements have been detected. To date, the research that 
investigates both the causes and consequences of accounting misstatements is scarce 
(Dechow et al. 2010). The disparity between the cause and consequence examinations 
limits our ability to understand why a firm decides to commit accounts manipulation 
and what the constraints are in cases where such behaviour is intentional. To overcome 
this limitation, this thesis aims to examine both the determinants and the consequences 
of accounting misstatements. With regard to the study of consequences, many prior 
studies have assessed the effect of accounting misstatements on share prices shortly 
after the misstatements have been announced. Only a few studies focus on the reactions 
of creditors and all of them were conducted on widely held firms. The capital structure 
of the concentrated ownership system (including Thai firms) is primarily based on debt, 
making the reaction from the creditors more appropriate to be examined.  
 
This chapter will start with a review of the relevant literature on the consequences of 
accounting misstatements. It then outlines the link between causes and consequences. 
Finally, the limitations of the prior literature and the objectives of the present research 
will be discussed.  
 
 
3.2 Consequences of Accounting Misstatements 
A number of previous studies (e.g. Beneish 1997; Dechow et al. 1996; Rezaee 2005) 
have agreed that accounting misstatements are deemed to be part of a cost-benefit trade-
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off in the process of financial reporting; however, quantifying them is difficult. Revsine 
et al. (2002, pp. 295-319) provide a number of examples of financial reporting costs, 
which include: preparation and publication costs, competitive advantage costs, litigation 
costs, and political costs. Moreover, additional costs seem to appear when financial 
reporting includes accounts manipulation, such as: costs for lawsuits, costs of future 
financing and reputational costs (Jiambalvo 1996). Although many scholars believe that 
there are cost-benefit trade-offs in the decision-making process (e.g. Jiambalvo 1996; 
Kellogg 1984; Rezaee 2005), this hypothesis has not received conclusive support. The 
previous research on the subject is restricted by possible issues. Firstly, there is no 
theory that dictates costs and benefits of GAAP and non-GAAP reporting (Wahlen 
2004) and, therefore, a number of methodological issues can occur. For example, 
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) predicted and found empirical evidence that firms with 
restatements of core accounts are more likely to be sued after being controlled for other 
relevant factors; however, why firms with core accounts ended up in court while other 
firms with restatements of non-core accounts did not was not explained, particularly in a 
theoretical view (Wahlen 2004, p. 186). Secondly, quantifying all of the costs involved 
in financial reporting decision-making is difficult (Francis 2001, p. 313). Additionally, 
to date much research has been constrained by data availability. However, despite these 
limitations, empirical researchers have attempted to identify many of the costs and 
benefits of accounting misstatements. Some benefits of accounting misstatements were 
discussed in respect of the determinants of accounting misstatements (presented in the 
previous chapter). In this chapter, the costs imposed on misstating firms will be 
discussed. 
 
Many aspects of the costs, or consequences, for misstating firms have been explored. 
Capital market reaction and management turnover are two common measures that a 
number of previous studies have utilised, probably because most mainstream research 
has focused on the shareholder-agent conflict. Therefore, the shareholders’ responses 
and penalties for the agent are two possible outcomes relevant to such conflict. Other 
consequences comprise class actions lawsuits, litigation costs, and corporate governance 
reforms. Unlike the shareholder-agent conflict, the principal-principal conflict occurs 
between controlling shareholders and outside investors. Therefore, the researcher is 
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interested in the reactions of those outside investors and economic consequences (i.e. 
subsequent financing activities). Nevertheless, there are certain methodological issues in 
the other types of consequences (i.e. corporate governance reforms and legal costs) that 
the researcher found during the review into literature and they are worth considering. 
There are also linkages between the causes that were previously reviewed in Chapter 2 
and the consequences imposed on misstating firms and monitors when misstatements 
are revealed. Therefore, some space in this section is dedicated to discuss the other 
types of consequences, even though the main focus of this research is on economic 
consequences. 
 
The following subsections will review the empirical evidence of consequences imposed 
on misstating firms, which can be divided into three groups according to the entities in 
the contracting process (Stolowy and Breton 2004). The first category is the response of 
capital providers (i.e. shareholders and creditors) through costs of capital and contracts. 
The second group engages subsequent improvements in monitoring mechanisms, which 
involve penalties for managers and incompetent monitors. The third group is a response 
from society, particularly from legislators and authorities.  
 
3.2.1 The Effect of Information Uncertainty 
Because financial reports play an important role in providing economic information for 
funds providers, concern about information uncertainty must occur after an accounting 
misstatement is revealed.  
 
a) Cost of Equity 
Share Prices 
Since a listed firm’s funding comes from equity investors, there is a likelihood that 
investors will penalise the firm if it commits an accounting misstatement. A measure of 
market reaction is ascertained by change in share prices. Pioneering researchers 
observed changes in share prices around the misstatement announcement and they 
found an average negative cumulative abnormal return after an announcement of 
accounting misstatements of about 9-13% (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996; Feroz et al. 1991; 
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Kellogg 1984; Palmrose et al. 2004). The literature then shifted from exploring 
abnormal returns in misstating firms to exploring the effect of misrepresentation on 
abnormal returns through a multivariate regression model. Despite an absence of theory 
explaining the linkage between a misstatement announcement and a negative abnormal 
return (Wahlen 2004), empirical research has tested a casual relationship between the 
two. Kinney and McDaniel (1989) discovered two characteristics of the misstatements 
influencing abnormal returns: the sign (overstatement) and magnitude of misstatements. 
Abnormal returns are greater when there is a larger misstatement in relation to 
overstatements. Because the findings in Kinney and McDaniel (1989) are limited to the 
sample of accounting errors in quarterly financial reports, Palmrose et al. (2004) later 
tested the same issue in a sample of annual financial misreporting. Apart from testing a 
relationship between a restatement announcement and abnormal returns, Palmrose et al. 
(2004) also examined relationships between abnormal returns and the characteristics of 
restatements (such as the magnitude of restatements and reasons for restatements). 
Similar to Wahlen (2004), Kasznik (2004) argues that the lack of theory makes it 
difficult to explain why these characteristics generate greater adverse responses on the 
abnormal returns. 
 
Besides the adverse effect on the misstating firms, Gleason et al. (2008) found that non-
restating firms in the same industry also experienced share price declines at the same 
time. Many previous studies find negative abnormal returns for both misstating firms 
and non-misstating firms in the same industry around the restatement period. Ball and 
Brown (1968), and Ball (1972) detected the earlier movement of abnormal returns and 
its appearance in the industry. The pre-existing abnormal returns had appeared for a 
year before the detection of accounting misstatements in Kellogg’s (1984) sample. 
Wilson (2008) acknowledges the contagion effect and, therefore, used a sample 
containing both misstatement firms and matched non-misstatement firms. The results 
reveal an interaction effect of the restatement announcement on abnormal returns: 
abnormal returns are greater when unexpected earnings appear due to the restatement 
announcement. Meanwhile the abnormal returns of non-restating firms did not 
significantly vary across time; even when unexpected earnings appeared in these firms. 
Therefore, Wilson argues that abnormal returns are a result of restatement 
  
46 
 
announcement and they are not caused by time-period trends. Some studies (e.g. Kinney 
and McDaniel 1989; Palmrose et al. 2004) argue that there is news leakage. Ball and 
Brown (1968), emphasised by Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 45), point out that the 
earlier movement can occur because investors usually get information from quarterly 
financial reporting and from non-accounting sources. Therefore, the investors regularly 
revise the asset pricing, and the revision can also make the expected earnings of the 
firms in the same industry fluctuate (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, pp. 71-110). A recent 
study by Bardos et al. (2011) supports this point of view. They found that investors can 
anticipate subsequent restatements and start marking the share prices down several 
months (i.e. four months in their study) before a restatement announcement. This price 
reduction costs a misstating firm three times as much as does the effect of a restatement 
announcement.  
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 88) urged caution in the research design for an 
examination of abnormal returns. Because the research sample is usually selected on the 
basis of one variable (i.e. accounting restatement), if the research cannot control for 
other factors, it might later be found that the sample differs from the population due to 
some other variables. If this happens then it should not be concluded that the abnormal 
returns in the misstating firms around the misstatement period are a result of the 
restatement announcement (Ball 1972). In addition, Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 
92-93) argue that if investors’ expectations are correct, then why the firm waits for 
years to announce the restatement. Alternatively, whether the firm waits until when 
there appears to be no correlation between price change and restatement 
announcements. This point of view is consistent with the no-effect hypothesis.
10
 
Consequently, the appearance of prior movement of abnormal returns is an issue that 
researchers must be aware of if they are interested in observing a change in share price 
after the announcement. 
                                                 
10
The no-effect hypothesis underlines the efficient market hypothesis, which implies that the share price is 
a function of the firm’s expected future cash-flows and the expected rate of return and earnings are 
unimportant (unless they capture the primary drivers). The mechanistic hypothesis implies that there is a 
relation between stock prices and accounting earnings changes, supported by Ball and Brown (1968). 
However, it was later clarified that the stock prices will react to the accounting earnings changes that 
reflect real economic changes, but they do not react to the earnings changes that have no cash flow 
effect (Ball 1972; Watts and Zimmerman 1986, p. 97). 
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Other responses of capital market participants 
Besides the decline in stock prices, prior research has measured the reactions of capital 
market participants to misstatements through bid-ask spreads, estimated rates of returns 
and analysts’ reactions. Dechow et al. (1996) found an adverse effect of misstatement 
announcements on bid-ask spreads. Meanwhile, Hribar and Jenkins (2004) argue that 
the bid-ask spread is an indirect measure for costs of capital, so they applied three asset-
pricing models to estimate the effect of a restatement announcement on cost of capital. 
Their premise is that a restatement announcement generally leads to downward 
revisions in future expected earnings. They therefore used analyst forecast revisions to 
proxy for an effect of the announcement on expected future cash flows. Data for the 
assessment include book value of equity, analyst forecasts and long-term growth rates. 
The rates of returns were calculated and analysed to determine whether they changed 
between the periods. They found that the rates of return rose by 10.8%-19.5% during 
the five days after the revelation of misstatements.  
 
Investors tend to find corporate information from other sources when they are 
concerned about the information uncertainty in misstating firms, including analysts’ 
forecasts (Barniv and Cao 2009). Dechow et al. (1996) showed a significant increase in 
the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts after the misstatement announcement (year -3 to 
year +3), while they do not find a change in dispersion of forecasts for control firms. 
Similarly, Palmrose et al. (2004) discovered a wider dispersion in restating firms along 
the 45 days after the announcement. The number of analysts following has also been 
studied in prior studies. Dechow et al. (1996) observed changes in the median number 
of analysts following during a six year window (year -3 to year +3) when compared 
with those of the control firms. They found a significant decline in the numbers from 
year -1 to year +1. More interestingly, for the three years before the misstatement 
announcement the median number of analysts following in the misstating firms is found 
to be higher than that of the control firms. Dechow et al. (1996) posit that the higher 
rate supports the proposition that the managers of growing firms are under more intense 
pressures from the markets and that they are consequently more likely to misstate 
financial reports. 
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In brief, studies into the reactions of market participants are available, and their findings 
are all alike: affirming that a misstating firm suffers negative consequences from 
investors and analysts. However, the lack of theoretical foundation limits empirical 
researchers’ explanations in some circumstances; for example, why misstatements of 
core accounts results in a higher level of abnormal returns, or why share prices start 
marking down several months before a restatement announcement (Kasznik 2004; 
Wahlen 2004). Therefore, it might be improper to conclude a casual relationship 
between misstatement announcements and a higher cost of capital, but it is useful to 
confirm their correlation.  
 
To assess the reactions of equity investors is deemed to be an effective measure for 
dispersed ownership systems, where capital market participants (e.g. shareholders and 
analysts) importantly discipline the firms. In contrast, capital markets in the 
concentrated ownership system are not enhanced and firms are more likely to choose 
debt alternatives than equity (La Porta et al. 1997; Rajan and Zingales 1995). Therefore, 
concentrated ownership firms might be less concerned about the market reaction. Rather 
they can be more concerned about creditors’ responses. The next section reviews the 
reactions of creditors studied in prior literature.  
 
b) Cost of Debt 
A revelation of accounting misstatements signals the low quality of the financial 
reporting process, so it would seem rational for creditors to call for efficient monitoring 
and higher charges to secure their investment returns. A higher interest rate, tighter debt 
covenants and stricter requirements for collateral are instances of debt features that the 
creditors might prefer from misstating firms.  
 
Graham et al. (2008) examined the impact of restatement announcements on loan 
features. An average cost of debt, measured by the amount of the interest rate above 
LIBOR rate (named loan spreads) is higher after a restatement announcement. An 
investigation into the characteristics of the misstatements was conducted, similar to the 
approach used in abnormal-returns studies. An average loan spread was found to be 
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larger when the restatement involved fraud, but was irrelevant to the restatement 
initiated by auditors, company, and capital market regulators. With reference to loan 
obligations, the restatement announcement resulted in a decline in loan maturity, a 
requirement for collateral, and an increase in the number of covenants. General 
covenants (such as prepayment, dividends, and voting rights) were added into the new 
debt covenants - more so than financial covenants (e.g. ratios). This possibly happened 
because financial covenants can be manipulated. In addition, misstating firms had to 
pay more for upfront and annual fee charges. The results from Graham et al. (2008) 
confirm the negative impact of the restatement announcements on loan features. Chen et 
al. (2009) argue that since the sample in Graham et al.(2008) comprises only of firms 
getting subsequent loans, there may be some restating firms that also need funds but the 
firms are unable to get them because they are high in financial constraints. Therefore, 
Chen et al. (2009) explored the financial constraint status and external financing 
capability of the restating firms and compared these with matched non-restating firms. 
 
Chen et al. (2009) found that about half of restating firms do not raise any external 
financing within two years after the restatements. They assessed whether misstating 
firms need financing in the post-announcement period by using two indices. The first 
measured the level of financial constraint, following the approach used by Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997). The data were collected from misstating firms’ annual reports. The 
second measure is a calculation of a financial constraint index, as developed by Whited 
and Wu (2006). Both measures provided consistent results in that an average of the 
constraint level of the restating firms did not differ from that of the non-restating firms 
before the restatement announcement, but the average is greater for the restating firms 
after the announcement. After assuring that the restating firms need financing but are 
less likely to find it because their ability to get new funding is lower, Chen et al. (2009) 
then examined the dynamic changes of financing choices around the misstatement 
period. Based on the financing choices from pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf 
1984), Chen et al.’s (2009) study found that the proportion of private debt increases 
while the proportion of public debt and equity decrease after the misstatement 
announcement. This result agrees with the financial constraint indices, affirming that 
misstating firms suffer from financial constraints in the post-restatement period. The 
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increase in private debt funding is consistent with the description by Bharath et al. 
(2008) of how firms with low quality financial reports prefer private-debt alternatives. 
This is consistent with pecking order theory in that the cost of equity is the highest 
because it is associated with the highest information asymmetry costs. Since the 
restatement announcement raises information asymmetry between the firm and the users 
of financial statements, it is a persuasive argument that these firms should prefer private 
debt to equity. In addition, firms tend to lose their credibility of financial reporting and, 
therefore, the costs of capital from public debt and stock issuance are deemed higher.  
 
Even equity-based firms, such as the U.S. firms in Chen et al. (2009), are more likely to 
prefer private debt after the restatement period. This finding raises a question of how the 
external financing choices change for misstating firms in debt-based firms. Due to the 
primary preference on debt financing, debt-based firms have already had a relatively 
high leverage ratio and debt covenants to maintain. After an announcement of 
accounting misstatements, a number of questions arise, including: whether they can 
raise more debt, or change to issue stocks, and whether minority shareholders and 
creditors charge the firms more. Unfortunately, the answers for these questions are 
unavailable. Having a sample of debt-based firms (i.e. Thai firms) allows the present 
research to respond to these questions.  
 
This thesis will therefore assess the economic consequences of accounting 
misstatements in Thailand, with a particular focus placed on the firms’ external 
financing activities. With regard to the reactions from capital markets, previous studies 
in Thailand have found results that are consistent with prior studies into other countries. 
For example, Tummanon (2005a) finds an average of cumulative abnormal return of -
9.78% in Thai firms after they are subject to accounting enforcement actions by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand. The concentration on the debt 
financing activities of Thai firms will enable the present research to contribute new 
evidence to the literature in order to understand the reactions of creditors and minority 
shareholders. 
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Financial difficulties after the misstatement announcement lead firms to face a 
restriction on their investment (Kedia and Philippon 2009). Since misstating firms risk a 
higher cost of capital, (some cannot even get new finances) corporate liquidity and debt 
covenants are deemed to restrict the firms from investing activities. During the two 
years after the restatement period, misstating firms’ operations are more economically 
constrained than are those of non-restating firms in the same industry, measured by the 
growth rates of capital expenditures, employees, sales, and market values (Kedia and 
Philippon 2009). If these restrictions last for long then the cost of a restatement 
announcement is inclined to be dramatic and might cost more than the firm can quantify 
(Graham et al. 2008). 
 
One possible solution to reduce the severity of the costs of information uncertainty is to 
improve corporate governance structures so that the reforms can lessen the potential 
costs of capital and can restore the firms’ credibility to investors and creditors. The next 
section illustrates changes in corporate governance for the misstating firms in the post-
restatement period.  
 
3.2.2 Improvement in Corporate Governance Structures 
Improvements in corporate governance mechanisms are a potential mechanism to help 
restore misstating firms’ reputation. The revelation of accounting misstatements 
indicate the weakness of corporate governance (Dechow et al. 1996) and it decreases 
value of the firm’s reputational capital (Agrawal et al. 1999). The misstating firms may 
thus desire to show their investors the improvement on corporate governance systems in 
order to restore their credibility; for example, firing the managers (Feroz et al. 1991) or 
increasing the number and proportion of outside directors (Farber 2005).  
 
a) Change in Top Management Position 
The benefit of a managerial change is still a controversial point of debate. Since a firm’s 
market value decreases after a misstatement announcement (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996; 
Palmrose et al. 2004), the firm is anticipated that a managerial change may increase its 
firm’s value (Weisbach 1988). Previous studies have found that management turnover is 
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significantly higher in misstating firms after the revelation of accounting misstatements 
(e.g. Desai et al. 2006; Feroz et al. 1991; Hennes et al. 2008), yet many studies have not 
(e.g. Agrawal et al. 1999; Beneish 1999b; Peasnell et al. 2001).  
 
Hennes et al. (2008) advise that the inconsistency of evidence in prior studies into the 
management turnover may be a methodological issue. When accounting misstatement 
cases (i.e. both error and fraud samples) are aggregated, the sample is not as powerful as 
the disaggregation between them in predicting a managerial change. In their study, there 
is a significant positive relationship between the accounting irregularity (intentional 
misstatements) and the CEO/CFO turnover, but there is none in the group of accounting 
errors. Agrawal et al. (1999) emphasise that there is a complex process behind the 
decision for a managerial change. A firm tends to have a trade-off between the benefits 
of a managerial change (e.g. restoring reputational capital, reduced legal liability costs) 
and the costs (e.g. loss of human capital and expertise). In addition, Weisbach (1988) 
raises that some CEOs might voluntarily resign from the poorly performing companies 
because of their difficulties in recovery and the threat of stakeholder suits; so an 
observation on the appearance of turnover only cannot deal with this argument. 
Unfortunately, this suggestion can be achieved only if the data are available and even 
Weisbash (1988) recognises this limitation.  
 
Besides management turnover, subsequent employment of the restating firms’ managers 
has been also investigated in prior studies. When an accounting misstatement is 
detected, it will at least be reported in the restated financial statements in following 
years, while they go public for listed firms. Therefore, the managers tend to lose their 
reputation and it might be difficult for them to find employment afterwards. Desai et al. 
(2006) discovered that the appearance of restatements reduces the managers' ability to 
find comparable employment at another firm. This finding is consistent with an 
exploratory study by Beneish (1999b). In addition, Persons (2006) found that the 
compensation (bonus and salary) of executives decreased after the revelation of fraud or 
a lawsuit. These insights confirm the important role of the managerial labour market in 
disciplining the managers’ behaviour.  
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In concentrated ownership systems, although studies into management turnover are 
scarce, this type of penalty is unlikely to occur because of the affiliation between the 
managers and controlling shareholders. Gibson (2003) finds a weak negative correlation 
between corporate poor accounting-based performance (i.e. profitability and sales 
growth) and CEO turnovers in emerging markets, including Thailand, particularly when 
firms have a large shareholder (holding > 20% of the total shares). In addition, there is 
no significant correlation between stock performance (i.e. stock market returns) and 
CEO turnover in Gibson’s sample. These results may indicate that the monitoring 
system to control managers’ performance in emerging markets is weak because it is 
often in emerging markets that CEO are affiliated with the controlling shareholder, and 
sometimes the CEO is one of the controlling shareholders (Morck et al. 2005; Young et 
al. 2008) and, therefore, the probability that the CEO is fired is reduced. In addition, 
there is a smaller opportunity for investors in emerging markets to be able to discipline 
managers and request effective corporate governance (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Accordingly, concentrated ownership firms may not need to 
fire managers in order to minimise the cost imposed by the markets. The weak 
relationship between the CEO turnover and accounting performance which was found in 
the Thai sample of Gibson (2003) indicates an absence of support for an examination 
into the managerial change in Thai firms. Therefore, managerial change tends not to be 
a significant consequence suffered by misstating firms in Thailand and that the 
consequence imposed on managers is not an interest in this research.  
 
b) Change in Monitoring Systems 
When a misstatement is found, not only are the executives sometimes fired, but the 
monitors themselves are also occasionally dismissed. Srinivasan (2005) points to a 
higher rate of outside director turnover, particularly when the outside directors are also 
audit committee members. He also finds that the labour market penalises outside 
directors of misstating firms. Outside directors are shown by Srinivasan (2005) to lose 
their position in other companies after the companies they service had announced 
income-decreasing restatements. However, the multivariate tests of Srinivasan’s (2005) 
findings were run on misstating firms only and, therefore, these results are not entirely 
surprising (Richardson 2005). In contrast, Agrawal et al. (1999) do not find a higher 
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turnover of outside directors by the three year post-period window, when compared 
with control firms; however, they do notice a significant change in the turnover of 
inside directors. In terms of the board size, the number of directors on a board is larger 
for fraud firms than for control firms in year t-1, but it is slightly smaller and close to 
that of the control firms in the post-restatement period. This result supports the previous 
studies into corporate governance structures which found that the size of the board is 
not significant in monitoring roles (Beasley 1996), but qualifications are important 
(Agrawal and Chadha 2005).  
 
Auditors can also receive a penalty. Detecting and disclosing fraud is an auditors’ 
responsibility (ISA 240 (IAASB 2006)), and a suspension and litigation costs can be 
imposed on those auditors who fail to fulfil their obligations. Feroz et al. (1991) find 
that 85 auditors of the 188 misstating firms were censured by the SEC and 89% of them 
were penalised. Bonner et al. (1998) developed a model to predict the possibility that 
the auditors will be sued based on characteristics of the misstatements. They discover 
that auditors are more likely to be sued when litigation relates to the frequently 
misstated accounts (e.g. revenues and assets) or to fictitious transactions. 
Unsurprisingly, the severity level also increases the likelihood of auditor litigation. 
Since fictitious transactions are illegal, the more severe the offence, the more 
stakeholders lose and the more likely auditors are to be sued. With regard to the reaction 
of the market participants when the auditors are dismissed, restating firms with auditor 
changes have a quarter shorter penalty for the decline in share prices when compared 
with restating firms who have no audit change (Wilson 2008). 
 
Significant changes in the monitoring level have been found in misstating firms, but the 
benefits of these changes is inconclusive. By three years after the revelation of fraud, 
the fraud firms studied by Farber (2005) were shown to have improved their corporate 
governance mechanisms to the same level as those of the control firms. Farber (2005) 
finds that the governance reformation informs the capital markets and leads to a higher 
stock price performance, as measured by buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Yet, when an 
evaluation is performed of a stock following by financial analysts, these reforms have 
been shown to have no effect on subsequent institutional ownership and short sales. 
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Although there is evidence supporting a positive relationship between governance 
reforms and an average share return, like in Farber’s (2005) study, it is still somewhat 
difficult to argue that corporate governance reforms benefit the firm in terms of an 
increase in stock performance because a firm’s value is principally derived from future 
expected cash flows (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, pp. 15-36), or might be linked to the 
earnings number, as Ball and Brown (1968) argue. Consequently, a confirmation of the 
correlation between the governance reforms and stock performance is persuasive, but it 
is too early to confirm a casual relationship. This conclusion is similar to the situation of 
the relationship between share price and the announcement of accounting misstatements 
in Section 3.2.1 in that both occurred but explanations for the results are constrained.  
 
3.2.3 Legal and Regulatory Penalties 
The previous subsections reviewed the reactions of capital providers to misstating firms 
and the corporate governance reformation in misstating firms after accounting 
misstatements are announced. This subsection will review legal and regulatory costs 
imposed on misstating firms, when accounting misstatements are in violation of laws 
(such as fraud) or when the misstatement costs stakeholders who then file a lawsuit 
against the firm. The prior literature asserts that legal liabilities limit, but do not 
eliminate, GAAP violation (Jiambalvo 1996). Moreover, some research is against the 
view that the legal liabilities are an inadequate deterrence in the protecting mechanism 
(e.g. Coffee 2001). Exploratory results from previous studies, based on litigation cases, 
show that the likelihood of litigation increases when a misstatement is fraudulent 
financial reporting and involves core accounts (Palmrose and Scholz 2004). In the same 
vein, the probability of litigation for auditors increases when they cannot detect 
fictitious items and the core accounts (Bonner et al. 1998). These studies show the 
correlations between accounting attributes and litigation probability, and the adverse 
consequence for supplying low quality financial reports.  
 
Although there is a significant relationship between financial reporting and litigation 
probability, based on the statistics in previous research, the managers might still take a 
risk (Wahlen 2004). According to the results in Palmrose and Scholz (2004), only 38% 
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of misstating firms were sued and the chance of being sued occurs only when the 
misstatements are in core accounts. These findings tend not to be economically 
significant enough to deter self-seeking managers from the temptation to misstate 
elements of earnings. Karpoff et al. (2008) develop certain measures for the costs 
imposed to a misstating firm: for every pound of inflated value after the detection, the 
firm’s value decreases by that pound, plus £0.36 for fines and class-action settlements 
and £2.71 for reputational loss. Even though there are some limitations in their study 
(Karpoff et al. 2008, p. 606), it is a rare attempt to disentangle the measurement of 
reputational cost.  
 
To summarise, this section has reviewed the consequences imposed to misstating firms, 
management team, and monitors. There is empirical evidence showing that misstating 
firms and managers receive penalties from stakeholders, in terms of economic 
consequences (i.e. costs of capital, financing abilities, litigation and regulatory costs), 
managerial changes, costs of the corporate governance restructuring, and reputational 
costs.  
 
The next section discusses the linkages from the causes of accounting misstatements to 
the consequences after the misstatements have been detected (a link from Chapter 2 to 
Chapter 3).  
 
 
3.3 Linkages between the Causes and Consequences  
Chapter 2 reviewed the determinants of the causes of accounting misstatements.  The 
previous section (Section 3.2) discussed the evidence on the consequences imposed on 
misstating firms and relevant parties. From this, it can be seen that the causes and 
consequences are related, as shown in Table 3.1. 
 
In Table 3.1, the left-hand column presents the causes of accounting misstatement, 
which were taken from the determinants of the causes in Table 2.2. The causes can be 
divided into three groups: incentives, weakness of monitoring activities and external 
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drivers (see Chapter 2). The right-hand column contains the consequences of accounting 
misstatements. As discussed earlier, they consist of managerial changes, economic 
consequences, corporate governance reforms, and litigation costs.  
 
Table 3.1: Relevance between Causes and Consequences of Accounting Misstatements 
Causes Consequences 
Incentives 
Managers’ own benefits 
 Higher compensation 
 Profit from selling shares at inflated price 
 Reputation gain  
 
Financial motives 
 Circumvent debt covenant violation 
 Minimisation of costs of capital 
Management turnover 
Managers 
 Decreased compensation 
 The loss of employment and poorer 
subsequent employment 
 
Economic consequences 
 Ability to obtain external financing 
 Higher costs of capital 
Weak monitoring activities 
 Audit deficiency 
 Ineffective and/or incompetence internal 
monitors (board of directors, audit 
committee, internal auditors) 
Corporate governance reforms 
 Auditors (suspended, dismissed) 
 Internal monitors (decreased 
remuneration, dismissed) 
 Improve governance structures 
External drivers 
 Maintain or raise share price by meeting 
earnings benchmarks and analysts’ 
forecast 
 Comply with requirements and 
regulations 
 
 
 
Economic consequences 
 Capital market participant’s reactions 
(decreased share price, increased bid-
ask spread, downward analysts’ 
revisions) 
 
Legal and regulatory penalty 
 Firm 
 Management 
 Auditors and internal monitors 
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The linkages between the causes and consequences can be explained as follows. Firstly, 
if the accounting misstatement is created to maximise personal gains then the self-
seeking or incompetent managers are fired or face a reduction in compensation. They 
are also penalised by the labour market in subsequent employment. Secondly, if the 
misstatement is performed so that the firm can avoid debt covenants and minimise cost 
of debt then the creditors will penalise the firm by tightening debt covenants and 
increasing interest rates. Thirdly, the managers may offer an excuse that they had to 
create a misstatement to meet the capital market’s expectations; however, the capital 
market participants disagree. They are likely to sell the firm’s shares and the firm's 
value will then decrease. As for prospective investors, they will require a higher rate of 
returns due to concerns over information uncertainty. Financial analysts are also 
concerned about the market performance of the firm. Fourthly, the misstatement signals 
the weaknesses of corporate governance structures and, therefore, the firm is more 
likely to improve the governance systems in order to assure the investors and minimise 
the likelihood of accounting misstatements in future. Finally, if the misstatement is in 
violation of the law then the firm will face a lawsuit case and litigation costs will be 
incurred. Due to the limitation of research in concentrated ownership systems, it is 
acknowledged that the attributes of the causes and consequences in the Table are mainly 
driven by the samples from dispersed ownership systems. 
 
The linkage of the causes and consequences of an accounting misstatement can also be 
integrated into a timeline (see Figure 3.1) devised by Wahlen (2004, p. 184).  
 
At the outset of Figure 3.1, there is a certain set of circumstances that can lead to an 
occurrence of non-GAAP reporting. Similar to the review conducted in this research, 
the antecedents are composed of: managers’ incentives, internal control systems, 
external pressures from capital markets and a firm’s characteristics that are usually 
control variables in research analyses (e.g. size, growth, and industry). Three columns at 
the middle present the process of non-GAAP reporting after an incentive occurs. The 
internal control systems are common protection tools to weaken the incentives but if the 
control systems are weak then non-GAAP financial reports will be released. The GAAP 
violation might take the form of an error on a core account, inadequate disclosures, or 
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fraudulent financial reporting. The non-GAAP reporting expropriates some 
stakeholders’ interests, depending on the incentives of the misreporting. For instance, 
inflated earnings numbers misleads the capital-market participants, or lenders are misled 
by manipulated accounts when the firm is close to default. The board of directors and 
compensation committee are deceived, if the manager wants to mask his poor operating 
performance or maximise his compensation, respectively.  
 
Figure 3.1: Factors Associated With Non-GAAP Financial Reporting 
Timeline 
 
    
  
Non-GAAP report is: 
 
 Released Used Restated  
Antecedent 
circumstances 
Actions taken to 
misstate 
earnings 
Resource allocation 
decisions 
Detection 
triggers 
restatement 
Restatement triggers 
consequences and ex 
post settling up 
 Managers’ 
incentives 
 Internal 
Controls 
 Prior earnings 
and returns 
 Earnings 
expectations 
 Size 
 Growth 
 Industry 
 Others 
 
 Core and non-
core elements 
of earnings 
 Pervasiveness 
 Transactions 
versus accounts 
 Estimates 
versus 
allocations 
 Annual or 
interim 
financial 
statements 
 Number of 
periods restated 
 Disclosures 
 Auditor 
negligence or 
compliance 
 Fraud 
 Others 
Are users fooled? 
 Capital-market 
participants 
 Lenders 
 Boards of directors 
 Compensation 
committees 
 Regulators 
 Others 
Who detects 
misstatement? 
Who triggers 
restatements? 
 Capital-market 
participants 
 Directors and 
officers 
 The SEC and 
other regulators 
 Auditors 
 Other managers 
within the firms 
 Others 
 
 Share price 
reactions in the 
capital markets 
 Cost of capital 
implications 
 Litigation and 
resolution 
 Managers sued 
and/or fired 
 SEC actions 
(AAERs) or other 
regulatory actions 
 Auditors sued 
and/or fired 
 Delisting 
 Bankruptcy 
 Survivorship 
 Others 
 
Source: Wahlen et al. (2004, p. 184). 
 
Since non-GAAP reporting can be very costly to relevant users, a certain set of 
monitoring systems is instituted to detect misstatements (the fourth column). The 
monitors include authorities (e.g. stock exchange authority), external auditors, and 
internal monitors (e.g. directors, an audit committee, and officers). A requirement for an 
accounting restatement arises after these monitors have detected the misreporting. Once 
the restatement, or the detection of the misstatement, is revealed, the relevant 
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stakeholders take action (the fifth column). These actions are in accordance with the 
review in the previous section. Equity holders are then expected to sell the firm’s stocks 
(or buyers are prepared to pay less for them) and the share price declines. Possible 
capital providers increase their charges for the capital provided because of the firm’s 
poor quality of financial reporting. The self-seeking and incompetent manager can be 
dismissed, as might incompetent auditors and monitors. The related authority will file a 
lawsuit against the perpetrator(s) and/or issue a specific command to the firm (such as 
an enforcement action or delisting). Existing studies have been conducted in line with 
this Wahlen (2004) timeline; however, it is useful to divide it into two phases: causes 
and consequences. 
 
The extant literature frequently separates the occurrence of accounting misstatements 
into two parts. The samples in previous research are usually the ex post cases, i.e., 
studying non-GAAP reporting after it is detected. For instance, mainstream U.S. 
research has collected samples from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, AAERs, or accounting restatement 
filings in the U.S. Government Accountability Office database. Detection, either by the 
independent authorities or by the internal monitors, is at the midpoint of the timeline. 
Therefore, the detection is deemed to have become a cut-off point for the specification 
of independent and dependent variables in the research. By the AAERs (or restatements), 
these ex post case studies go backwards to find the causes of accounting misstatements. 
When the causes are being examined, the substance of the consequences is assumed to 
be less than the economic benefits that the misstating firms get from the manipulation 
(e.g. in Efendi et al. 2007), and it is assumed that the managers decide to misstate 
financial reports. With regard to the consequences, from the revelation of an accounting 
misstatement point, the studies go forward to investigate the costs imposed to the 
misstating firm after the discovery, such as capital market reactions, legal penalty, and 
corporate governance reforms.  
 
To be consistent with the methodology of previous studies, and the timeline suggested 
by Wahlen (2004), this thesis is interested in gathering samples from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Thailand. The research will then examine the determinants of 
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accounting misstatements, where the occurrence of accounting misstatements is the 
dependent variable of the determination. After that, it will assess the economic 
consequences after the accounting misstatements have been disclosed. The incidence of 
accounting misstatements, therefore, is an independent variable in the consequence 
assessment. Both the determinants and consequences of accounting misstatements will 
be determined in one study, consistent with the recommendation of Dechow et al. 
(2010). 
 
 
3.4 Summary 
The consequences of accounting misstatements can be categorised into three groups: 
capital market participants’ reactions, improvements in monitoring mechanisms, and 
liability and litigation commitments. An absence of theory explaining the relationship 
between GAAP violation and the consequences imposed on misstating firms means that 
some research results contain limitations (Wahlen 2004). For instance, a casual 
relationship between the announcement of an accounting misstatement and abnormal 
returns cannot be confirmed because the abnormal returns have already appeared before 
the announcement, and have also happened with other firms in the same industry. There 
is also a lack of theoretical grounds to explain the incremental effects of some variables 
(i.e. initiators, characteristics of errors). Nevertheless, the available empirical findings 
can provide us with many important insights of the costs and benefits of financial 
reporting decision-making. 
 
The evidence on the causes and consequences in the setting of the principal-principal 
conflict is found to be smaller than that of the principal-agent conflict. Since most of the 
mainstream research to date has been conducted on samples in the U.S., where the 
shareholder-agent conflict appears, analysis of the causes has mostly focused on the 
agent’s personal incentives and capital market drivers. As a result, the consequences are 
predominantly focused on capital market reactions and management turnovers. In the 
presence of a principal-principal conflict, a majority of shares are usually held by 
controlling shareholders and the managers are affiliated with them. Consequently, the 
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potential agency conflicts in this setting are a conflict between the controlling 
shareholders and the outside investors. The related causes and consequences of those 
misstatements that involve outside investors are less well explored when compared with 
those of the principal-agent conflict. An examination of these issues in Thailand can 
help to bring them into light. 
 
The next chapter provides a brief background for the country of Thailand and will 
describe the financial reporting regime for Thai firms.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CASE OF THAILAND 
 
4.1 Introduction  
As previously discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the aim of this research is to study the 
determinants and consequences of accounting misstatements in concentrated ownership 
systems. Thai firms are selected to serve as a sample of firms from a concentrated 
ownership system. In this chapter, the country’s institutions and financial reporting 
regulations are described. Hypothesis development and the research methodology will 
be set out in Chapter 5, while secondary data analysis for the determinants and 
economic consequences of accounting misstatements in Thailand are contained in 
Chapters 6 and 7 respectively. 
 
Thailand’s institutions and firms are highly representative of a concentrated ownership 
system (Rahman et al. 2010). Thai firms mostly use debt financing and the power of 
capital markets to discipline a firm is low (Alba et al. 2003). Approximately 83% of 
non-financial firms listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand are firms with controlling 
shareholder(s) (Wiwattanakantang 2001) and the high ownership concentration risks 
weakening corporate governance mechanisms (Alba et al. 2003; SECT 2005a). These 
attributes call into question the quality of financial reporting in Thailand. Since the 1997 
crisis, the authorities in Thailand have enacted many regulations to improve corporate 
governance structures and the quality of financial reporting. For example, listed firms 
are now required to have an audit committee with at least one member who has 
financial expertise (SET 2000a). However, so far, it is reported that such changes have 
had little impact on the management and behaviour of Thai firms (White 2004). These 
reforms are still in an early stage and have not yet worked effectively in financial 
reporting control (Tengamnuay and Stapleton 2009). Therefore, it is likely that financial 
reporting in Thailand is not of a particularly high quality.  
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In light of this, this research examines financial reporting quality in Thailand, 
particularly focusing on the occurrences of accounting misstatements. It has been 
suggested in the literature that Thailand’s financial statement preparers’ incentives are 
more important than the body of accounting standards (Ball et al. 2003). Consequently, 
it is necessary to ask what the incentives of the financial statements preparers are, and 
how the existing corporate governance structures function in order to limit the 
preparers’ incentives in the financial reporting process. Apart from the determinants of 
accounting misstatements, this study also aims to assess the economic consequences 
after the misstatements have been discovered. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
analysis of both the determinants and consequences should help contribute a 
comprehensive understanding of a cost-benefit trade-off in financial reporting process. 
 
 
4.2 The Case of Thailand 
Thailand’s capital market is considered to be an emerging market (Boubakri and 
Ghouma 2010; La Porta et al. 1998) and the ownership structure of Thai firms is based 
on business groups and family-based firms (Claessens and Fan 2002). A pyramid 
structure and cross-holdings are common and these characteristics generate a divergence 
between cash flow rights and voting rights (Claessens and Fan 2002; Wiwattanakantang 
2001). In addition, they increase the possibility that controlling shareholders can 
expropriate the interests of outside investors (Claessens et al. 2002). Thailand’s 
concentrated ownership system has meant that it has been the subject of several prior 
cross-country studies (e.g. Boonlert-U-Thai et al. 2006; Fan and Wong 2002; Leuz et al. 
2003; Rahman et al. 2010). 
 
Another reason that has made Thailand a popular focus of research is the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis. The Asian Financial Crisis began with the flotation of the Thai 
currency (Thai baht-THB) in July 1997. The crisis quickly spread to Indonesia, Korea 
and other countries in South-East Asia and East Asia. This crisis represented an 
exogenous shock that significantly lowered the available return on investment 
opportunities of firms in these countries (Johnson et al. 2000). The sudden shock 
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provides an opportunity to assess the legal systems and corporate governance that 
existed at that time. Empirical research finds that legal protections and the national 
governance policy in East Asian countries were poor (Johnson et al. 2000). Firms with 
weak corporate governance (i.e. low disclosure quality and large shareholders involve in 
management) have been shown to suffer more severe decreases in stock prices during 
the crisis (Mitton 2002). Ownership concentration has generally had a positive effect on 
share price, but the share price declined when there was a great divergence between 
cash-flow and voting rights (Lemmon and Lins 2003). All of the South-Asian 
economies that experienced a crisis in 1997 have subsequently improved their corporate 
governance structures (e.g. in Talha et al. 2009). Many improvements have been made 
in Thailand’s monitoring bodies, such as full adoption of International Accounting 
Standards, stricter regulations for listed companies, and corporate governance reforms. 
However, the efficiency and effectiveness of such reforms has not yet been confirmed. 
The following sections will address this issue in detail, and will further continue 
reviewing the effect of the corporate governance reforms on financial reporting quality. 
 
4.2.1 Thailand’s Accounting and Financial Institutions 
This section provides the background of Thai regulatory systems. Thailand’s law and 
legal systems are emphasised in this section, as are its accounting and auditing 
professions. 
 
a) Legal Systems 
It has been found that Thailand’s legal systems to protect investors are weak. In 
particular, its protection of minority shareholders is lacking. Thailand’s laws are based 
on common law, but they have been significantly influenced by French civil laws (La 
Porta et al. 1998, p. 1119). La Porta et al. (1998) also showed that Thailand has a 
below-average score on liability standards (which minority shareholders can use to sue 
directors and majority shareholders for damages), and a below-average score of creditor 
rights. The efficiency of the Thai judicial system was ranked 48
th
 out of 49 countries 
(La Porta et al. 1998). The presence of civil lawsuits by minority shareholders is absent 
in Thailand and large penalties for offenders in cases where listed companies have 
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violated the law are also rare (Ananchotikul et al. 2010). As for the criminal cases, 
Viverito (1998) argues that these often do not end in convictions.  
 
All listed companies and market regulators are governed under the Securities and 
Exchange Act B.E. 2535 (A.D. 1992). It is noteworthy that although the Thai stock 
exchange was created in 1975, the Act was only released in 1992. Although the Thai 
government intended to develop the regulatory framework since 1987, the project took 
five years until it was completed because of the frequent changes in government and the 
lack of competent human resources and expertise. At present, there are two projects to 
amend the Securities and Exchange Act and the Public Company Act, and to enact a 
Class Action Act, in order to increase the protection of minority shareholders. However, 
once again they are progressing slowly and it is uncertain if these legislative 
amendments will be ultimately adopted (SECT 2005a).   
 
b) Accounting and Auditing Profession 
The body of the accounting and auditing profession in Thailand is deemed to be 
improved. In particular, since the crisis of 1997 their independence has been 
strengthened. Accounting and auditing professionals in Thailand are under the control 
of the Institute of Certified Accountants and Auditors of Thailand (ICAAT), which is 
now named the Federation of Accounting Professions (FAP). The ICAAT started to 
adopt International Accounting Standards (IASs) for guidance in its accounting standard 
setting in 1987. However, because the ICAAT was under the supervision of Ministry of 
Commerce at that time, all accounting standards had to be approved by the Ministry of 
Commerce. The independence of the standard setting and financial reporting practices 
in Thailand is consequently criticised because it is highly related to political factors 
(Ball et al. 2003). After the 1997 Financial Crisis, the World Bank encouraged the 
establishment of the Thailand Financial Accounting Standards Board, which would 
have the sole authority to issue accounting standards and regulations. The project was 
achieved in 2004 when the FAP was formally established. It now has full power to 
regulate accounting and auditing standards.  
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The FAP fully adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as Thai 
GAAP for the SET50 in 2011 and plans to expand it to all of the listed companies in 
2015. Nonetheless, the effective date for each standard usually provides the benefit of a 
transition period. Therefore, it is currently unknown when the full IFRS/IAS will 
become mandatory in Thailand. In addition, during this evolution period it is impossible 
to be sure that the financial reports in Thailand have met the global standard level. In 
addition, since IAS/IFRS emphasises a principles-based approach, the implementation 
depends on the manager’s and the auditor’s judgement (Ball 2006). Since markets, 
political forces, and economic influences are still local (White 2004), it is still 
impossible to conclude that the financial reporting quality in Thailand has met the 
standard. 
 
Auditors in Thailand are authorised by the FAP under the Accounting Professions Act 
B.E. 2547 (A.D. 2004).
11
 The auditors who certify the financial reports of listed 
companies are also under the Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 (A.D.1992). 
Auditors’ practices are regulated by Thai Standards on Auditing, which are adopted 
from the International Standards on Auditing. Audit firms in Thailand fall into two 
categories: Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms. The Big 4 are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG and Deloitte. Non-Big 4 firms encompass international firms (e.g. Grant 
Thornton and BDO Richfield) and local Thai audit firms. Foreign audit firms are not 
allowed to practise in Thailand without local audit partners. Therefore, the 
establishment of a global audit firm in Thailand is in reality a form of incorporation 
with a local audit firm.  
 
Thailand has a shortage of well-qualified accountants and auditors. Alba et al. (2003) 
comment that the country has unnecessary statutory requirements; for example, 
partnerships and inactive limited enterprises (about 300,000 firms in the survey) have to 
be audited every year. By statutory requirement, each CPA can provide a service to up 
to 300 corporations a year. This regulation thus limits the availability of audit partners. 
                                                 
11
Before the Accounting Professions Act B.E. 2547 (A.D. 2004), auditors were under the Auditor Act 
B.E. 2505 (A.D. 1962). The new Act draws more attention on the qualification of auditors, such as 
auditors are required to attend a training course at least 12 hours a year. 
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As of 2002 there were 4,700 CPAs, but only 2,700 were active and qualified for 
700,000 registered companies in total (White 2004). Therefore, there was an average of 
260 clients per auditor, which almost reaches the maximum level. In the capital markets, 
auditors who want to provide a service for listed companies must register and get 
approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand. At the end of 2009, 
there were 140 certified auditors for 560 companies, 77 of whom work for Big 4 
auditors (SECT 2011). The next subsection will separately review the regulatory body 
of the capital markets in Thailand, including their regulations for financial reporting of 
listed companies.  
 
4.2.2 Thailand’s Capital Market 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) was first started as a limited partnership in 
1962, but it ceased operations in the early 1970s due to poor performance and a lack of 
official government support. The capital market was resurrected in 1975, and it has 
remained in business ever since. In 1999, the SET constructed a new Market for 
Alternative Investment (MAI) to provide an opportunity for small and medium-sized 
companies. Large companies with more than THB 300 million (£5.77 million) in paid-
up capital after IPO can trade in SET, while small and medium-sized enterprises having 
over THB 200 million (£3.8 million) can trade in MAI. However, the MAI market does 
not operate separately; it is considered to be a sector of the SET market. Therefore, 
firms listed in either market are similarly required for reporting, disclosure 
requirements, and corporate governance rules and they all are under the supervision of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand (SECT). The size of Thailand’s 
capital market is relatively small when compared with neighbours (BOT 2011).
12
 The 
number of listed companies has grown slightly, from 518 companies in 2006 to 525 
companies in 2008.  
 
According to the SET (2009) report, more than 50% of investors are local individual 
investors while about 7% are local institutions. The number of foreign investors has 
                                                 
12
Based on the market capitalisation of THB 449.96 million (£8 million) at the end of 2008. It was 1/25 of 
Hang Seng (Hong Kong), 1/33 of Nikkei (Japan), 1/3 of Straits Times (Singapore) and 3/4 of Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (Malaysia).  
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decreased from 33.7% in 2006 to 19.4% in 2009 (SET 2009). A report to World Bank 
by the SECT (2005a) documents that foreign institutional investors are quite active in 
Thailand and often drive the market. Firms that are controlled by a group of foreign 
investors have higher performance of return on assets than firms with no controlling 
shareholders; however, no significant relationship has been found between foreign 
ownership and a firm’s value (i.e. Tobin’s Q) (Wiwattanakantang 2001). The influence 
of foreign investors in disciplining listed firms might be limited and exist in only some 
groups of firms because the Foreign Business Act, B.E. 2542 (A.D.1999) restricts 
foreign share ownership in companies (including listed companies) and the investment 
from foreigners is usually directed into the largest firms. 
 
The ownership of listed companies is not dispersed even when listed. The average of 
ownership concentration is about 44% of all outstanding shares (Alba et al. 2003). 
Families are major shareholders. A survey of 270 Thai listed companies in 1996 shows 
that 70% of the sample is owned by a single family, and 83% of all have controlling 
shareholders involving in management as officers or directors (Wiwattanakantang 
2001). The structure of business groups is also found to be linked through stock 
pyramids and cross-ownership; however, at 13.5% the number of firms having a 
structure of stock pyramids and cross-shareholdings is relatively smaller in the region 
(Claessens et al. 2000).
13
 Even so, some Western firms (e.g. in the U.S., Ireland and 
Finland), or even Japanese firms, do not have ultimate owners who control the company 
through either a pyramid or through cross-holdings (La Porta et al. 1999, p. 499). 
Wealthy families play a major part in the national economy of Thailand: just twenty-six 
wealthy families controlled approximately 66 percent of the market capitalisation in 
2004, and 75 percent for the same number of families in 2001 (SECT 2005a). This high 
ownership concentration and the prevalence of controlling shareholders tend to be a 
major obstacle that weakens corporate governance in Thai firms (Alba et al. 2003; 
Kouwenberg 2010; SECT 2005a). 
 
                                                 
13
The region includes nine countries in the study by Claessens et al. (2000): Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 
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a) Corporate Governance Policies 
Corporate governance has been of major concern to the government and regulators of 
Thailand since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Since 1998, all listed companies are 
required to have an audit committee, and the audit committee members must be 
composed of at least three independent directors (SET 2000b). Companies also need to 
have a code of best practice for board members. The year 2002 was officially 
designated as the Year of Corporate Governance, and the SET introduced a corporate 
governance code for listed companies in this year. The code consists of fifteen 
principles of good governance, similar to existing codes in developed markets (e.g. the 
U.K.). The current fifteen principles of corporate governance are in compliance with the 
2004 Principles of Corporate Governance by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. Most of them are voluntary principles on a “comply or 
explain” basis. If a listed firm does not adopt a particular policy recommended by the 
code, it is expected to provide an explanation in an annual report. A study by 
Ananchotikul et al.(2010) suggests that an adoption of the fifteen principles is likely to 
be given attention by large firms. To date there have only been a few compulsory 
policies, such as facilitating voting through proxy, having an audit committee, and 
having at least three independent directors.  
 
As for banks and financial institutions, they are also under the supervision of the Bank 
of Thailand (BOT). After the collapse of fifty six financial institutions during the crisis, 
the BOT has more strictly enforced good corporate governance; including the guidelines 
of good practices for directors and notifications to spell out the requirements of an 
external auditor’s qualifications (Montreevat 2007). The financial sector is consequently 
excluded in this research project because of the specific regulatory systems and 
accounting for finance companies. 
 
With regard to boards of directors, a listed company is required to have a board of 
directors, which must be composed of at least five directors and the board must meet 
once every three months (Public Company Act of B.E. 2535 (A.D.1992) section 67, 79 
and 80). Since 2006, one-third of the directors (at least three members) must be 
independent directors. The average number of independent directors in Thai listed firms 
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has seldom changed: three in 2002 and four in 2008 (Kouwenberg 2010) and it does not 
differ from the requirement. A possible reason for this may be that the controlling 
shareholders do not desire to see their influence reduced by outside directors. In 
addition, prior research has argued that the governance systems in Thai firms are 
established due to obligations/compliance with regulation, and are not due to an 
appreciation of their benefits (Dhnadirek and Tang 2003; White 2004).  
 
The involvement of controlling shareholders on management and corporate governance 
usually appears and weakens the independence of monitoring systems. Since most Thai 
firms are family-run business, it is frequently found that the board is dominated by 
family members (Nikomborirak 2001). In addition, eighty-eight percent of listed 
companies have a chairman of the board who is also the chief executive officer (CEO) 
(Kouwenberg 2010). Generally, CEOs are monitored by boards of directors. The 
monitoring system is, thus, weakened if the chairman and CEO is the same individual. 
The prevalence of audit committees has been done in a ‘passive’ way (they are often 
established only because they are compulsory) and it is hard to be assured that the audit 
committees are not affiliated with controlling shareholders and management 
(Tengamnuay and Stapleton 2009). Since an audit committee is appointed by boards of 
directors, and because the boards of Thai firms are often composed of family members, 
the boards may appoint affiliated members to serve on the audit committees. 
Accordingly, the appearance of controlling shareholders is likely to reduce the 
independence and effectiveness of the corporate governance systems.  
 
In addition, a cost-benefit trade-off is an inevitable factor in the decision-making for a 
corporate governance policy. Less developed countries, including Thailand, seem to 
have less incentive to improve firm-level governance and one reason involves the 
financing activity choice (Doidge et al. 2007). The incidence of good corporate 
governance is more likely to appear when Thai companies issue equity (Nikomborirak 
2001; White 2004). Kouwenberg (2010) finds that an increase in the implementation of 
voluntary corporate governance practices in Thai firms appears only in some aspects 
(e.g. a disclosure of individual directors’ fees and written ethics code and corporate 
governance policy) and exists only in large firms.  
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Another interesting point of the trade-off in the decision-making for corporate 
governance policy is given by Ananchotikul et al. (2010); that is, firms may prefer 
implementing only costless policies (e.g. a code of ethics and a statement for business 
conduct) to more costly polities (e.g. reforming boards of directors and increasing 
independence in the controlling systems). Ananchotikul et al. (2010) call this group of 
firms a ‘talk-only’ group. They measure the talk-only group by using a dummy variable 
for the firms having a high score (top 33%) for written statement policies but a low 
score (bottom 33%) for either shareholder rights or board structure. Twelve percent of 
the sample in Thailand is found to be in this ‘talk-only’ segment. The results indicate 
that, overall, the voluntary implementation of corporate governance practice reduces the 
likelihood of a firm to violate listing rules, laws and accounting standards; however, the 
talk-only policy increases the likelihood of violations. Accordingly, the findings remind 
us of that the significance of the quality is more essential than its appearance. In a 
similar vein, Chuanrommanee and Swierczek (2007) examined the relationship between 
corporate governance reforms and firms’ operating performance (as measured by ROA) 
after the crisis, basing their study in three countries: Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
Chuanrommanee and Swierczek (2007) did not find a significant relationship between 
corporate governance reforms and operating performance. They argue that the 
prevalence of corporate governance policies in these countries in the post-crisis era is 
more illusion than fact.  
 
In brief, corporate governance in Thailand has been the subject of considerable reform 
after the 1997 crisis. However, because the management and behaviour of Thai firms 
have not changed (White 2004), and because legal enforcement is weak 
(Chuanrommanee and Swierczek 2007), the reforms do not seem to function effectively. 
The SECT (2005a) comments that a majority of the listed companies are family firms 
and they have near absolute control in the corporations. They can effectively control the 
company’s annual general meetings through voting rights. The SECT (2005a) also 
addresses a drawback of the structure of pyramids and cross-holdings.
14
 Therefore, the 
                                                 
14
A pyramidal ownership structure is defined as an entity whose ownership structure displays a top-down 
chain of control (La Porta et al. 1999). The ultimate owner is located at the apex and below are 
successive layers of firms, which all are affiliated. For example, outstanding shares of a public company 
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ownership structure of Thai firms tends to threaten the effectiveness of internal 
corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. boards of directors and audit committees). So 
much so, that it can eventually lower the financial reporting quality of the firms.  
 
Since the prevalence of audit committees in Thailand is in an early stage (Tengamnuay 
and Stapleton 2009) and there is no variation in the number of independent directors for 
listed firms between 2002-2008 (Kouwenberg 2010), these mechanisms are unlikely to 
vary an incidence of accounting misstatements in Thailand. On the other hand, the 
ownership structure is likely to influence the financial reporting and corporate 
governance policies. Due to the constraint of time and data availability, this research 
excludes an examination into the boards of directors and audit committees. Instead, 
following the suggestions by Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) this research will determine 
relationships between ownership structure and accounting misstatements. 
 
There is a group of external monitors who might be able to moderate the agency 
conflicts in the contracting process and to protect the interests of minority shareholders 
and creditors. This group includes external auditors and market regulators.  
 
As is the case in most countries, auditors play an important role in East Asia (Fan and 
Wong 2005). Big 4 auditors can increase detection of earnings management in Thai 
firms, while neither board size nor the proportion of independent directors on boards is 
associated with restraint (Pornupatham 2006). The Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Thailand, who regulate the Thai markets, also play a role in monitoring 
financial reporting of listed firms. Their regulations and monitoring process are 
discussed in the following section.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
A are held by family X, 10%, and by private companies Y and Z, 10% each. It seems that there is no 
ultimate owner in company A. However, in detail family X is the owner of companies Y and Z and 
holds half of shares in both private companies. Ultimately family X has control rights over public 
company A for 30%. Regarding cross-holding structure, if public company A also holds shares of 
company Y, company A has cross-holdings. More examples can be seen in La Porta et al. (1999) and 
Wiwattanakantang (2001). 
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b) Regulations for Financial Reporting 
The Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand (SECT) is the securities regulator 
in Thailand and it regulates every activity of securities business (e.g. listed companies, 
broker/dealer companies, investment advisory companies, registrars and credit rating 
agencies). In terms of corporate financial reporting, CEOs and CFOs of listed 
companies are fully responsible for financial reporting. Annual financial statements 
must be approved by shareholders in the annual general meeting. They should then be 
submitted to the Stock Exchange of Thailand within one month of the annual general 
meeting, and then made available for public access. The annual general meeting must be 
prepared within four months after the end date of fiscal year.   
 
According to Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 (A.D. 1992), section 56, listed 
companies must submit:  
i. Quarterly financial reports;  
ii. Annual financial reports;  
iii. Annual reports; and,  
iv. Any other reports specifically required by the SECT.  
 
Quarterly and annual financial reports must be reviewed and audited by an auditor who 
has been approved by the SECT, respectively. Auditors have to state their findings and 
disclosure the facts material to the financial statements incorrectly prepared by the 
company (section 62). The SECT can suspend or withdraw its authorisation from 
auditors who fail to report such circumstance, and they can be withdrawn or suspended 
of certification. The financial reports of government-owned enterprises are required to 
be audited by auditors of Office of the General Auditor of Thailand.  
 
Regarding penal provisions, any company who fails to submit financial reports shall be 
liable to a daily fine not exceeding THB 100,000 (£2,058), and a further daily fine not 
exceeding THB 3,000 (£62) (section 274). Any director and manager who acts or omits 
to act in order to obtain unlawful gains for himself and causes damage to others (e.g. 
asset misappropriation) shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of five to ten years 
and a fine of THB 500,000 to THB 1,000,000 (£10,290-£20,580) (section 311). The 
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penalty for any director or manager who commits fraudulent financial reporting and 
keeps incomplete inaccurate accounts (section 312) does not differ from the penalty for 
the asset misappropriation case.  
 
The monetary penalty tends not to be costly for the firms and perpetrators. Roughly 
calculated, if a director commits a fraud then he or she is liable to a fine of THB 2 
million (£41,160) (sections 311 and 312). An average value of the accounting 
misstatements that have been found by the SECT is THB 417.6 million (£8.84 
million).
15
 With this amount of misstatement, a fraudulent director may be able to gain a 
certain amount of private benefits, which are considerably higher than the fine of THB 2 
million. Even in the U.S., where legal enforcement is stronger, on average the 
proportion of litigation cost is less than 10% of the total cost imposed on the misstating 
firms (Karpoff et al. 2008).  
 
The process of investigations on accounting allegations by the SECT does not 
substantially differ from that of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (U.S. 
SEC). The SECT was itself modelled on the U.S. SEC. Investigations by the SECT 
include company and securities fraud, and management malpractice. Examples include 
embezzlement by company officials and securities firms, expropriation of assets that 
hurt minority shareholders, false and inadequate financial disclosures, and stock market 
manipulation. The SECT has a practice of regular reviews, as well as random 
inspections, of companies and securities firms. The financial statement review has a 
division that observes companies’ operation and financial reporting. The SECT has two 
main sources where it looks for unusual items and behaviour. The first source includes 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) and newspapers, which it uses to gather 
abnormal trading volumes and insider trading information. Another source is company 
financial reports. Analytical reviews are normally done to uncover accounting 
irregularities. The SECT publishes information on its investigations if wrongdoing is 
found. However, if the infraction is deemed minor, or if the company accepts that it 
must correct the misstatement shortly after the SECT detects and informs them 
                                                 
15
There has never been a document published showing the value of accounting misstatements in Thailand. 
This amount is based on the sample of this research, which is detailed in Chapter 6 and Appendix B. 
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informally, this detection will not be made public. However, the restated financial 
reports must be sent to the SET and released to investors.
16
  
 
Part of the sample in this research is accounting misstatements that were filed in the 
SECT’s enforcement actions. They comprise requirements for accounting corrections 
and announcements of fraud allegations (a violation of the Securities and Exchange Act 
section 312). The remainder comprises accounting misstatements that were detected by 
the companies themselves, or there might be a case where a firm agrees to correct the 
misstatement since an informal contact from the SECT is made. These cases are also 
considered accounting misstatement cases. The researcher collected these cases from 
the restated financial reports, available in Thomson One Banker database. (More details 
of the sample are presented in Chapters 5 and 6.) 
 
The next section discusses previous studies into financial reporting quality in Thai 
firms. The effects of ownership structure, corporate governance, debt orientation are a 
subject of particular focus. 
 
 
4.3 Evidence on Financial Reporting in Thailand 
As discussed earlier in the thesis, financial reporting quality is a multi-dimensional 
construct (Cohen et al. 2004). Many attributes of accounting quality in Thailand have 
been examined by previous studies and they range from the informativeness of earnings, 
earnings management, to accounting allegations.  
 
4.3.1 Informativeness of Reported Earnings 
Informativeness of reported earnings is one attribute of financial reporting quality that 
has been tested since before the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.
17
  Based on the data 
                                                 
16
Details into the review process of the SECT in this paragraph were gathered from the conversation with 
an authority of the SECT, Mr.Thawatchai Kiatkwankul, Head of the Audit Department, on 28 August 
2010. The questions had been approved by the Research Ethics Committee Cardiff Business School. In 
addition, the contents of the process were agreed by Mr. Kiatkwankul. 
  
77 
 
before the crisis, Ball et al. (2003) contend that informativeness of reported earnings in 
East Asian firms, including Thai firms, differs from that of other common-law 
countries; it is even lower than that of code-law countries. Their regression analysis 
shows that accounting income does not significantly respond to negative returns and the 
timeliness of loss recognition is lower than that of other firms in other common law 
countries and code law countries. Vichitsarawong et al. (2010) retested the 
informativeness of earnings in the four East Asian firms across the crisis period. Their 
findings are consistent with Ball et al. (2003) in that the informativeness of reported 
earnings was low both before and during the crisis (i.e. 1995-1998) and the 
informativeness improved after the crisis (i.e. 1999-2004). However, when considered 
by country, the improvement is clearly seen in Malaysia and Singapore, but only 
partially confirmed in Hong Kong and Thailand. The relationship between the reported 
earnings and returns in Hong Kong and Thailand is significant only in the period of 
2003-2004, while it has been significant in Malaysian and Singaporean groups since 
2001. In addition, when scrutinising the corporate governance disclosure scores for each 
country provided by Standard & Poor’s in 2004, they find that the disclosure scores are 
widely distributed, from the best to lowest score they are: Singapore (median score = 
92), Malaysia (64), Hong Kong (38) and Thailand (35). The score of Singapore and 
Malaysia are thus of the order of two-three times that of Hong Kong and Thailand. 
Consequently, a premise that the improvement in earnings informativeness after the 
crisis is an effect of corporate governance reforms is weak in the Hong Kong and 
Thailand samples. The average corporate governance disclosure in Thailand is behind 
that of all of its neighbours. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
17
The informativeness of earnings in this content comprises accounting conservatism and timeliness of 
loss recognition (Fan and Wong 2002; Vichitsarawong et al. 2010). To measure accounting 
conservatism, many prior studies (i.e. Ball et al. 2003; Boonlert-U-Thai and Kuntisook 2009; Herrmann 
et al. 2008; Vichitsarawong et al. 2010) have used Basu’s (1997) reverse regression model. The model 
observes the relationship between returns (an independent variable) and accounting income (the 
dependent variable). A positive relationship is expected (it indicates the sensitivity of accounting 
income to returns). Under accounting conservatism the relationship is expected to be greater when a 
firm’s return has negative balance (a proxy of bad news). A dummy variable of 1 is thus added into the 
model and interacted with the return when firms have negative returns (the coefficient of this interaction 
is anticipated to be positive in order to indicate the sensitivity of accounting income to bad news). The 
timeliness of loss recognition is measured by the adjust R
2
 of this regression model. If the association 
between accounting income and bad news (i.e. negative returns) is strong, the adjust R
2
 will be higher 
and as such accounting income contains timely information of loss. 
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The research into the effects of ownership structures on accounting conservatism in 
Thai samples is available. Boonlert-U-Thai and Kuntisook (2009) found that a higher 
ownership concentration and family ownership have a positive effect on accounting 
conservatism. They also find a significant relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms (i.e. board size, the number of audit committee and number of independent 
directors) and accounting conservatism, but Thai firms are less conservative in reporting 
earnings when firms have a high leverage ratio and a high share value. The latter finding 
is similar to the two incentives of accounts manipulation; i.e., firms with high leverage 
ratio and high share value are more likely to misstate financial reports (Dechow et al. 
2011; Dechow et al. 1996). Therefore, the negative effects of the debt level and the 
share value may lead to a decision to misstate financial reports later. 
 
The evidence of the role of auditors in accounting conservatism is varied, particularly 
when the samples were considered in the period around the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997. Before the crisis (i.e. 1990-1996), Khurana and Raman (2004) did not find a 
variation in accounting conservatism between Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients; yet, during 
the crisis (i.e.1997-1998) Big 4 clients reported more conservative earnings (Herrmann 
et al. 2008). After the crisis (i.e. 1999-2003), Herrmann et al.(2008) argue that both Big 
4 and non-Big 4 clients reported conservative earnings (i.e. firms responded to timely 
loss recognition), but non-Big 4 auditors advanced their work until the quality of their 
clients’ reports did not differ from that of Big 4 clients. However, Boonlert-U-Thai and 
Kuntisook (2009) found an increase in the level of accounting conservatism in Big 4 
clients in a longer period of study (i.e. 2000-2006). A bias in the research results due to 
the crisis should not be an issue for this research because the observations collected 
range from 2001 to 2009. Meanwhile, this research provides evidence on the role of Big 
4 auditors in financial reporting process when measured by an incidence of GAAP 
violation.  
 
In summary, for the attribute of earnings informativeness, it is likely that Thai firms 
generally have an incentive to provide high quality of financial reports and provide 
good corporate governance (such as a use of Big 4 auditors) because by so doing they 
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can maintain their reputation and minimise their costs of capital. Yet, such an intention 
can often be reduced by certain financial pressures (i.e. high debt and high share value). 
 
4.3.2 Earnings Management  
Prior evidence reveals some evidence of earnings manipulation (within GAAP) in Thai 
firms, consistent with incentives revealed in extant research. Charoenwong and Jiraporn 
(2009) examine whether or not Thai firms have an incentive to avoid reporting losses 
and negative earnings growth, both before and after the 1997 crisis. Their work was 
conducted with reference to Degeorge et al.’s (1999) threshold; however, their results 
showed that earnings management reduces in non-financial firms after the crisis. This 
result is somehow surprising because the financial sector is generally more regulated by 
authorities (both by the Bank of Thailand and by the stock exchange) and the 
monitoring is found elsewhere to be more intense after the crisis (Montreevat 2007). 
Nonetheless, since the measure indicates more of a kind of income smoothness than 
aggressive accounting, it can be possible that the financial firms, which have a higher 
proportion of outside investors than non-financial firms, want to maintain their 
performance and not surprise their investors and, therefore, the change of earnings 
number falls within the threshold.  
 
Pornupatham (2006) reveals more on the incentives of earnings management in Thai 
firms by surveying auditors’ perceptions. The first three incentives of earnings 
management in the auditors’ opinion are to increase share prices, to avoid loss, and to 
avoid a decline in earnings growth. The last two of the top three incentives are 
consistent with the findings of Charoenwong and Jiraporn (2009). The pressures 
concerning debt covenants and analysts’ forecasts are not important in the auditors’ 
opinion. Regarding monitors’ roles, the responses agree that Big 4 auditors are more 
capable of detecting earnings management than non-Big 4 auditors. Respondents 
explain that non-Big 4 auditors are less resistant to the management’s discretion, 
particularly when firms are highly concentrated. One limitation of this study is that the 
incentives of earnings management are analysed in the survey, but they were excluded 
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in secondary data analysis. This research project will develop this previous research by 
examining whether these incentives exist if observed in accounting items.  
 
Both this research and that by Pornupatham (2006) have a similar objective to reveal 
incentives of Thai firms in manipulating earnings; however, there are important 
differences between the two studies. The first difference is the dependent variable. 
Pornupatham (2006) focuses on the manipulation within GAAP and measures it by 
discretionary accruals, but this thesis is interested in the cases of GAAP violations. 
Because the question of whether or not earnings manipulation benefits or harms 
shareholders (Bowen et al. 2008; Guay 2008) is still inconclusive, the difficulty here is 
that the earnings management measure may not be strong enough to show a conflict of 
interests among the parties in contracting processes. Additionally, to examine the 
opportunistic accrual management hypothesis by assessing discretionary accruals (e.g. 
from Jones’ (1991) model) is controversial. A number of previous studies have found a 
number of flaws in the models that are used for the assessment of discretionary accruals, 
particularly for the opportunistic accrual management hypothesis (e.g. Guay et al. 1996; 
Young 1999).
18
  
 
Since this research aims to shed light on the principal-principal conflict, the researcher 
needs a reliable measure that can indicate the occurrence of the conflict of interests. 
Since an accounts manipulation signals a wealth transfer (Stolowy and Breton 2004), 
the researcher proposes that GAAP violation can indicate that certain financial 
statements users are being misled by the misstated financial reports (e.g. minority 
shareholders are deceived by fake firm value or debt covenant violations are hidden 
from creditors). Using the GAAP violation as a measure should, therefore, enable the 
researcher to examine how the interests of minority shareholders and creditors are 
                                                 
18
There are two main types of error that can occur due to the use of regression residuals in the 
measurement of discretionary accruals (Guay 2006). First, the residuals can contain non-discretionary 
accruals. Suppose a firm suddenly experiences a negative operating cash flow. This shock affects the 
amount of working capital deviating from the usual and, therefore, the prediction of discretionary 
accruals in that year contaminates this performance-driven shock. Ball and Shivakumar (2006), for 
example, has evidence to support this view. The second type of error occurs due to the estimates of non-
discretionary accruals. For example, Young (1999) finds that the parameters that are employed to 
estimate non-discretionary accruals (e.g. operating cash flow, sales growth and fixed asset structure) are 
significantly associated with the discretionary accruals generated from the frequently-used models (e.g. 
Jones’ 1991 model).  
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expropriated by the firms and controlling shareholders. It also allows the research to 
show what the reactions of capital providers are after they find that they have been 
fooled by the counterfeit financial reports. A GAAP violation is thus likely to be a 
superior measure. The other difference is on the variable of ownership concentration. 
Pornupatham (2006) computed the percentage of the ownership concentration from the 
top ten shareholders. Meanwhile, this research considers all the shareholders who own 
more than 0.5%, it also investigates the shareholders who are private companies with 
the aim of knowing who the ultimate owners are and the levels of their aggregated 
control rights. This further investigation is important because more than a half of Thai 
firms are family-based and their shareholding structure is often in the form of pyramids 
and cross-holdings. Consequently, the aggregated control rights of ultimate owners are 
greater than those that the investors see in the shareholder list.   
 
When ownership structure is taken into account, the incidence of earnings management 
increases in firms with high ownership concentration; however, this result is valid only 
in non-Big 4 clients (Pornupatham 2006). A question is then raised: whether such 
appearance occurs because of the poor quality of non-Big 4 firms. It may be that the 
non-Big 4 auditors are competent but they cannot resist the dominant shareholders’ 
intention (as the interviewees in Pornupatham (2006) suggest), or the controlling 
shareholders may create certain settings which obstruct the auditors from detecting the 
manipulation (Cohen et al. 2002). An occurrence of audit firm change is one of these 
settings. It is possible that the controlling shareholders want to hide their expropriation, 
so they change an audit firm to reduce the possibility of detection. A higher proportion 
of audit firm change for fraud firms than non-fraud firms has been found elsewhere 
(Summers and Sweeney 1998). However, it is also possible that the newly appointed 
auditors are extra vigilant about accounting irregularities. For example, Loebbecke et al. 
(1989) found that more than one third of the frauds were detected in the first two years 
of an auditor’s tenure. If this is the case, then fraud cases can be more easily identified 
and there will be a positive relationship between audit firm change and the occurrence 
of fraud cases in the ex post fraud sample. The relationship between auditor changes and 
the likelihood of accounting misstatements, including the relationship by type of audit 
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switch (suggested by Lennox and Pittman 2010), will be examined further in this 
research.  
 
4.3.3 Accounting Allegations in Thailand 
The two previous subsections yielded two important points for financial reporting in 
Thai firms. Firstly, although high ownership concentration has a positive effect on the 
informativeness of earnings, the quality of earnings reduces when firms have higher 
debt and higher share value (Boonlert-U-Thai and Kuntisook 2009). Secondly, earnings 
management (within GAAP) is also found in Thailand and the Thai managers’ 
incentives are in line with those in other countries (i.e. to avoid reporting loss and 
negative earnings growth and to increase share prices) (Charoenwong and Jiraporn 
2009; Pornupatham 2006). However, it is still inconclusive if earnings management 
costs shareholders (Bowen et al. 2008; Guay 2008), particularly when the manipulation 
is measured by discretionary accruals (Guay 2006). Since this research aims to shed 
light on financial reporting that can be opportunistically used by controlling 
shareholders to extract private benefits, the attribute of financial reports that are in 
violation of GAAP will be focused upon. This section will review the prior studies 
involving accounting misstatements and a particular focus is given to the misstatements 
found by capital market regulators. 
 
Tummanon (2005b) explores the characteristics of Thai firms that were required by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Thailand (SECT) to correct accounting errors, 
and/or provide a special audit, during 2003-2005. A special audit required by the SECT 
generally occurs due to two situations. Firstly, when the SECT suspects a firm’s 
transactions, a further investigation by an independent auditor is required. Secondly, 
when an auditor has a qualified opinion on the submitted financial reports due to the 
limitation of evidence, the firm is required to provide the auditor with adequate 
evidence. In many cases, the investigation starts from a requirement for special audits, 
after which a requirement for accounting correction or an announcement of 
management fraud is initiated. The firms subject to such enforcement appear the most 
frequently in rehabilitation sector (30.8%). Seventy-seven percent of them are audited 
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by non-Big 4 auditors (compared with an average proportion of 43% across the 
market
19
). The primary reasons for the requirements involve understated allowance for 
bad debt (18.7%), revenue recognition (15.25%) and managers’ misconduct (15.25%). 
The share price of the alleged firm reduces after the news of the SECT’s enforcement 
actions is released. An average cumulative abnormal return is -9.78% (Tummanon 
2005a). Since the objective of Tummanon’s (2005b) study is to explore the 
characteristics of the firms and the transactions only, it does not contain any hypothesis 
testing and control group. Hypothesis testing can help to analyse whether there is 
significant evidence to support the predicted determinants of accounting misstatements 
in Thailand, while the prior research could show only the number of the occurrence. In 
addition, an inclusion of a control group in the test can explain why, under the same 
condition, some firms misstate financial reports but some do not. This thesis will 
develop this previous work significantly and contain a control group in order to 
investigate the causes of the accounting allegations in Thai firms. 
 
Ananchotikul et al. (2010) examined whether the corporate governance adoptions assist 
the firm to avoid violating capital market rules and accounting standards. Their study 
gathered a sample of the announcements of the SECT under the news section during 
2003-2006. The violations include management’s expropriation, falsification of 
financial statements, insider trading and market manipulation. These violations are rated 
from 1 to 3, depending on the severity (subject to researchers’ opinions). For instance, a 
failure to submit financial statements on time is scored as 3, financial statements with 
disclaimer of opinion and qualified opinions are scored as 2, while financial statements 
with an adverse opinion are rated as 1. The corporate governance adoptions cover nine 
principles introduced in the SET best practices (SET 2003). A Tobit regression is used 
in the data analysis. After certain variables of the agency conflicts are controlled for, the 
model shows that corporate governance adoption can reduce the likelihood of 
violations. Ownership concentration has no significant impact on the violations in this 
study. Phunnarungsi (2010) further investigates the cost imposed on the sample which 
was used by Ananchotikul et al. (2010). Phunnarungsi (2010) finds that the firms were 
                                                 
19
This proportion is based on the data in this research. It is a ratio of non-Big 4 clients to the total number 
of listed firms during 2003-2005.  
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facing an average abnormal return of -3.55% for day +1, and -4.57% for day 0 to +1. 
There is no difference in this study between the abnormal return of high-governed firms 
and the abnormal return of low-governed firms. The negative abnormal return in 
Phunnarungsi (2010) and Tummanon (2005a) confirms that the participants in the 
Thailand capital market negatively respond to the firm after they know that the firms 
have violated the regulations. 
 
Although there are some overlaps on the data and sample between this thesis and the 
study of Ananchotikul et al. (2010), the research objectives and research designs are 
different. Firstly, Ananchotikul et al. (2010) assessed the effect of voluntary adoption of 
corporate governance in 2002 on the likelihood of subsequent violations in the years 
2003-2006. Their corporate governance variables are nine out of the fifteen governance 
principles suggested by the Stock Exchange of Thailand. On the other hand, this thesis 
desires to discover the causes of accounting misstatements in Thailand. In the extent of 
corporate governance practices, this research specifically focuses on the effectiveness of 
external auditing and the weaknesses in the monitoring system when the chairman of 
the board and the executive officer is the same individual. The potential determinants 
are firm-level characteristics occurring to a firm in an individual year and driving the 
firm to release misstated financial reports at the end of year. Secondly, the dependent 
variable in Ananchotikul et al. (2010) covers a wide range of violations, while this 
thesis focuses only on accounting violation. Ananchotikul et al. (2010) used a two-stage 
Tobit estimation with instrumental variables to serve two research objectives, orderly: 
to predict governance policy adoption by using firm-level characteristics, and to 
examine an impact of the adoption on a likelihood of violations. Ananchotikul et al. 
(2010) contribute to the literature on the determinants of corporate governance adoption 
(Doidge et al. 2007) and show an effect of the adoption on a probability of subsequent 
violations. This thesis uses logistic regression models to discover the determinants of 
accounting misstatements in Thai firms. The thesis expects to contribute the significant 
causes of GAAP violation in order to answer why accounting misstatements appear in 
some firms and do not in other firms.  
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To summarise, there is evidence of an improvement of the quality of financial reporting 
in Thailand after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. However, whether the 
improvement is caused by corporate governance reforms is an ambiguous point of 
debate. Controlling shareholders tend to be a key factor of both financial reporting and 
corporate governance implementation. Under certain circumstances (e.g. high 
ownership concentration, financial constraints and high expectation from capital 
markets), the quality of financial reports tends to reduce. Even so, these circumstances 
have rarely been tested, particularly when the quality of financial reports is measured by 
an incidence of GAAP violation. This research will examine the determinants of 
accounting misstatements in Thai listed firms. The consequences imposed on the 
misstating firms are also of interest, yet these have not been investigated in prior 
studies. The next subsection contains the contributions that the research expects to make 
to the literature. 
 
 
4.4 Expected Contributions from the Case of Thailand  
The determinants of accounting misstatements have been previously been explored in 
the literature, but most of the studies have been conducted in cases where the managers 
are originators of the agency conflict. This thesis will shed light on the principal-
principal conflict. Thailand is selected to serve as a sample for two important reasons. 
Firstly, Thailand is one of the East Asian countries where previous research has found 
an expropriation of controlling shareholders (such as through poor firm performance). 
Secondly, there have been some previous studies that have drawn attention to the cases 
of accounting irregularities found by the SECT (Tummanon 2005a, b) and the effect of 
corporate governance on the likelihood of violations (Ananchotikul et al. 2010). This 
research project can further the prior work and contribute some insights to the literature. 
The following areas are expected to benefit from the study into public companies in 
Thailand: 
 
1. Based on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 
1986) and a proper conceptual framework (Coffee 2006; Jiambalvo 1996; 
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Wahlen 2004), this thesis creates a systematic research design for the 
determinants of accounting misstatements, which contain both incentives and 
corporate governance mechanisms into one model. Prior research involving 
Thailand has missed this (e.g. Pornupatham 2006). Although some studies (e.g. 
Ananchotikul et al. 2010) have included both groups of factors, since the 
incentives are not their research focus this means that the incentives of financial 
statements preparers in Thailand (raised by Ball et al. 2003) have not been 
thoroughly revealed.  
2. A study into both the determinants and consequences of accounting 
misstatements should provide a comprehensive understanding on the cost-
benefit trade-off for financial misreporting decision. The research into both 
dimensions is limited in the literature (Dechow et al. 2010). 
3. The evidence on how the ownership relates to the likelihood of accounting 
misstatements is lacking in the literature. High ownership concentration presents 
a high potential for agency conflict between controlling shareholders and outside 
investors. The study into the ex post accounting misstatements will reveal the 
incentives of the controlling shareholders in accounts manipulation. Moreover, 
the study into the ownership of Thai firms will enlarge the firm-level database 
for ownership in emerging market economies. The ownership information in 
Thailand is normally restricted because they are available only in the Thai 
language and often required supplemental documents in respect of shareholders 
of private companies (Wiwattanakantang 2001). This thesis will gather the data 
of the ownership and further track down to the shareholders of the private 
companies in the pyramids structure. Extensive manual work will increase the 
data for the interested researchers. 
4. The financial structure that is primarily based on debt for Thai firms is a well-
qualified setting to verify the debt hypothesis and contribute to the literature on 
how accounting quality plays a role in debt contracting, suggested by Armstrong 
et al. (2010).  
5. Previous studies have found that Big 4 auditors serve a corporate governance 
role in safeguarding accounting information in East Asia (Fan and Wong 2005) 
and Thailand (Boonlert-U-Thai and Kuntisook 2009; Pornupatham 2006). This 
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research will shed further light on the roles of Big 4 auditors in detecting 
accounting misstatements. This thesis will also examine whether an audit firm 
change signals a likelihood of an accounting misstatement in Thai firms.  
6. In the Stock Exchange of Thailand, firms under rehabilitation are separately 
categorised into the REHABCO sector. It is interesting to examine whether or 
not the profitability requirement and the financial distress of these firms has an 
impact on the financial reporting quality of these firms. The result will be of 
potential interest to both investors and regulators. 
 
 
4.5 Summary 
The principal-principal conflict replaces the shareholder-agent conflict in the 
environment of high ownership concentration. The principal-principal relationship is 
argued to be firmly embedded in ultimate ownership structures of South-East Asian 
firms, including Thailand (Claessens et al. 2000; Fan and Wong 2002; Young et al. 
2008). The event of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 led to the revelation of weak 
corporate governance and the opacity of financial reporting in the region, and the 
ownership structure has been considered to be a primary cause of these problems. 
Although corporate governance has been very much improved after the crisis, previous 
research has not yet confirmed its outcome on a firm’s performance and financial 
reporting quality. The reason for this engages two possible factors that remain 
unchanged: the country’s legal enforcement and Thailand’s corporate ownership 
structures that are still dominated by controlling shareholders.  
 
In general, there is evidence showing that the family ownership in Thai firms has a 
positive effect on a firm’s performance and informativeness of reported earnings 
(Boonlert-U-Thai and Kuntisook 2009; Wiwattanakantang 2001). However, when there 
is a divergence between cash flow and voting rights, then the possibility of taking 
private benefits of control by controlling shareholders increases. The incentives of the 
financial statement preparers (i.e. controlling shareholders) are more significant than 
accounting standards in Thailand. Therefore, the incentives of controlling shareholders 
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in the financial reporting process are interesting to be explored. With regard to the 
corporate governance, the involvement of the controlling shareholders in the 
management and monitoring systems weakens the effectiveness and independency of 
the corporate governance mechanisms. The roles of external monitors, such as auditors, 
become more outstanding in the monitoring systems, but since the controlling 
shareholders have a high proportion of voting rights, they might enable to govern the 
monitoring role of the auditing, such as change an audit firm. Therefore, in the 
prevalence of controlling shareholders it likely appears that the controlling shareholders 
have an impact on both corporate governance mechanisms and financing reporting 
process. It is thus interesting to examine how ownership, controlling managers’ 
incentives and corporate governance are associated with the occurrence of accounting 
misstatements. 
 
This thesis contains studies of the determinants and consequences of accounting 
misstatements in Thailand. The first objective of this research is to continue exploring 
the determinants of accounting misstatements in the context of the principal-principal 
conflict. These insights will benefit outside investors so that they can be aware of, and 
have more confidence in using, financial reports of Thai firms. In addition, regulators 
will be able to apprehend the underlying causes of financial misreporting in Thai firms, 
and with this knowledge, they will enable to solve the problems effectively. The second 
objective of this research is to assess the economic consequences imposed to the 
misstating firms after accounting misstatements are revealed, with particular focus on 
subsequent external financing capability. The capital structure of debt orientation in 
Thai firms provides fruitful institutional setting for determining the creditors’ and 
minority shareholders’ responses to the low quality of financial reports. The results can 
contribute significantly to the literature on how accounting quality plays a role in debt 
contracting and outside investors’ decision-making in an emerging market.  
 
Taking together with the literature on the causes and consequences of accounting 
misstatements and on the characteristics of Thai firms, this research has established a set 
of empirical predictions for the determinants and economic consequences of accounting 
misstatements in Thailand. These are presented in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters, this thesis reviewed the theoretical background and the empirical 
evidence on the causes and consequences of accounting misstatements (Chapters 2 and 
3) as well as the institutional settings and evidence on financial reporting quality in 
Thailand (Chapter 4). Based on this evidence, it can be seen that there is a limitation in 
the literature on the causes and consequences of accounting misstatements in 
concentrated ownership systems. This research project aims to address this issue. In so 
doing, Thai firms are sampled because their characteristics are in accordance with firms 
in a concentrated ownership system and there is evidence showing a conflict of interests 
between controlling shareholders and outside investors in the country. Based on 
theoretical justifications drawn from previous studies and the rationale of this study, a 
conceptual framework showing relationships of the relevant factors and empirical 
predictions for the case of Thailand are developed and presented in this chapter. A 
rigorous research design is then constructed and discussed in this chapter. The data and 
analysis will be presented in the following two chapters.   
 
The next section presents the study’s conceptual framework. Then, Section Three 
details empirical predictions. Section Four discusses how the research methodology was 
prepared. Section Five demonstrates the sample and data collection and Section Six 
considers the statistical tools for data analysis.  
 
 
5.2 Conceptual Framework 
The timeline of an occurrence of accounting misstatements and the relevant factors of 
the occurrence (Bowen et al. 2008; Jiambalvo 1996; Wahlen 2004) that were previously 
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reviewed in the preceding chapters are integrated into a conceptual framework 
employed by this research (see Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1: Conceptual Framework of Accounting Misstatements  
Entire Framework             
                               
 
 
 
 
Part I:  Determinants of Causes 
Accounting misstatement=f(ownership, incentives, monitoring, control variables)               
                               
 
 
 
       Independent Variable                   Dependent Variable 
Part II:  Consequences 
Financing ability = f(accounting misstatement, control variables) 
 
                                                             Independent Variable              Dependent Variable 
 
Overall, the timeline shows a set of antecedent circumstances that, in combination, 
create a fertile ground for accounting misstatements (Wahlen 2004, p. 183). Then after 
the accounting misstatements are revealed the company may be penalised by lenders 
and minority shareholders. The subsequent financing activities of misstating firms are 
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therefore focused on in this thesis. The research project thus has two main parts of the 
analysis. 
 
The first part is an examination in the determinants of accounting misstatements in 
Thailand. The body of literature suggests the important influences of firms/managers’ 
incentives and corporate governance mechanisms on the likelihood of accounting 
misstatements (e.g. Bowen et al. 2008; Jiambalvo 1996). In addition, the influence of 
ownership structure is also of interest because the ownership structure is an origin of the 
agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Young et al. 2008) and it is correlated 
with the corporate governance policies (Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009). Leuz et al. 
(2003) also raised the question that there might be a relationship between ownership and 
accounts manipulation at firm-level. As a result, the ownership structure, controlling 
shareholders’ incentives, and corporate governance mechanisms are proposed to be 
significant determinants of accounting misstatements in Thailand. The incidence of 
accounting misstatements is the dependent variable in this stage. 
 
The second part of the study will assess the economic consequences that have occurred 
to the misstating firms after the misstatements are revealed. In this stage, the occurrence 
of accounting misstatements is one independent variable affecting the subsequent 
financing activities of the misstating firms. This study considers the consequence of this 
after the end of the year of the announcement date. 
 
Linked from the relationships of the variables that have been described in this section, a 
set of hypotheses is developed and discussed in the next section.  
 
 
5.3 Empirical Predictions 
Based on the research questions (Chapter 1, Section 1.2) and the body of literature that 
has been reviewed in Chapters 2 to 4, the researcher has developed a set of hypotheses 
for the determinants and economic consequences of an accounting misstatement for the 
Thai sample. They are presented as part of the group of determinants as follows. 
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5.3.1 Ownership 
There are three attributes of ownership that prior studies have tested to determine 
whether or not they have an impact on the quality of financial reporting, they are 
ownership concentration, owner identity, and the divergence between voting rights and 
cash-flow rights (i.e. the existence of pyramids and cross-holdings). 
 
Gaining effective control of a corporation enables controlling shareholders to control 
the corporate operations, including the financial reporting policies. There are two 
perspectives of the influences of controlling shareholders on the quality of financial 
reports, which are: entrenchment effects and alignment effects (Fan and Wong 2002; 
Morck et al. 2005). On one hand, the controlling shareholders are less inclined to 
provide high quality of financial reports and there are three possibilities for this scenario 
that the prior studies discussed. Firstly, controlling shareholders distort accounting 
numbers to bury the wealth effects of their expropriation activities. Secondly, their 
expropriation can be anticipated by outside investors who already discount the stock 
prices or charge high interest rates, so the benefit that the firms can earn if the firms 
invest more is deemed to be only slight. Thirdly, the number of transactions with 
outside parties is likely to be smaller than that of dispersed ownership firms, so that a 
cost-benefit trade-off limits the information disclosures. Empirical evidence by Fan and 
Wong (2002) supports this scenario: there is a negative relationship between the 
pyramidal structure and the informativeness of earnings in East Asian firms including 
Thai firms. On the other hand, since the expropriation is predictable, controlling 
shareholders want to assure outside investors that they have an incentive to align their 
interests with that of outsiders and, therefore, an alignment effect occurs. Controlling 
shareholders commit to provide high quality financial reports. Boonlert-U-Thai and 
Kuntisook (2009) support this alignment viewpoint. They find a positive relationship 
between the ownership concentration and informativeness of earnings. Whether the 
controlling shareholders use financial reporting as a commitment mechanism or if they 
use it to facilitate greater extraction of private benefits is still an open question 
(Armstrong et al. 2010) and the evidence on the association between ownership 
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structure and the quality of financial reports in Thailand is also inconclusive. When 
assessed by discretionary accruals, no significant relationship has been found between 
the ownership concentration and earnings management (Pornupatham 2006). There has 
never been a study into the relationship between the ownership and accounting 
misstatements in Thailand case. In China, the likelihood of fraud increases when the 
ownership is concentrated in the government’s hands (Firth et al. 2011). Since accounts 
manipulation may signal a wealth transfer (Stolowy and Breton 2004), the group that 
earns the benefit of an accounts manipulation in concentrated ownership systems is 
more likely to be controlling shareholders. The interviewees in Pornupatham (2006) 
stated that local audit firms are less resistant to the management’s discretion, 
particularly when firms are highly concentrated. Therefore, this research predicts that 
when a firm misleads financial statement users, high ownership concentration is more 
likely to be more accommodating of the opportunism of controlling shareholders. 
Therefore, the first empirical prediction of this research is that:  
 
Hypothesis 1.1: There is a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and accounting misstatements.
20
  
 
In addition, the ownership arrangement of pyramids and cross-holdings in East Asian 
and Thai firms creates divergence in the voting rights and cash-flow rights, and it 
increases the possibility of expropriation by controlling shareholders (Morck et al. 
2005). Family ownership also lowers the quality of financial reporting, which can be 
measured by a higher cost of debt (Boubakri and Ghouma 2010). In Thailand 70% of 
listed companies are owned by a single family (Wiwattanakantang 2001) and 
approximately 13.5%-17.4% of listed companies have pyramidal and cross-holdings 
ownership structures (Claessens et al. 2000; Wiwattanakantang 2001). Although the 
proportion of firms having a complex structure in Thailand is smaller than that of other 
firms in the same region (Claessens et al. 2000), this structure rarely exists in Western 
firms (La Porta et al. 1999). Therefore, it is interesting to examine whether the complex 
ownership structure as well as the family ownership are associated with accounting 
misstatements. As accounting misstatements signal a wealth transfer (Stolowy and 
                                                 
20
Accounting misstatements here mean the occurrence and not the magnitude. 
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Breton 2004), so the existences of group affiliation and family ownership are likely to 
be positively associated with the likelihood of accounting misstatements. Consequently, 
two hypotheses are: 
 
Hypothesis 1.2: There is a positive relationship between family ownership and 
accounting misstatements.  
 
Hypothesis 1.3: There is a positive relationship between the existence of a 
pyramid structure and accounting misstatements.  
 
5.3.2 Incentives 
In the context of the principal-principal conflict, financial motives are expected to be an 
important factor for a decision to misstate financial reports (the arguments were 
developed in Chapter 2). Prior studies in other countries (i.e. the U.S., the U.K., Malaysia 
and China) have found that firms are more likely to misstate financial reports because 
they wish to minimise their cost of capital (e.g. Dechow et al. 2011; Dechow et al. 1996; 
Efendi et al. 2007; Skousen et al. 2008), they are highly constrained by debt covenants 
(Firth et al. 2011), and they are distressed and face the possibility of bankruptcy (e.g. 
Hasnan et al. 2008). In Thailand firms are financed by debt more than equity (Alba et al. 
2003); consequently, Thai firms are likely to be constrained by debt covenants. A debt 
covenant violation is costly (Roberts and Sufi 2009), and so the likelihood that a firm 
will misstate financial reports increases when they are close to a debt covenant 
violation.
21
 Therefore, an alternative hypothesis for the debt hypothesis is that:  
 
Hypothesis 2.1: There is a positive relationship between the leverage ratio and 
accounting misstatements.  
 
                                                 
21
As discussed in Chapter 2, this research acknowledges a limitation of the leverage ratio to proxy a 
violation of debt covenants (Dichev and Skinner 2002). The assessment of debt hypothesis refers to the 
closeness to debt covenant violation rather than technical defaults because the data on debt defaults are 
unavailable for the Thai sample. 
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In terms of the incentive to minimise the cost of capital, the likelihood of accounting 
misstatements increases in the year when firms issue shares, this is an ex post measure of 
financing need (e.g. Dechow et al. 2011; Efendi et al. 2007). It also increases when firms 
have negative free cash flow, which is an ex ante measure of financing need (e.g. 
Dechow et al. 1996; Skousen et al. 2008). There is no record of either situation being 
influential over earnings manipulation in Thailand. Nonetheless, since the sample of this 
research is listed firms, it is possible for both incentives to occur in the Thai sample and 
the direction of the relationship is expected to be similar to that found in the previous 
studies. Therefore, the two empirical predictions for the Thai sample are: 
 
Hypothesis 2.2: There is a positive relationship between share issuances and 
accounting misstatements. 
  
Hypothesis 2.3: There is a positive relationship between negative free cash 
flow and accounting misstatements.  
 
A survey by Pornupatham (2006) suggests that Thai firms are more likely to manipulate 
earnings in order to maintain market expectations. Empirical results from prior studies 
(e.g. Dechow et al. 2011; Ettredge et al. 2010) also show that firms are more likely to 
misstate financial reports when their shares have a high market-to-book ratio. This may 
be because the high value of a firm indicates that the capital market participants have 
high expectations for the firm’s growth and incoming cash flow. When the firm’s real 
financial status is less than their investor’s expectations, then it is more likely that the 
firms will misstate financial reports because the cost of not reaching the benchmark 
seems too high (Graham et al. 2005). Consequently, there is also likely to be a positive 
relationship between capital market pressures and the likelihood of accounting 
misstatements in Thailand.
22
 
 
                                                 
22
This research recognises that the capital market pressure can be assessed by such measures as analyst 
forecasts (e.g. Perols 2011; Perols and Lougee 2011). However, the data on analyst forecasts are 
missing more than a half of the sampled firms (i.e. the researcher found 142 firm-years are available on 
the I/B/E/S), while prior studies (e.g. Ciccone and Etebari 2004) found in the same source for 192 firms 
out of 520 firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Therefore, the research uses the market-to-
book ratio for this hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 2.4: There is a positive relationship between capital market 
pressure and accounting misstatements.  
 
The significance of the regulation driver, such as the profitability regulation in Chen et 
al. (2001), is also important in the Thai sample. Thailand has the regulation of 
rehabilitation (as detailed in Chapters 2 and 4), and the firms that were subject to the 
accounting enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand 
(SECT) were most often found to be in the REHABCO sector (Tummanon 2005b). 
Therefore, there may be a positive relationship between the rehabilitation status and the 
likelihood of accounting misstatements. However, firms in rehabilitation can be 
specially scrutinised by creditors because of their incapability of making repayments. In 
addition, these firms’ financial reports face more scrutiny by the SECT, particularly in 
the year when the firms are permitted to resume a normal status. On the other hand, 
extra monitoring might discipline firms in rehabilitation, meaning the likelihood of the 
decision to misstate financial reports can be mitigated. Therefore, the prediction is 
formed as a two-way hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2.5: There is a relationship between rehabilitation status and 
accounting misstatements.  
 
5.3.3 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
As set out in Chapter 2 above, monitoring activities are an important factor (besides the 
relationship between incentives and accounting misstatements) constraining the 
likelihood of accounting misstatements. External auditors are fully responsible for 
monitoring the quality of financial reports and audit quality should influence the 
occurrence of accounting misstatements. Empirical research has tested many 
dimensions of audit quality (i.e. audit firm, audit firm change, auditor change, and 
audit opinion), though empirically, many are not statistically associated with the 
occurrence of accounting misstatements, particularly in the U.S. samples (e.g. Skousen 
et al. 2008; Skousen and Wright 2006). Nonetheless, Big 4 auditors have been shown 
to reduce the likelihood defective accounting items in the U.K. (Peasnell et al. 2001) 
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and Canadian (Smaili and Labelle 2009) samples. In Asia, auditors play an important 
role in the monitoring process (Fan and Wong 2005). In Thailand, the quality of 
financial reports is higher for Big 4 clients than non-Big 4 clients when measured by 
discretionary accruals (Pornupatham 2006) and accounting conservatism (Boonlert-U-
Thai and Kuntisook 2009). Three-fourths of accounting allegations found by the SECT 
were audited by local audit firms (Tummanon 2005b). Therefore, the Big 4 auditors 
may be able to protect against and detect accounting misstatements before financial 
reports are released. Accordingly, a negative relationship between the use of a Big 4 
auditor and the occurrence of accounting misstatements in Thai firms is expected.  
 
Hypothesis 3.1: There is a negative relationship between the use of a Big 4 
auditor and accounting misstatements.  
 
Additionally, in concentrated ownership systems it is likely that the controlling 
shareholders dominate the monitoring mechanisms (Salacuse 2006). They can also set 
the environment of the monitoring process, either to govern the monitors or to be 
governed by the monitors (Cohen et al. 2002). The influence of management in making 
an auditor change appears to increase when the CEO is dominant on the board (Cohen 
et al. 2010). In Thailand, 88% of 546 listed companies have CEOs serving as chairmen 
of the board (Kouwenberg 2010) and it is possible that controlling shareholders change 
their audit firm in misstatement years because they want to avoid being detected. It is 
consequently interesting to investigate whether there is a relation between an audit firm 
change and the likelihood of an accounting misstatement. Elsewhere, a higher 
proportion of audit firm change has been found in fraudulent firms than in non-
fraudulent firms (Summers and Sweeney 1998). In addition, the newly appointed 
auditor is new to the firm. He or she has a higher risk of failing to detect the accounting 
misstatements and, therefore, a positive relationship between the likelihood of 
accounting misstatement and short audit tenure has been found (e.g. Carcello and Nagy 
2004; Stanley and Todd DeZoort 2007). In contrast, a newly appointed auditor may not 
be aligned with the controlling shareholders; he or she may perceive this as a risk and 
be more aware of the accounting misstatements. In this case, the auditor is more likely 
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to detect accounting irregularities during the audit process and the appearance of 
accounting misstatements (i.e. when financial reports go public) consequently 
decreases. For instance, more than one third of frauds have been found to be detected in 
the first two years of an auditor’s tenure (Loebbecke et al. 1989). This second 
perspective will result in a negative relationship between an auditor change and the 
likelihood of accounting misstatements and will be in line with, for example, a negative 
association between audit tenure and earnings management in Taiwanese firms (Chen et 
al. 2008; Chi and Huang 2005). On the other hand, in the U.S. sample of Myers et al. 
(2005), there is no significant relationship found between the length of audit tenure and 
restatement cases. Because the effect of an auditor change on the likelihood of 
accounting misstatements has been found in both directions, the prediction is set as a 
two-way hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3.2: There is a relationship between an audit firm change and 
accounting misstatements.  
 
Additionally, because the point of an audit firm change is still an open issue in the 
literature (as explained above), this thesis will further examine how the relationship 
occurs (i.e. whether the controlling shareholders govern, or are governed by, the 
auditor). This research will test the relationship between the likelihood of accounting 
misstatements and the sorts of audit firm change (i.e. lateral switch (e.g. from Big 4 to 
Big 4), downgrade (from Big 4 to non-Big 4), and upgrade (from non-Big 4 to Big 4)). 
The types of the audit switch used here follow the categorisation of Lennox and Pittman 
(2010). The empirical predictions for the types of audit switch are detailed later in 
Chapter 6.  
 
In addition to the effect of the external monitors, prior studies have found an effect of 
internal monitoring activities on the likelihood of accounting misstatements. One 
measure of internal monitoring activities which has been found to be significant in 
monitoring financial reporting quality is the duality position (Larcker et al. 2007); i.e., 
where a CEO is also chairman of the board. Even in dispersed ownership firms, this 
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duality position exists and it increases the likelihood of accounting misstatements (e.g. 
Dechow et al. 1996; Efendi et al. 2007; Peasnell et al. 2001; Skousen et al. 2008; 
Skousen and Wright 2006). In Thailand, this duality position appears in almost 90% of 
listed companies (Kouwenberg 2010) and, therefore, it is also expected that the duality 
position will be a significant determinant of the likelihood of accounting misstatements 
in Thailand.  
 
Hypothesis 3.3: There is a positive relationship between duality position and 
accounting misstatements.  
 
5.3.4 Economic Consequences of Accounting Misstatements 
Since an occurrence of accounting misstatements may signal a wealth transfer and the 
low quality of the firm’s financial reporting process (Stolowy and Breton 2004), an 
announcement of an accounting misstatement is hypothesised to negatively affect 
financing activities of misstating firms. Like the empirical function of the post-stage in 
the study of Bowen et al. (2008), if an accounting misstatement is a manifestation of the 
opportunism that is stronger than the capability of monitoring then there should be a 
consequent loss in stakeholder wealth which can be used as evidence of the abuse. As 
far as external financing activities are concerned, previous studies have found that the 
announcement of accounting misstatements has an adverse effect on bank loan 
contracting (Graham et al. 2008) and financing capability (Chen et al. 2009) for 
misstating firms. Accordingly, an ability of misstating firms to get new loans tends to be 
restricted in the post-announcement period. Similarly, the announcement of accounting 
misstatements reduces the credibility of the firms and the equity holders react 
negatively, share prices fall (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996; Palmrose et al. 2004) and equity 
investors require a higher rate of return (Hribar and Jenkins 2004). In Thailand the share 
prices of misstating firms also fall significantly after the revelation of accounting errors 
(Tummanon 2005a). Therefore, if misstating firms in Thailand issue new shares after 
the announcement of accounting misstatements then the proceeds from the stock 
issuance are inclined to be lower. Collectively, an announcement of accounting 
misstatements is likely to affect both the share and debt choices. Therefore, when 
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measured by the flow of capital, the external financing ability of misstating firms is 
likely to be affected by the announcement of accounting misstatements in the post-
announcement period. The hypothesis is that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between an announcement of 
accounting misstatements and subsequent external financing activities.   
 
This research project follows the methodology of the study by Roberts and Sufi (2009), 
who examined the amount of funds that the firms earn after firms violated debt 
covenants (which is one example of the incentive conflict between firms and creditors). 
This thesis determines the dynamics of the amount of funds shown in the cash flow 
statements during the first two fiscal years (i.e. year t+1 and t+2) after the revelation of 
misreporting. The focused period for the event of accounting misstatements is shown in 
Figure 5.2 below. 
 
Figure 5.2: Timeline for the Period of Misstatements 
 Pre-misstatement period Misstatement 
Year(s) 
Announcement 
 
Post-misstatement period  
        
        
 year t-2 year t-1                   year t year t+1 year t+2  
 
The misstatement year (year t) ranges from the misstatement fiscal years to the year 
when accounting misstatements are revealed. The research interest of an economic 
consequence is drawn upon the post-announcement period (year t+1 and t+2). Prior 
studies have also investigated the consequence of misstatements in the first two-year 
period after they are revealed (e.g. Chen et al. 2009). One possible reason for this 
involves the disclosure of the restated items in comparative financial statements. The 
restated items in year t will last appear as the beginning balance of fiscal year t+1, when 
compared with the financial statements of year t+2. 
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This section has illustrated the empirical predictions for the determinants and economic 
consequences of accounting misstatements in Thai firms. The next section will discuss 
the research methodology that will be used to test the empirical predictions. 
 
 
5.4 The Research Methodology 
To achieve the research objectives and address the hypotheses above, a detailed 
research process was planned. The research process can be viewed as a series of linked 
stages in a linear manner (Saunders et al. 2007). After identifying the research questions 
(as presented in Chapter 1) and critically reviewing the literature (Chapters 2 to 4), the 
research hypotheses were developed (as shown in the previous section). The following 
step is to construct a rigorous and appropriate research design for the testing of the 
hypotheses, which will be described in this section.  
 
A comprehensive understanding of the ‘research onion’ (Saunders et al. 2007) (see 
Figure 5.3) helped clarify the researcher’s position in the development of knowledge for 
this research project.  
 
Figure 5.3: The Research Onion 
Positivism
Survey
Case Study
Grounded 
Theory
Ethnography
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Experiment
Cross-sectional
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and data analysis
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Mixed-method
Multi-method
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Pragmatism
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Choices
Time horizon
Techniques and 
procedures
Inductive
Deductive
 
Source: Saunders et al. (2007, p. 132). 
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The principles of positivism and deductive approach were applied in this research. The 
research technique which is used is an archival research strategy, which uses 
administrative records (i.e. enforcement actions by the SECT) and documents (i.e. 
financial reports) as the principal source of data. This research used a single data 
collection technique from secondary data sources (which is called mono method) and 
the data were observed for a particular phenomenon (i.e. accounting misstatements) at a 
particular time (i.e. 2001 to 2009), which is considered to be a cross-sectional study 
(Wooldridge 2006). The justification for these attributes is detailed as follows. 
 
5.4.1 Research Philosophy 
“Mainstream accounting research is dominated by a belief in physical realism-the claim 
that there is a world of objective reality that exists independently of human beings and 
that has a determinate nature or essence that is knowable” (Chua 1986, p. 606). Jensen 
(1993) asserts that economists and management scholars in the 1990s were developing 
positive theories of the world to understand how the firm, capital providers, and control 
systems work and how they interact with the other control forces (e.g. product markets, 
legal and regulatory systems, and the capital markets). The positive theories of cause 
and effect relationships allow an understanding of the subject’s existence. The principal-
agent theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is one of the positive theories attempting to 
discover a knowable, objective reality of a firm (Chua 1986). Accounting research that 
is based on agency theory has stimulated an understanding into the role of financial 
accounting in contractual relationships between managers and shareholders (Ryan et al. 
2002, p. 107). 
 
The principles of positivism, mainly guided by Chua (1986) and Guba and Lincoln 
(1994), can be summarised as follows. 
1. The ontological assumption, which involves the belief of reality. The objects 
already exist and they are independent of the researchers’ perception. There are 
general laws or theories that govern the world, and these need to be tested so 
that we can understand the world (Creswell, 2009).  
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2. The epistemological assumption, which concerns the relationship between the 
researchers and what is being researched. Positivists observe the event 
independently and gather data, evidence, and rational considerations to shape 
knowledge.   
3. The methodological assumption, which entails how researchers discover and 
validate reality. Researchers use observations to verify the theory as 
representative of general laws. A deductive approach can be used here which 
derives the hypotheses from theories and then formally tests these via the 
collected observations.  
Researchers in the area of the principal-agent literature believe that the reality of 
accounting misstatements exists (as theoretically claimed by the agency theory and 
empirically supported by prior empirical evidence) and waits for researchers to discover 
‘the truth’ about them. The discoveries of the determinants and economic consequences 
of accounting misstatements in concentrated ownership systems (the research objectives 
of this thesis) will enable the researcher to generalise the truth of the agency theory in 
concentrated ownership systems. Based on the literature review, previous principal-
agent studies were primarily conducted under the positivist paradigm and used a 
deductive approach, which is in accordance with the approach of the positivist paradigm 
(as stated in the methodology assumption above). This study maintains the deductive 
approach and its details are presented in the next subsection.  
 
5.4.2 Research Approach 
This research project implements a deductive approach. The process of deduction (as 
explained in Bryman and Bell 2007, pp. 7-14) is that a researcher deduces hypotheses 
on the basis of what is known about a particular domain (i.e. the agency theory and 
opportunistic financial reporting in the context of this research) and then translate them 
into operational terms. This translation process can be referred to as operationalisation 
(Bryman and Bell 2007); in other words, to devise measures of the concept that the 
researcher is interested in. Data are then collected and analysed in order to test the 
hypotheses. The researcher’s findings are finally fed back into the stock of the 
knowledge (or theory in the domain). All of these procedures are similar to what 
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Bryman (1988) explained for the quantitative research process and the structure of these 
manners (see Figure 5.4).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bryman (1988, p. 20).  
 
The research process of this thesis is in accordance with the structure suggested by 
Bryman (1988) and the relevant chapter(s) and section(s) for each step are presented in 
the blankets in Figure 5.4. Out of the five phrases, the first two stages have already 
performed and described in the preceding chapters. The literature was reviewed in 
Theory and Empirical 
Evidence 
(Chapters 2 to 4)  
 
Hypothesis 
(Chapter 5, Section 5.3)  
Deduction 
Data Processing 
Operationalisation 
Observations/  
Data Collection 
(Chapter 5, Section 5.5) 
Data Analysis 
(Chapters 6 and 7) 
Findings 
(Chapter 8, Section 8.2) 
Interpretation 
Main Phases Intervening Processes 
(Chapter 8, Section 8.3) 
Induction 
Figure 5.4: The Logical Structure of the Quantitative Research Process 
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Chapters 2 to 4 that pioneering research has applied the agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976) in explaining an occurrence of accounting misstatements.
23
 Many 
rational insights of the determinants of financial misreporting have been introduced 
from these positive theories (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996; Efendi et al. 2007). The research 
is consistent with prior studies in considering that the agency theory can be used to 
explain an occurrence of accounting misstatements in concentrated ownership systems. 
A taxonomy of theory of the firm and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) is thus 
maintained and it led the research in developing the hypotheses (as previously shown in 
Section 5.3). Similar to the previous quantitative studies, the research knowledge will be 
derived in a form of hypothetico-deductive account (Chua 1986).  
 
The next three phrases of the research process (shown in Figure 5.4) will be performed 
as follows. Firstly, the research will translate the research’s interests into operational 
terms; it is the operationalisation process in Figure 5.4. This process will be explained 
in the next paragraph and it also includes the research method for data collection 
(Section 5.4.3) and the specification of the data (Section 5.5). Then, the analyses into 
the data are performed. They are reported in Chapters 6 and 7. After that, the research 
findings are concluded in Section 8.2, Chapter 8. Lastly the research findings will be 
related back to the theories (Section 8.3) in order to validate and/or extend the agency 
theory in the setting of concentrated ownership systems, referred as the term ‘induction’ 
in Figure 5.4. The next paragraph discusses the process of operationalisation. 
 
According to the theory of a firm and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) a set 
of operational terms (interests of the research) was devised as follows. It is assumed in 
agency theory that all units are profit maximisers (the utility-maximisation assumption 
of neoclassical economic theory). In concentrated ownership firms, controlling 
shareholders hold a majority of control rights, and so they are rational profit maximisers 
by maximising their property rights (such as by reducing monitoring costs or 
expropriating others’ interests). Reduced monitoring costs (e.g. having only compulsory 
corporate governance, hiring affiliations rather than professional managers) can lead to 
                                                 
23
The discussion of the determinants of the causes are emphasised in Chapter 2, while the discussion on 
the consequences are in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 engages the institutional settings for the Thai sample. 
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ineffective governance mechanisms, and this eventually lowers the quality of financial 
reports. As a result, the likelihood of an accounting misstatement increases. On the 
other hand, controlling shareholders may extract private benefits, which cost minority 
shareholders and creditors; for example, controlling shareholders manipulate accounts 
to maintain share performance, minimise the cost of incoming capital, and avoid debt 
covenant violations. Observations on the ex post accounting misstatements could help 
us to understand the causes of accounting misstatements in these concentrated 
ownership firms. Therefore, the ex post accounting misstatement cases form the 
research sample and the controlling shareholders’ incentives and corporate governance 
mechanisms are two of the three groups of the prospective determinants of accounting 
misstatements in concentrated ownership firms. These entities are included in the 
analysis of the determinants of accounting misstatements (see the conceptual 
framework, Figure 5.1, Part I).  
 
In addition, the utility-maximisation assumption for capital providers is also tested. 
Firms are contracted with capital providers (i.e. minority shareholders and lenders), and 
the capital providers are also assumed to be profit maximisers. In the contracting 
process, the investors assess the integrity of the firms’ financial reporting process (e.g. 
corporate inherent risks and corporate governance policies) and then they require a 
certain rate of return that maximises their investment returns. Financial reports are one 
traditional monitoring mechanism used by the capital providers to observe firms’ 
performance and economic status. When they perceive that the financial reports are 
misstated, the capital providers rationally revise the existing contracts and circumspect 
their future investments. Consequently, the amount of funds provided by the capital 
providers after the announcement of accounting misstatements may be reduced. An 
investigation into the dynamics of the capital of misstating firms, particularly in the 
post-announcement period, is thus another aspect of interest to the present research (see 
Figure 5.1, Part II).  
 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that since all units are profit maximisers then there is 
no reason why the other group of firms that do not misstate financial reports (including 
their controlling shareholders) pursues the interests of stakeholders instead of 
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maximising their own returns. This group is, therefore, taken into account as a control 
group in the analysis so that an insight on the firms with accounting misstatements will 
reliably appear.  
 
A conclusion for this subsection is that this research project is conducted as quantitative 
research under a deductive approach. The hypotheses and operational terms have 
already been specified. The next subsection will discuss the research method for data 
collection. 
 
5.4.3 Research Method 
Because financial misreporting is a form of ethical issue, some of which is illegal, to 
observe its occurrence through disclosures in secondary data sources (i.e. financial 
reports and the documents filed to stock exchanges and governmental agencies) is 
inclined to be feasible and less biased than to collect primary data (such as from 
interview and questionnaire methods). In sensitive topics, the informant may either 
transmit the information in a biased manner or withhold it entirely and that an interview 
barely provides real answers (Christensen 1992). Some previous studies in the Thai 
context (e.g. Pornupatham 2006) used an interview approach; however, their 
interviewees were auditors and securities regulators, not the perpetrators. Access to 
fieldwork is also an unlikely method for observing the financial misreporting process. 
Questionnaires may be a possible choice, but the respondents in developing countries 
(including Thailand) pay less attention to research and do not consider it a worthwhile 
endeavour (Sjorberg 1967). In addition, since the interest is in Thailand while this 
research is written in English, many rounds of translating between Thai and English 
languages may distort the data. To trade-off between the costs and benefits (including 
the reliability of data), use of data from secondary sources is preferred.  
 
In terms of the data analysis, quantitative methods (i.e. statistical techniques) are 
deemed most suitable for use in this research project. As shown by the conceptual 
framework (Section 5.2), this research will examine the cause-effect relationships of the 
variables. Creswell (2009) suggests that quantitative approaches suits problems which 
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call for identification factors that influence an outcome. In addition, the discovered 
cause-effect linkage can lead to a prediction of corporate financial reporting in 
subsequent periods. Quantitative methods allow generalisability (Chua 1986), and so 
the research findings from the Thai sample can be of benefit to our understanding of the 
phenomenon of accounting misstatements in other countries that have similar 
institutional settings.  
 
Finally, as Firth et al. (2011) point out, several studies use data which is drawn from 
U.S. firms and, consequently, this means that it can be difficult to generalise the 
findings from the previous research because there are different historical, legal, and 
institutional backgrounds between countries. According to Beneish (1997), a possibility 
of GAAP violation is a function of three factors: an incentive to do (i.e. managers’ 
incentives), an ability to do (i.e. exploitation of principal-based accounting standards), 
and a probability of detecting GAAP violation (i.e. the effectiveness of monitoring 
systems). Presently, many countries, particularly developing economies, adopt or 
modify the governance practices from the developed economies (Young et al. 2008). In 
addition, European and Asian countries are now using the International Financing 
Reporting Standards (Ball 2006). Accordingly, the principles of accounting standards 
and corporate governance practices are currently more similar. Therefore, the likelihood 
of GAAP violation now is more likely to depend on the financial statements preparers’ 
incentives and the environment they set for the misrepresentation, which is in line with 
Jiambalvo’s (1996) framework. These two features are firm-level characteristics and as 
such the methodology of the firm-level research in the U.S. and the U.K. can be used as 
a point of reference for a study in the developing economy sample, but the agency 
theory is applied and focused in the type of principal-principal conflict (Firth et al. 
2011). The research findings are considered to be the discovery (or an application) of 
the truth of the positive agency theory in the developing economies. 
 
In summary, this research is based on the positivist paradigm and it applies a deductive 
approach and quantitative strategy. Data will be independently collected from secondary 
sources. The next section presents the procedures for the sample and data collection, 
and the last section discusses the statistical tools for data analysis. 
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5.5 Sample and Data Collection 
After the research approach and research method were specified (as detailed in the 
previous section), this section sets out the data collection procedures. 
 
5.5.1 Sample Selection 
The initial sample used in this research project is misstated financial reports of firms 
listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The sample was gathered from two sources. 
The first source is the announcements of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Thailand (SECT) on its website. These announcements are close to the Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases that have been used in previous U.S. studies (e.g. 
Dechow et al. 1996; Feroz et al. 1991). However, in addition to accounting issues the 
SECT announcements cover all ranges of topics. The SECT announcements are 
presented on its website for the last ten years. This research project initially selected 
2000 as the start year for the sample construction; however, the data for ownership, 
which were provided in an electronics database of Ministry of Commerce, Thailand, are 
only available since 2001; therefore the start date is 2001 and the end date is 2009.  
 
The second source for companies with accounting misstatements used in this research 
project is the financial restatements published in the Thomson One Banker database. All 
restated financial reports of non-financial firms during the year of 2001 to 2009 were 
searched in the database and only the restatements due to prior period errors are of 
interest (e.g. an error due to mathematical problem, or misapplication of GAAP).
24
 
Some of the restatements shown in the database were initiated by the SECT, so they are 
overlapped with those in the first source. 
 
                                                 
24
It is possible that the misstatements may be detected during the following year, such as during the 
auditor’s review on quarterly financial reports, but the study takes it as occurring at the end of such 
year. 
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This research then compares the sampled financial reports with a control group. The 
control group comprises the financial reports of the non-financial companies listed on 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand. They are subject neither to the SECT enforcement 
actions, nor restated due to a prior period accounting error. The firms that restate their 
financial reports due to other reasons (such as retroactive restatements because of an 
accounting policy change or in a compliance with a new Thai Accounting Standard) are 
included in the control group. The finance sector is excluded from this study because 
financial institutions are subject to a more stringent regulatory framework required by 
Bank of Thailand (Chuanrommanee and Swierczek 2007; Montreevat 2007) and have 
different accounting items which limit comparability. Additionally, as the accounting 
items engage economical substances, which may vary across time, the research limits 
the control firms only to the firms having fiscal years ending on 31 December in order 
to improve the comparability between the sample and control group.
25
  
 
For a number of reasons, the control group in this thesis covers all non-financial listed 
firms rather than a matched control group (which has been used in many previous 
studies). Firstly, a matched sample causes a choice-based matched-sample bias, which 
results in a bias of coefficient (Cram et al. 2009; Zmijewski 1984). Secondly, the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand lists only 520 companies in seven industries. To find a qualified 
matched sample can be difficult and this might affect the research results. On the other 
hand, the small size of the capital market made the alternative of non-matched sample 
design more possible. Thirdly, because the data of Thai firms are still limited, the data 
collection on all listed firms can increase the data availability (which is of benefit to 
further research). After trading-off the costs and benefits, a choice-based non-matched 
sample is preferable: the treatment group is selected on the basis of outcome (i.e. having 
an accounting misstatement) and the control group is selected from firms not having the 
same outcome (i.e. not having an accounting misstatement).
26
 This alternative is also 
                                                 
25
No misstatement observations were lost due to this. 
26The term ‘choice-based’ refers to a sample selection process in which the outcomes to be explained in 
the analysis affect whether observations are selected. The outcome (i.e. choice) is the dependent 
variable (i.e. the incidence of accounting misstatements). The term ‘non-matched’ refers to a selection 
for comparison sample, or control group. This research used a non-matched sample, which comprises 
all non-financial listed companies, of which data are not missing. Some prior studies use the matched 
sample approach, such as Firth et al. (2011) matched a misstating firm with a non-misstating firm that is 
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used in a number of previous studies (e.g. Beneish 1997; Burns and Kedia 2006; 
Dechow et al. 2011). Logistic regression, which will be used for the data analysis, can 
be applied for a choice-based non-matched sample (Cram et al. 2009).  
 
The research excludes those observations with incomplete data and, therefore, a sample 
selection bias exists (Cram et al. 2009; Zmijewski 1984). The coefficients of a probit 
model (Zmijewski 1984) and logit model (Dietrich 1984) can also be biased. However, 
based on the examples in Zmijewski (1984, pp. 76-79) the significance level of the 
coefficients is similar when compared to that of the sample with complete data. Since 
the research main objective is to examine the relationship between the variables in order 
to understand what the causes of accounting misstatements are (i.e. hypothesis testing), 
rather than to create a model to predict the likelihood of accounting misstatements, the 
limitation of the incomplete data availability can be accepted in this project. 
 
This research assumes that the firms that are not in the group of misstating firms did not 
experience accounting misstatements. It is acknowledged that the possibility of 
undetected or unreported misstatements may exist, and that these can work against the 
finding a distinction between misstating and non-misstating firms.  
 
5.5.2 Data Collection 
Data were collected according to the research objectives and proposed hypotheses. 
There are two primary types of data used in this thesis: financial and non-financial. 
 
The financial data were collected from the Thomson One Banker database, ranging 
from 1996 to 2009. The non-financial data were gathered from a variety of sources. The 
data involving external auditors and their opinions were collected manually from audit 
reports, available on the website of the SECT. The names of audit partner and audit 
firms were collected back as far as 2001. The data governing rehabilitation periods, 
firms’ chief executive officers and chairmen of the boards were mainly collected from 
                                                                                                                                               
traded in the same stock exchange, has the nearest firm size, and has the same age of trading in the 
stock exchange.   
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the annual registration statements (Form 56-1)
27
 and supplemented where necessary by 
annual reports. The Form 56-1 and annual reports were gathered through a commercial 
web-based database of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, named SETSMART. Some 
annual reports were also available on the Thomson One Banker database and 
companies’ websites. Collecting data from many sources minimised the numbers of 
missing observations.  
 
Data on the major shareholders were manually collected from several sources. The first 
source is the SETSMART database, which shows the names of major shareholders 
holding shares above 0.5%. In the SETSMART, there are many types of shareholder 
lists, such as a list for dividend payout and a list for annual meetings. In this study, the 
list for annual meetings was selected because firms must report their financial 
statements and appoint an auditor in the annual general meeting. The atmosphere of the 
monitoring should at least occur at this point. After gathering the major shareholders’ 
names, the researcher then identified the firms’ ultimate owner; the definition of the 
ultimate owner which was used in this study is consistent with La Porta et al. (1999) 
and Wiwattanakantang (2001).
28
 In cases where the major shareholders are private 
companies, the researcher tracked down the shareholders of those private companies in 
order to identify exactly who was the ultimate owner. Those shareholders who share the 
same family name were grouped together as one group, like prior research studying into 
the ownership of Thai firms
29
 (e.g. Boonlert-U-Thai and Kuntisook 2009; 
Wiwattanakantang 2001). The number of shares held by the ultimate owner was 
recorded and then used for the ownership concentration. These shares indicate the 
voting rights, or control rights, of the ultimate owner. A further investigation through 
the shareholders of the private companies allowed this study to account for the effect of 
                                                 
27
Form 56-1, or the annual registration statement, is a type of report required by the Stock Exchange (the 
regulation no. Bor.Jor./Por.01-00). The report covers events occurring in the last period, such as: 
significant changes in the company, or its business operations, board of directors, shareholder structure, 
summary financial status and operational results, industrial conditions or business risks. Since 
December 2002, companies have had to disclose how they comply with the fifteen principles of 
corporate governance practices under the comply-or-explain basis, and the directors’ and management 
profiles (e.g. name, education, percentage of share holding and remuneration). 
28
The method which was used to collect the ownership data is presented in Appendix A. 
29
In Thailand it is very uncommon that two families have the same surname. The family name is unique. 
When a family wants to change its surname, the new one must differ from existing surnames. 
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pyramids and cross-holdings structure. The ownership arrangement is measured in using 
a dummy variable rather than a continuous measure of cash-flow rights. This approach 
is used in numerous prior studies (e.g. Filatotchev et al. 2011; Wiwattanakantang 2001). 
The information on shareholders of private companies was gathered from the updated 
shareholder lists (Form Bor.Or.Jor 5).
30
 These copies are made available by request 
from the Department of Business Development, Ministry of Commerce Thailand.  
 
 
5.6 Data Analysis Tools 
This section discusses statistics issues and the treatments for the data and analyses. 
 
5.6.1 Treatment of Outliers 
An important issue in using financial data is that of outliers, which might distort the 
research results and interpretation of research findings. Therefore, a winsorisation 
method is applied to values of extreme outliers at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles, which is 
similar to prior studies (e.g. Chen et al. 2009; Roberts and Sufi 2009).
31
 
 
5.6.2 Inferential Statistics 
The data analysis, which will be presented in Chapters 6 and 7, started with the 
exploration of the distribution of the data and comparisons in means/medians between 
two groups of the sample. Then a correlation matrix was created to investigate the 
relationships among variables. Multiple regression models were then employed to test 
the hypotheses described in Section 5.3. Logistic regression models were employed for 
                                                 
30Form Bor.Or.Jor 5 is an updated list of the company’s shareholders, which needs to be prepared for the 
annual general meeting and submitted together with the annual financial reports and income tax filing 
form to the Revenue Department and the Department of Business Development, Ministry of Commerce 
within 14 days of the annual general meeting. The contents in this form comprise shareholders’ names, 
the amount of shares held, numbers of the shares, and the beginning and ending dates of holding. 
31
The main research results for the causes and consequences of accounting misstatements are not sensitive 
to the winsorisation at the cut-off points of 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles, but are sensitive to the case where 
the winsorisation procedure is not used. Results of the latter case are reported after the data analysis has 
been performed in Chapters 6 and 7.  
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analysing the determinants of accounting misstatements. Although model creation is not 
a purpose of this study, McFadden’s pseudo R2 was also considered for a measure of fit 
in modelling. An ordinary least squares linear regression was used in the examination of 
economic consequences. The adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted R
2
) was 
analysed for the power of explanation by models. Heteroscedasticity and 
multicollinearity were tested for and rectified if such statistical problems existed. The 
hypotheses were generally tested at the conventional significance level of 5%; however, 
a 10% significance level was also considered and presented in the analysis.  
 
5.6.3 Rare Events Logit Models 
Since the research uses a non-matched approach for the sample groups, the research 
may confront the issue of a small proportion of the sample (i.e. the misstatement firm-
years) to the control group (i.e. the non-misstatement firm years) of these studies, such 
as: 2.4% in Beneish (1997), 3.32% in Burns and Kedia (2006) and 0.31% in Dechow et 
al. (2011). The researcher adopts a rare events logit model of King and Zeng (2001c)
32
 
to test the robustness of the results. King and Zeng (2001a, c) show that the application 
of traditional logit models in samples where the binary dependent variable has much 
fewer ones than zeros might lead to biased results due to the underestimation of the 
parameter estimates. The constant term of a traditional logit model for rare events is 
underestimated while the coefficient of explanatory variables is overestimated (King 
and Zeng 2001c, pp. 153-154). The rare events logit models can correct the parameters 
in the presence of rare events or small samples. This method was first used in political 
science (e.g. King and Zeng 2001b). Although this has recently been applied in the 
management literature (e.g. Lafuente et al. 2010), it has not yet been applied by 
accounting scholars. Consequently, introducing the rare events logit models to 
accounting literature is one of the contributions of this research. 
 
                                                 
32A rare events logistic regression model can be run in Stata by a command of ‘relogit’ (Tomz et al. 
2003). The zip file of the command is available in Tomz et al. (2003) (http://www.jstatsoft.org/v08/i02) 
and the instalment procedure is available at http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~jhamner/readme.txt. 
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5.6.4 Estimating Standard Errors 
The data set contains multiple firms in multiple years, and so the residuals from 
regression analyses for a given firm may be correlated across years for a given firm (an 
unobserved firm effect) or the residuals for a given year may be correlated across 
different firms (a time effect). These correlations result in biased standard errors and 
inaccurate estimates (Petersen 2009). To produce unbiased estimates, Petersen (2009) 
suggests that research can address one dimension by including, for example, time 
dummies and then estimating standard errors clustered on the other dimension. This 
study uses year dummies (YEAR) to control for time effects and it uses firm-level 
clustering to make standard errors unbiased.
33
  
 
5.7 Summary 
Due to the limitations of prior literature into the causes and consequences of accounting 
misstatements in the concentrated ownership systems, this thesis was designed to 
provide evidence to address this gap and uses Thailand as an example of the 
concentrated ownership systems. There are two main parts in this research. The first 
part is an examination into the determinants of accounting misstatements in Thailand. 
The second part is a study of the external financing activity of misstating firms after the 
accounting misstatements have been revealed. With a belief on the objectivity of the 
agency theory, this research project has oriented the research methodology towards a 
positivist paradigm. The structures of quantitative research and deductive approach 
were implemented. The samples and data were independently collected to test the 
hypotheses.   
 
The next two chapters will present the data analysis. Chapter 6 details the empirical 
findings on the determinants of accounting misstatements in Thailand. Chapter 7 reports 
                                                 
33
A fixed effect regression model can also cope with the unobserved firm effect; however, in this study it 
cannot be applied because, when using a command of fixed effect in Stata, an analysis of logistic 
regression model cannot be prepared due to an absence of the variation in dependent variable for the 
control group. Nonetheless, there is a suggestion that there is no great difference on the parameters from 
the fixed effect model and the clustered robust standard error when the number of firms is large and 
time period is fixed (Kezdi 2003)and at the sample size of time period equals to ten and number of 
clusters is less than 500 (Stock and Watson 2008), which is the size of the research’s observations. 
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the effect of the accounting misstatement announcements on subsequent external 
financing activities. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DATA ANALYSIS ON THE DETERMINANTS OF ACCOUNTING 
MISSTATEMENTS IN THAILAND 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The research sample and data were collected according to the research methodology 
described in Chapter 5. This present chapter illustrates the empirical results of the 
analysis into the determinants of accounting misstatements in Thailand, while the 
results for economic consequences are presented in the next chapter. This chapter is 
organised as follows. Section Two illustrates the research sample. Section Three details 
the description of each variable, its measure(s) and the logistic regression model for the 
data analysis. Section Four furnishes the empirical results of the data analysis. 
Robustness tests and some additional issues are reported in Section Five. The final 
section summarises the results on the antecedents of accounting misstatements in 
Thailand.  
 
 
6.2 Research Sample  
Table 6.1 below presents how the final sample was obtained. Observations of 
accounting misstatements were gathered from two sources, which are presented 
separately. Panel A, which is the first source, encompasses the misstated financial 
reports detected by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand (SECT). 
Meanwhile Panel B, which is the second source, consists of the misstated financial 
reports that are later restated. Panel C summarises the sample observations.  
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Table 6.1: Samples of Accounting Misstatements during 2001-2009 
Panel A: Identification of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions 
Panel A-1: SECT News Releases By Year    
Year Number of All 
Releases 
Number of  
Accounting 
Based 
Releases  
1999 27  1 
2000 40  6 
2001 38  5 
2002 35  2 
2003 36  3 
2004 103  11 
2005 126  25 
2006 100  14 
2007 104  7 
2008 85  9 
2009 111  18 
Jan - Nov 2010
34
 82  12 
Total 887  113 
Panel A-2: Classification of the Accounting Based Releases    
 Releases Number 
of Firms 
 Number  
of Firms 
1. Fraud  50   
1.1 Misappropriation of assets              9   
1.2 Fraudulent financial reporting                                       9 18 
2. Accounting errors 30     
2.1 Errors in quarterly financial reports  5  
2.2 Errors in annual financial reports  10 15 
3.Unfair trading by executives 11  10 
4.Requirements for disclosures 5  4 
5.Requirements for special audits 5  2 
6.Others  (i.e. clarification of rehabilitation plan and 
operations, cooperation with auditor) 5  3 
7. Suspended auditors 7  9 
 auditors 
Total 113     
Number of firms relating to accounting misstatements 
from the SECT source (1.2 and 2.2, subtracted one firm 
appearing in both categories) 
    
   
(AM1)
18 
                                                 
34
The period of the SECT news releases covers until November 2010 because the announcements relating 
to the misstatement fiscal year of 2009 were released in the following year after the SECT reviewed the 
submitted financial reports. 
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Table 6.1 (continued)    
Panel B: Identification of Firms Using a Search on the Thomson One Banker Database 
   Number 
of Firms 
Number 
of Firms 
Step I: Searching financial reports of listed companies  in Thailand  
Search “BAN” market code   554 
Less security funds (i.e. industrial funds, property funds)    (12) 
Trading companies   542 
Less financial industry   (63) 
Industrial company   479 
Less firms with non-December fiscal year    (27) 
Less firms with only one year of data on financial reports   (4) 
   448 
Step II: Investigating the financial reports of the 448 companies  
1.Firms with at least one fiscal year of restated financial 
reports 
  121 
2.Firms with no restated financial reports   327 
Total investigated financial reports  
 
448 
Step III: Examining the reasons of the 121 restated financial reports (Step II, item no.1) 
1.Accounting misstatements   31 
   The cases required by the SECT and already included in 
the 18 observations in Panel A-2  15  
   The cases initiated by the companies  
      (AM2)
16  
2.Other reasons    
   Changes in accounting policy  44  
   Changes to comply with Thai Accounting Standard  
changes  24  
   Subsequent events required backward adjustments  14  
   Subsidiaries' subsequent accounting adjustments  7  
   The database is incorrectly presented  1 90 
Total cases of financial restatements   121 
    
Number of firms relating to accounting misstatements 
from the Thomson One Banker source 
   
31 
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Table 6.1 (continued)     
Panel C: Final Sample     
      Number 
of Firms 
Number 
of Firm-
Years 
1) Misstatement observations     
Misstating firms subject to the SECT enforcement actions   
 (AM1)
18  
Add the misstating firms voluntarily corrected their 
accounting misstatements, searched from Thomson 
One Banker database  
 
 
      
(AM2)
16  
Less one firm missing the data of ownership (Manager Media Plc)  (1)  
Final misstatement observations   33 51 
2) Non-misstatement observations     
Preliminary non-misstating firms (327+90 from Panel B)   417  
Less incomplete data firms   (62)  
Final non-misstatement observations   355 2,257 
Add the number of non-misstated financial reports of the 33 misstating 
firms 33 195 
Final non-misstatement observations   388 2,452 
Total number of financial reports   388 2,503 
     
Table 6.1 presents the sample collection. Panel A shows the number of misstatement firms gathered from 
the SECT’s enforcement actions. Panel B reports the number of misstatement firms gathered from restated 
financial reports. Panel C summarises the numbers of the misstatement and non-misstatement 
observations. 
 
Panel A in Table 6.1 shows the identification of the firms charged by the SECT for 
allegedly violating GAAP and committing corporate fraud. In Panel A-1 there were a 
total of 887 announcements, of which 113 were relevant to accounting aspects. Panel A-
2 details the issues on the 113 announcements (e.g. fraud, accounting errors, insider 
trading, disclosure requirements, and audit suspension). The announcements involving 
fraudulent financial reporting (item 1.2) and accounting errors in annual financial 
reports (item 2.2) are of particular interest. The final number of the misstating firms 
charged by the SECT is 18 companies (AM1).  
 
Apart from the accounting misstatement cases that were found by the SECT, this 
research also collected accounting misstatement samples from restated financial reports. 
The restated financial reports were gathered from the Thomson One Banker database. 
There are three steps of sample collection for this group. Panel B in Table 6.1 presents 
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the number of observations involving these three steps. The first step was to find firms 
listing on the Stock Exchange of Thailand by searching through BAN code. This search 
yielded 554 securities; however, the following securities were excluded: industrial funds 
and property funds (12 units), banks and financial institutions (63 companies), firms 
whose fiscal year did not end on 31 December (27 companies), and firms who only 
have one year of financial reports (4 companies).
35
 Consequently, the primary number 
of firms listing on the Stock Exchange of Thailand and their financial reports are 
available in the Thomson One Banker database is 448. The second step was to survey 
whether or not these 448 firms restated their financial reports between 2001 and 2009. 
One hundred and twenty one firms were found to have restated financial reports in at 
least one year. The third step was to determine the reasons for the restatements. The 
focus of this study is on prior period accounting errors and fraud, and, therefore, only 
the restatements due to this basis are included. Of the 121 firms, 31 firms have had the 
misstatements falling into the focus. However, 15 out of the 31 firms they were already 
included in the 18 firms of the first source (named AM1 in Panel A-2) because their 
restated their financial reports initiated by the SECT. Consequently, only 16 firms 
(named AM2 in Panel B) were additionally counted. Collectively, there were 34 
(AM1+AM2) preliminary firms generating at least one fiscal year of misstated financial 
reports in Thailand during 2001-2009, summarised in Panel C. 
 
Panel C in Table 6.1 reports the final sample of accounting misstatements. Originally, 
there were 34 firms releasing misstated financial reports. However, after the data 
collection, the ownership data of one firm (i.e. Manager Media Plc) was missing (the 
firm has been suspended from trading since May 1998 and so its disclosures have never 
been prepared for public from this date). Therefore, the sample ended up with 33 
misstating firms with 51 firm-years of misstated financial reports.
36
 There are eleven 
firms releasing more than one fiscal year of misstated financial reports. Regarding the 
                                                 
35
As described in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1, this research excludes those firms in the finance sector and the 
firms having fiscal years not ended on 31 December in order to control the impacts of economic factors 
at a different point of time. Those firms with only one year of financial reports have been excluded 
because the study has some lagged independent variables (i.e. negative free cash flow, beginning cash, 
beginning receivables and inventory) which need accounting numbers from previous years.  
36
Details of the 33 firms are provided in Appendix B. 
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control group, since this research considers financial reports each fiscal year 
individually, the financial reports of the misstating firms in those years that do not 
involve any accounting misstatement are included in the control group. Accordingly, the 
control group comprises 2,257 non-misstatement firm-years from 355 firms that have 
never released accounting misstatements and 195 non-misstatement firm-years from the 
33 misstating firms. There are 2,452 firm-years for the control group.
37
 Collectively, the 
observations of this research are 2,503 firm-years in total.
38
 They covered 388 
individual firms out of 520 listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
 
Table 6.2 breaks down the sample by time period (Panel A), by industry and sector 
(Panel B) and by type of the accounting misstatements (Panel C).  
 
The data in Panel A indicates that accounting misstatements occurred more frequently 
in 2004 (34%), 2005 (22%) and 2006 (18%). One reason for the high frequency in 2004 
possibly could be the new appointment of Secretary-General of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Thailand (Mr. Thirachai Phuvanatnaranubala), who was 
appointed in December of that year. Mr.Thirachai was the first Secretary-General to 
have experience in auditing and he established an independent committee that is 
responsible for uncovering accounting irregularities and management malpractice. In 
the first two years of his duties, Mr.Thirachai and his team revealed 23 cases of 
accounting misstatements and management fraud (17 of these cases are included in the 
research sample while the rest are quarterly financial reports which are excluded in the 
study). SECT enforcement actions had rarely happened before this appointment 
(Matichon 2005).
39
 This research controls a potential effect of the SECT team on the 
detection of accounting misstatement cases that can be varied across time by including 
year dummies in the regression analysis (see Section 6.3.1).  
                                                 
37
If the 195 non-misstatement firm-years of the misstating firms are excluded, the coefficients for the 
multivariate logistic regression analysis (Section 6.4) are slightly changed but their significance levels 
are unaffected.  
38
However, later in Chapters 6 and 7 the number of observations reduces due to an aspect of statistics and 
requirements for the data (see Sections 6.3.3 and 7.2). 
39
Mr. Thirachai Phuvanatnaranubala was sent a letter reportedly containing death threats in September 
2005. The death threat was suspected to involve these accounting enforcement actions (Matichon 2005). 
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Table 6.2: Classification of Accounting Misstatements during 2001-2009 
Panel A: By Year and Initiator 
Year Misstated Financial Reports 
 
SECT Company Total 
(firm-
years) 
Percentage 
(%) 
2001 - - - - 
2002 4 - 4 8 
2003 4 - 4 8 
2004 11 7 18 34 
2005 6 5 11 22 
2006 4 5 9 18 
2007 1 - 1 2 
2008 3 - 3 6 
2009 1 - 1 2 
 34 17 51 100 
                  
Panel B: By Industry and Sector  
Industry/sector 
AM  
Firm-
Years 
Percentage 
(% of 51) 
Non-AM  
Firm-
Years 
Percentage 
 (% of 
Sector) 
Agro & food/ food producer 7 13.7 189 3.7 
Consumer products/fashion 1 2.0 180 0.6 
Industrials/automotive 9 17.6 108 8.3 
Industrials/industrial materials & 
machinery 2 3.9 137 1.5 
Industrials/packaging 6 11.8 105 5.7 
Industrials/petrochemicals & chemicals 2 3.9 89 2.2 
Property & construction/ construction 
materials 3 5.9 175 1.7 
Property & construction/ property 
development 5 9.8 236 2.1 
Resource/energy 2 3.9 117 1.7 
Resource/mining 1 2.0 21 4.8 
Service/commerce 2 3.9 74 2.7 
Service/health care services 1 2.0 110 0.9 
Service/ travel & leisure 2 3.9 105 1.9 
Technology/electronic components 6 11.8 80 7.5 
Technology/information & 
communication technology 2 3.9 157 1.3 
Seven sectors not having accounting 
misstatements 0 0.0 569 0.0 
  51  2,452   
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Table 6.2 (continued) 
  
 
 
Panel C: By Type of Accounting Misstatements 
  Firm-
Years 
Firm-
Years 
Percentage (%) 
1. Big bath accounting   1 1.67 
2. Overstating revenues:     
     2.1 Inappropriate revenue recognition   9   
     2.2 Transfer pricing  2   
     2.3 Fraudulent scheme with related parties  1   
 2.4 Over record gain on assets sold  1 13 21.67 
3. Failing to record revenues from assets 
sold to related parties   2 3.33 
4. Improperly booking allowance for bad 
debt   7 11.67 
5. Incorrectly recording cost of goods sold   5 8.33 
6. Understated operating expenses   5 8.33 
7. Capitalisation of repair and maintenance 
costs   1 1.67 
8. Overstating assets:     
8.1 Goodwill   3   
8.2 Failure to test impairment of assets  5   
     8.3  Counterfeiting documents  3 11 18.33 
9. Incorrectly classifying types of leasing   2 3.33 
10. Failing to prepare consolidated financial 
statements   9 15.00 
11. Managements’ embezzlement affecting 
financial reports   4 6.67 
   60 100.00 
          
Table 6.2 reports the distribution of the 51 misstatement firm-years. Since some fiscal years contain 
more than one type of misstatements, there are 60 cases of the misstatements in Panel C.   
 
The data in Panel B of Table 6.2 (industry/sector) indicates that, of the 51 cases, 
accounting misstatements most frequently occur in the automotive sector (17.6%). They 
are also common among firms in the food production sector (13.7%), packaging 
(11.8%), and electronic components (11.8%). When compared with other firms in the 
same sector, accounting misstatements most frequently appear in the automotive sector 
(8.3%) and electronic components sector (7.5%). There are seven sectors in Thailand 
that have not released financial reports. In an aggregate point of view for the industries, 
accounting misstatements have appeared in all industries during 2001-2009, but only 
one case occurred in the consumer products industry.  
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Panel C in Table 6.2 indicates the types of accounting misstatements. The total number 
of 60 is larger than the number of 51 misstatement observations because some fiscal 
years contained more than one accounting misstatement. The most common accounting 
misstatements involve overstated revenues (21.67%), overstated assets (18.33%), and a 
failure to prepare consolidated financial statements (15%). Revenue overstatement is 
amongst the most common reason for misstatements in other counties, such as the U.S. 
(e.g. Dechow et al. 2011). One distinction in the Thai sample is an accounting mistake 
that happens in preparing consolidated financial reports. This can happen because Thai 
firms (and also other Asian firms) have a characteristic of business group where 
ownership is arranged in forms of pyramids and cross-holdings (Claessens et al. 2000). 
These complex ownership structures can cause the firms to incorrectly prepare financial 
reports because parent companies often misinterpret the term ‘control’. The Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Thailand (SECT 2004, 2008) points out that the parent 
companies usually interpret the ‘control’ term (Thai Accounting Standard 44, an 
adoption of IAS 27 (IASB 2008) by considering the proportion of shareholdings (i.e. 
above 50%) in a subsidiary only; they disregard the control in other circumstances (e.g. 
the parent company has a power to govern the financial and operating policies of the 
subsidiary, or the parent disposes of an investment in a subsidiary but still retains 
control). 
 
Considering the magnitude of accounting misstatements in Thailand, the average 
amount of the impact of restatements on earnings numbers in Thai firms is 
approximately 49.62 million THB (£1.05 million) per year.
40
 This is approximately 
11% of the average firm’s market capitalisation a year.41 Specifically, the average 
absolute value of the impact of accounting restatements on earnings number is 417.6 
million THB (£8.84 million) for the restatement required by the SECT, and 29 million 
THB (£0.6 million) for the voluntarily restated financial reports (details are in Appendix 
                                                 
40
This is computed by dividing an average magnitude of restatements of 446.6 (417.6+29) million THB 
by nine years period (2001-2009). See Appendix B for more details. 
41
This is computed by dividing the average of 49.62 million THB a year by the market capitalisation (at 
the end of 2008) of 449.96 million THB.  
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B). When considering the impact of accounting misstatements by type (fraud and 
errors), an average absolute value of the impact is approximately 684.98 million THB 
(£14.13 million) for fraud cases and 72.88 million THB (£1.5 million) for accounting 
error cases. Dividing each impact by total assets in the year prior to the misstatement 
year (following Hennes et al. 2008), on average the impact is 28.34 % for the fraud 
group and 5.76% for the accounting error group and they are statistically different at the 
0.01 level, with a p-value of 0.0062 (one-tailed). The accounting misstatements due to 
fraud, therefore, have a greater impact on accounting items (and eventually the financial 
statement users) than do accounting errors. This finding is consistent with the U.S. 
sample in Hennes et al. (2008). Unfortunately, the SECT announcements do not provide 
consistent information on the magnitude of the misstatements, so this analysis is limited 
to only the cases where data are available (44 out of the 51 observations). The details on 
fraud and error cases were provided to increase the evidence on the Thailand country. 
These observations are examined in the aggregate in data analyses.  
 
 
6.3 Determinants of the Causes of Accounting Misstatements 
This section details the measures of the research interests for the causes of accounting 
misstatements in Thailand. It also includes discussion of the number of observations 
that is reduced due to a modelling constraint. 
 
6.3.1 Multiple Logistic Regression Model 
According to the conceptual framework (Chapter 5, Section 5.2) the dependent variable 
for the analysis of the determinants of accounting misstatements is a dichotomous 
variable of the incidence of accounting misstatements. Independent variables comprise 
three groups: ownership structure, large shareholders’ incentives and corporate 
governance mechanisms. A number of control variables (i.e. firm size, age, and 
industry-effects) is  also included into the analysis because, for example, Wang (2006) 
find a relation between firm age and earnings quality and accounting misstatements are 
found to most frequently occur in the computer, and the property and construction 
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industries in the U.S. and China, respectively (Chen et al. 2006; Dechow et al. 2011). 
Prior research has also found an influence of a firm itself on financial reporting 
(Lawrence et al. 2011; Lennox and Pittman 2010) and a variation in shareholder 
responses to auditing service after the 2001 Enron year, such as in the U.K. (Holland 
and Lane 2008). Consequently, there may be an unobserved firm effect and time effects 
in the Thai sample during 2001-2009. Standard errors are, therefore, clustered by firm 
and year dummies are included in the regression model (Petersen 2009). 
 
Logistic regression model: 
ti,t
t
tt
Κ
ΚiΚti,
ti,ti,ti,ti,
ti,ti,ti,ti,
ti,ti,ti,ti,ti,
εβββ
ββββ
ββββ
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∈13
1211109
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where:  
t:      The current fiscal year for firm i. 
AM: The occurrence of accounting misstatements, measured by a dichotomous 
variable of 1 if the firm’s financial reports for the current fiscal year contain 
at least one misstated accounting item; 0 otherwise. 
OWN: A measure of ownership concentration, measured by a percentage of the 
shares held by the ultimate owner. 
FAM: A measure of owner identity, measured by a dummy variable of family 
ownership, which equals 1 if the ultimate owner is a family; 0 otherwise. 
CROSS: A measure of ownership arrangement, measured by a dummy variable of 1 if 
the firm’s ownership is arranged in a form of pyramids, or cross-holdings or 
both; 0 otherwise. 
LEV: An incentive to avoid debt covenant violation, measured by the ratio of total 
debt to total assets. 
ISSUE: An incentive to minimise cost of capital, measured by a dummy variable of 1 
if the firm issued securities during the fiscal year; 0 otherwise. 
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NFCF: An incentive to minimise cost of capital, measured by a dummy variable for 
negative free cash flow, which equals 1 if FCF < -0.5 [FCF t = (OCF t – 
Average Cap Exp t-3 to t-1)/CA t-1]; 0 otherwise. 
     where:  OCF = The balance of cash flow from operations in cash flow 
statements. 
Average Cap Exp = An average of capital expenditures from cash 
flow statements from year t-3 to t-1. 
CA= The balance of current assets in balance sheet. 
MB: An incentive to maintain capital market expectation, measured by a ratio of 
market value to book value of equity. 
REHAB: An indication of financial distress and profitability regulation, measured by a 
dummy variable of 1 if the firm is under the rehabilitation plan; 0 otherwise. 
BIG: A measure of audit quality, measured by types of audit firms, where equals 1 
if the firm uses an audit service from a Big 4 audit firm; 0 otherwise. 
AUDCHG: A measure of audit quality, measured by a change in an auditor, where 
equals 1 if the firm changes an audit firm during the current fiscal year; 0 
otherwise. 
DUAL: A measure of weak corporate governance, particularly in concentrated 
ownership firms, measured by a dummy variable of 1 if the chief executive 
officer also serves as chairman of the board; 0 otherwise. 
LNSIZE: A control variable for size of the firm, measured by the natural logarithm of 
total assets. 
AGE: A control variable for age of the firm, measured by the number of years since 
the firm was established. 
IND: An array of seven industry dummies, where each firm falls into one of the 
seven categorises according to the categorisation of Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (Agro and Food, Consumer Products, Industrials, Property and 
Construction, Resources, Services, and Technology; Agro and Food industry 
dummy being arbitrarily omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity). 
YEAR: An array of eight fiscal year dummies 2002 to 2009; year 2002 dummy being 
arbitrarily omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity.  
: The regression residual. 
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6.3.2 Description of Variables  
A description of the variables illustrated in the previous section is presented in Table 
6.3. In addition, the expected signs of coefficients (directions of the alternative 
hypotheses from Chapter 5, Section 5.3) are included in this table. 
 
Table 6.3: Variables for the Determinants of Accounting Misstatements 
Proxy Measure Abbre-
viation in 
Model 
Calculation Expected 
Sign 
Dependent variable 
The incidence of accounting 
misstatements 
AM 1 if financial reports 
contain at least one 
accounting misstatement; 0 
otherwise  
 
Independent variables 
1. Ownership: 
1.1 Ownership 
concentration 
Ownership of the 
ultimate owner 
OWN Percentage of shares held 
by the ultimate owner 
+ 
  D_OWN 1 if ownership 
concentration > 25%; 
0 otherwise 
+ 
1.2 Owner 
identity 
Family ownership FAM 1 if the ultimate owner is a 
family; 0 otherwise 
+ 
1.3 Ownership 
arrangement 
The appearance of the 
an arrangement of 
pyramids and/or cross-
holdings 
CROSS 1 if the firm’s ownership is 
arranged in a form of 
pyramids, or cross-holdings 
or both; 0 otherwise 
+ 
2. Incentives: 
2.1 Debt 
covenant 
constraints 
Leverage  LEV Total debt to total assets  + 
2.2 Ex post 
financing need 
Securities issuance ISSUE 1 if securities issued during 
the fiscal year; 0 otherwise 
+ 
2.3 Ex ante 
financing need 
Negative free cash 
flow  
NFCF 1 if NFCF < -0.5 
[NFCF = (cash flow from 
operations – average capital 
expenditure from year t-3 
to t-1)/current assets in year 
t-1]; 0 otherwise 
+ 
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Proxy Measure Abbre-
viation in 
Model 
Calculation Expected 
Sign 
2.4 Capital 
market pressure 
Market to book ratio MB Market value 
a
 to book 
value of common equity 
+ 
2.5 Regulation 
effect 
Rehabilitation period REHAB 1 if a firm is under 
rehabilitation status; 
0 otherwise 
+/- 
3. Monitoring: 
3.1 External 
monitor 
The use of a Big 4 
auditor 
BIG 1 if a firm uses a Big 4 
auditor; 0 otherwise 
- 
3.2 Possibility 
of detection  
An audit firm change AUDCHG 1 if there is an audit firm 
change in the current year;  
0 otherwise 
+/- 
3.3 Internal 
monitor 
CEO=COB DUAL 1 if the chief executive 
officer (CEO) also serves 
as chairman of the board 
(COB); 0 otherwise 
+ 
Control variables: 
1.Firm size Size LNSIZE Natural logarithm of total 
assets  
+/- 
2.Firm age Age AGE Years after establishment +/- 
3.Industry 
effect 
Industry dummies IND Dummy variable   
4.Year effect Fiscal year dummies YEAR Dummy variable   
a
 There were some firms whose securities were suspended from trading during rehabilitation periods, 
and as such none of these firms’ market values are available. The market value of these cases was 
computed by using the latest firms’ market value before the securities were suspended in order to 
maintain the observations of the treatment group. However, the research results for the antecedents of 
accounting misstatements are unchanged if the models exclude these observations. 
 
It is noteworthy that there are two measures for the ownership concentration in Table 
6.3: a continuous variable (OWN) and a dummy variable (D_OWN). The dummy 
variable of the ownership concentration (D_OWN) takes a value of 1 if the control 
rights of the ultimate owner exceed 25%. The 25% level is employed following the 
definition of the Stock Exchange of Thailand for controlling shareholders and under the 
Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535 (A.D. 1992), which states that a shareholder 
at this level of shareholdings has sufficient voting power to a call for an extraordinary 
general meeting (section 100) and perform certain legal activities, such as dismissing 
external auditors (section 164). It was also used in prior studies of Thai firms (e.g. 
Ananchotikul et al. 2010; Wiwattanakantang 2001). Therefore, the dummy variable of 
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D_OWN will also be tested in the analysis and a positive association between the 
variable and the likelihood of accounting misstatements is predicted. 
 
6.3.3 The Final Sample for the Analysis of the Determinants of Accounting 
Misstatements 
According to the multiple regression models shown in Section 6.3.1, the logistic 
regression model includes a set of year dummies. However, since there were no 
accounting misstatement cases in 2001 (see Table 6.2 Panel A), the analysis excludes 
the observations for 2001 (152 firm-years) to avoid the problem of perfect failure 
determination. Consequently, the final number of the observations for the study into the 
determinants of accounting misstatements (Section 6.4) is reduced from 2,503 firm-
years (as shown in Table 6.1 Panel C) to 2,351 firm-years in the next section (51 
misstatement firm-years and 2,300 non-misstatement firm-years). 
 
 
6.4 Empirical Results 
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides descriptive statistics (Table 6.4) for misstatement firm-years and 
non-misstatement firm-years from 2002 to 2009. Continuous and discrete variables are 
presented separately in Panel A and B, respectively. As described in Chapter 5, to 
reduce the effects of extreme outliers in statistical tests, continuous variables (i.e. LEV, 
MB and AGE) were winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles (one might notice that the 
maximum value of the LEV and MB variables for two groups are identical; this results 
from the winsorisation process). As for firm size (total assets), the data were 
transformed by taking the natural logarithm of total assets (LNSIZE). Except for the 
data on ownership concentration (OWN), those of other continuous variables appear not 
to be normally distributed (the tests for normality
42
 rejected the null hypothesis that the 
                                                 
42
Including the Skewness-Kurtosis, based on D'Agostino et al. (1990), Shapiro-Wilks, and the Shapiro-
Francia tests. Graphical methods (e.g. box plot and histogram) were also employed to visually examine 
the distribution of the data. 
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data are normally distributed at the p-value < 0.05). Nevertheless, logistic regression 
does not assume normality and equal variance for the error term, whereas these 
assumptions are required for linear regression (Hair et al. 1998, pp. 239-325; Hosmer 
and Lemeshow 2000, pp. 6-7). In addition, the inaccuracy of this statistical inference is 
less problematic in large samples and the distribution of the error which follows a 
binomial distribution approximates a normal distribution for large samples (Menard 
1995, pp. 72-73).  
 
Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics of Misstated Financial Reports and Non-Misstated 
Financial Reports 
Panel A: Continuous Variables (N: 51 misstatement and 2,300 non-misstatement observations) 
Continuous Mean Median Standard  Min.    Max. Differences in 
Variables   Deviation   Mean  Median 
(abbreviation)      (t-statistic) (z-statistic) 
Total assets-million THB (SIZE)      
  Misstated 3442.43 1724.19 4311.27 35.09 18825.12 -8269.52  -456.80 
  Non-misstated 11711.95 2180.99 49372.58 57.68 1093526.00 (-6.929) ***  (-2.081)** 
  Total 11532.56 2175.45 48852.81 35.09 1093526.00    
Natural logarithm of total assets-million THB (LNSIZE)    
  Misstated 7.399 7.453 1.350 3.558 9.843 -0.518  -0.235 
  Non-misstated 7.917 7.688 1.433 4.055 13.905 (-2.557) ** (-2.081)** 
  Total 7.906 7.685 1.433 3.558 13.905    
Ownership concentration (OWN)     
  Misstated 40.680 38.720 18.569 4.130 93.830 -3.539  -4.885 
  Non-misstated 44.219 43.605 20.183 3.030 96.400 (-1.241)  (-1.349) 
  Total 44.142 43.420 20.152 3.030 96.400    
Total debt to total assets (LEV), winsorised    
  Misstated 0.500 0.459 0.389 0.389 1.453 0.219  0.220 
  Non-misstated 0.281 0.239 0.263 0.000 1.453 (3.998) *** (4.273)*** 
  Total 0.286 0.245 0.268 0.000 1.453    
Market to book value (MB), winsorised    
  Misstated 1.331 0.759 2.426 -2.162 8.846 -0.043  -0.223 
  Non-misstated 1.374 0.982 1.446 -2.162 8.846 (-0.124)  (-2.016)** 
  Total 1.373 0.979 1.473 -2.162 8.846    
Firm age-year (AGE), winsorised    
  Misstated 24.490 22.000 13.086 3.000 64.000 -1.698  -2.000 
  Non-misstated 26.188 24.000 13.777 3.000 89.000 (-0.872)  (-0.924) 
  Total 26.151 24.000 13.761 3.000 89.000    
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Table 6.4 (continued) 
Panel B: Discrete Variables (N: 51 misstatement and 2,300 non-misstatement observations) 
Discrete Variables  
(abbreviation) 
 Mean Median Standard  
Deviation 
Differences between Two 
Proportions 
              (Chi
2
-statistic, df = 1) 
Dummy ownership concentration (D_OWN) = 1     
 Misstated   0.804 1 0.401  0.007  
 Non-misstated  0.797 1 0.402  (0.013)  
 Total   0.798 1 0.402    
Family ownership (FAM) = 1       
 Misstated   0.608 1 0.493  -0.014  
 Non-misstated  0.622 1 0.485  (0.044)  
 Total   0.622 1 0.485    
Pyramidal and cross-holding structure (CROSS) = 1    
 Misstated   0.078 0 0.272  -0.109  
 Non-misstated  0.187 0 0.390  (3.904) ** 
 Total   0.185 0 0.388    
Stock issuance (ISSUE) = 1       
 Misstated   0.294 0 0.460  0.089  
 Non-misstated  0.205 0 0.404  (2.428)  
 Total   0.207 0 0.405    
Dummy negative free cash flow in prior year (NFCF) = 1    
 Misstated   0.216 0 0.415  0.161  
 Non-misstated  0.055 0 0.228  (23.539) *** 
 Total   0.058 0 0.234    
Rehabilitation stage (REHAB) = 1      
 Misstated   0.235 0 0.428  0.196  
 Non-misstated  0.039 0 0.194  (46.259) *** 
 Total   0.043 0 0.204    
Big 4 auditor (BIG) = 1       
 Misstated   0.216 0 0.415  -0.313  
 Non-misstated  0.529 1 0.499  (19.647) *** 
 Total   0.522 1 0.500    
Audit firm change (AUDCHG) = 1      
 Misstated   0.333 0 0.476  0.216  
 Non-misstated  0.117 0 0.321  (22.016) *** 
 Total   0.121 0 0.326    
Duality (DUAL) = 1       
 Misstated   0.549 1 0.503  0.292  
 Non-misstated  0.257 0 0.437  (21.942) *** 
  Total    0.263 0 0.441       
Table 6.4 reports descriptive statistics for the sample of 51 misstatement observations and 2,300 non-
misstatement observations. The period of data analysis is restricted to 2002-2009 and the number of 
observations falls from 2,503 (Table 6.1) to 2,351 in this table because none of the accounting 
misstatement cases in year 2001 causes a perfect failure determination in a logistic regression analysis 
(see Section 6.3.3).  
  
134 
 
Note Table 6.4 (continued)  
The continuous variables are presented in Panel A and in there t-tests are used to evaluate differences in 
means, while Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are used to evaluate differences in medians. Panel B indicates the 
proportions of discrete variables. Chi
2
 tests are used to evaluate differences in the proportions. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed hypothesis testing of 
whether the difference is equal to zero).  
 
In Panel A, Table 6.4, the average misstatement firm-year has: average total assets of 
3,442 million THB, an average ownership concentration of 40.68%, a leverage ratio of 
0.5, a market-to-book ratio of 1.331, and an average age of 24.49 years. For the same 
period, the average non-misstatement firm-year has total assets of 11,711 million THB, 
average ownership concentration of 44.22%, a leverage ratio of 0.281, a market-to-book 
ratio of 1.374, and an average age of 26.19 years. The average ownership concentration 
of 44.142% for the total sample is similar to the ownership concentration of 44.14% the 
percentage reported in Alba et al. (2003). To evaluate differences in means and 
medians, t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests were used, respectively. Where 
appropriate, t-tests were adjusted for unequal variances between the two samples.
43
 
Statistically significant differences appear in the LNSIZE and LEV variables at the 0.05 
and 0.01 levels, respectively. Misstatement firms are significantly smaller and more 
highly levered than non-misstatement firms.  
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test results are consistent with those of the t-tests. Misstating 
firms have a lower market to book ratio (MB); however only the difference in medians 
is statistically significant at the 5% level. The means and medians of OWN and AGE 
suggest that misstating firms have a lower ownership concentration and are younger 
than the non-misstatement firms; however, the differences are not statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
 
Table 6.4 Panel B describes the discrete variables. The proportions of firms having an 
ultimate owner with more than 25% of the total shares (D_OWN) between two groups 
are very close (80.4% for misstatement group and 79.7% for the non-misstatement 
group) and they are not statistically different at the 5% level. The mean level of family 
ownership (FAM) is 60.8% for misstatement firm-years and 62.2% for non-
                                                 
43
In this sample the SIZE, LEV and MB variable had an unequal variance in the two samples with p-
values of <0.0001. 
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misstatement firm-years. An average of pyramidal and cross-holding structure is 7.8% 
in the misstatement sample, while at 18.7% it is higher in the non-misstatement group. 
The smaller proportion in the misstatement group is opposite to expectations because in 
the context of opportunism, pyramid and cross-holdings are likely to benefit a firm’s 
ultimate owner to extract private benefits through a divergence between cash flow and 
control rights (Claessens et al. 2000; Morck et al. 2005). The incentive to minimise the 
cost of capital is, however, supported in this analysis. Both proportions of stock 
issuances (ISSUE) and negative free cash flow (NFCF) are higher for the misstatement 
observations than non-misstatement ones and the difference is significant at the 1% 
level for the NFCF measure.  
 
Almost one quarter (23.5%) of the misstatement observations occur in the year when 
firms are under rehabilitation (REHAB). This proportion is significantly higher than the 
proportion of the rehabilitation status in the non-misstatement group (3.9%) at the 1% 
level. This result is in line with Tummanon (2005b), who found that the firms required 
to correct their accounting items appear the most frequently in the REHABCO sector. 
With regard to corporate governance mechanisms, the use of a Big 4 auditor covers 
21.6% of the misstatement sample, but a (significantly) larger proportion (52.9%) of the 
control group. One-third of the misstatement group has had an audit firm change, while 
only 11.7% of the non-misstatement group has changed their audit firm. More than a 
half of the firms in the misstatement sample (54.9%) had a chief executive officer who 
also serves as chairman of the board, while the duality position occurs in only 25.7% of 
the firms in the non-misstatement group. This finding of the duality position is 
consistent with prior studies (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996). The proportions in the corporate 
governance variables (i.e. DUAL, BIG, and AUDCHG) are significantly different 
between two groups at the 1% level.  
 
In summary, the univariate results show that accounting misstatements are more likely 
to occur in Thai firms with financial constraints (i.e. high leverage ratio, need external 
financing, and under rehabilitation) and in firms with weaker corporate governance (i.e. 
duality position, the use of local audit firms and change in auditors). These descriptive 
statistical results are consistent with both the results of prior research (e.g. Dechow et 
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al. 1996) and the research expectations. With regard to ownership structure, except for 
the pyramidal and cross-holding structure there is no systematic variation in the 
ownership measures between the two groups on a univariate basis. 
 
6.4.2 Correlations 
Table 6.5 presents the correlations among the variables for the misstatement and control 
observations. The table presents both Pearson’s (below the diagonal) and Spearman’s 
(above the diagonal) correlation coefficients. The significant levels of a hypothesis test 
(whether the coefficient is equal to zero) from the two methods are in accordance with 
one another, except for certain cases.
44 
 However, the coefficients of the contradictory 
cases are small. Menard (1995, p. 66) advises that a high correlation of 0.80 can pose a 
problem of multicollinearity in regression analysis. In the table, all correlation 
coefficients are well below 0.80. Even so, a multicollinearity test is considered when the 
regression assumptions are examined (see Appendix C). In the following discussion, the 
coefficients from Pearson’s tests will be stated.  
 
                                                 
44
These include: (i) the correlation coefficient of MB with the following variables where the coefficient 
does not statistically differ from zero in Pearson’s test but it does in Spearman’s test: MB and AM (-
0.004, Pearson and -0.042, Spearman), MB and FAM (+0.002, Pearson and -0.055, Spearman), and MB 
and AUDCHG (-0.028, Pearson and -0.089, Spearman); (ii) the correlation coefficient of LEV and 
ISSUE does not statistically differ from zero in Pearson’s test (the coefficient of +0.032, Pearson) but it 
does in Spearman’s test (the coefficient of +0.065, Spearman); and (iii) the following correlations 
statistically differ from zero in Pearson’s test but not in Spearman’s test: LEV and BIG (-0.077, Pearson 
and -0.02, Spearman), AGE and BIG (+0.051, Pearson and <0.001, Spearman) and DUAL and LNSIZE 
(-0.053, Pearson and -0.031, Spearman). One reason for these differences possibly involves the non-
normality of the data. There is one existing extreme outlier in the MB data (the maximum value of 
8.8464; see Table 6.4 Panel A) and 108 of the 2,351 observations have a negative value of the MB. To 
test the robustness of the research results, the logistic regression model in the main analysis (Section 
6.4.3) were reassessed by eliminating the observations having a negative value of MB, as in finance 
literature (e.g. in Garlappi et al. 2008). The results for the corporate governance mechanisms (BIG, 
AUDCHG and DUAL) remain significant at the 1% level, while the results for the incentives (LEV and 
NFCF) become insignificant at the 5% level (the p-value of LEV was 0.068 and the p-value of NFCF 
was 0.183). 
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Table 6.5: Correlation Matrix for the Combined Misstatement and Non-Misstatement Firm-Years 
AM -0.028 -0.004 -0.041 ** 0.088 *** 0.032 0.100 *** -0.042 ** 0.140 *** -0.091 *** 0.097 *** 0.097 *** -0.043 ** -0.019
OWN -0.026 -0.183 *** 0.186 *** -0.113 *** -0.153 *** -0.101 *** 0.031 -0.077 *** 0.021 -0.053 *** -0.029 0.023 0.054 ***
FAM -0.004 -0.184 *** -0.174 *** 0.071 *** 0.006 -0.005 -0.055 *** -0.028 -0.142 *** 0.007 0.068 *** -0.125 *** -0.070 ***
CROSS -0.041 ** 0.185 *** -0.174 *** -0.062 *** -0.007 -0.011 0.132 *** -0.021 0.084 *** -0.016 -0.065 *** 0.108 *** 0.069 ***
LEV 0.119 *** -0.105 *** 0.049 ** -0.064 *** 0.065 *** 0.129 *** -0.085 *** 0.242 *** -0.020 0.058 *** -0.011 0.232 *** -0.102 ***
ISSUE 0.032 -0.150 *** 0.006 -0.007 0.032 0.061 *** 0.156 *** -0.016 0.082 *** 0.010 <0.0001 0.188 *** -0.126 ***
NFCF 0.100 *** -0.101 *** -0.005 -0.011 0.121 *** 0.061 *** -0.005 0.152 *** -0.053 ** 0.086 *** -0.004 -0.032 -0.092 ***
MB -0.004 0.008 0.002 0.086 *** -0.092 *** 0.138 *** 0.025 -0.213 *** 0.159 *** -0.089 *** -0.053 ** 0.173 *** -0.170 ***
REHAB 0.140 *** -0.076 *** -0.028 -0.021 0.435 *** -0.016 0.152 *** -0.106 *** -0.177 *** 0.126 *** 0.081 *** -0.133 *** 0.066 ***
BIG -0.091 *** 0.030 -0.142 *** 0.084 *** -0.077 *** 0.082 *** -0.053 ** 0.066 *** -0.177 *** -0.164 *** -0.088 *** 0.342 *** <0.0001
AUDCHG 0.097 *** -0.047 ** 0.007 -0.016 0.083 *** 0.010 0.086 *** -0.028 0.126 *** -0.164 *** -0.006 -0.096 *** 0.013
DUAL 0.097 *** -0.022 0.068 *** -0.065 *** 0.002 <0.0001 -0.004 -0.045 ** 0.081 *** -0.088 *** -0.006 -0.031 -0.076 ***
LNSIZE -0.053 ** 0.035 * -0.132 *** 0.127 *** 0.119 *** 0.204 *** -0.039 0.114 *** -0.137 *** 0.322 *** -0.097 *** -0.053 *** -0.021
AGE -0.018 0.089 *** -0.077 *** 0.051 ** -0.043 ** -0.115 *** -0.084 *** -0.094 *** 0.041 ** 0.051 ** 0.008 -0.102 *** 0.027
 LNSIZE  AGE DUAL  AM   OWN  CROSS  NFCF REHAB AUDCHG  FAM   LEV ISSUE  MB   BIG
 
Table 6.5 reports the correlation coefficients for Pearson (below the diagonal) and Spearman (above the diagonal). All variables are defined in Table 6.3.   
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (a two-tailed test of whether the correlation coefficient is equal to zero). 
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Within the first column the appearance of accounting misstatements (AM) is positively 
correlated with rehabilitation stage (REHAB), leverage ratio (LEV) and demand for 
external financing (NFCF) at the correlation coefficients of 14%, 12% and 10%, 
respectively. The incidence of accounting misstatements is also significantly correlated 
with the corporate governance variables. The existence of accounting misstatements 
(AM) is positively correlated with duality position (DUAL) and audit firm change 
(AUDCHG), and is negatively correlated with the use of Big 4 auditors (BIG). Their 
coefficients differ from zero at the 1% level. Although there is a negative correlation 
between the pyramidal and cross-holding arrangement (CROSS) and the occurrence of 
accounting misstatements, the coefficient correlation is low (4%). Neither ownership 
concentration (OWN) nor family ownership (FAM) is significantly correlated with the 
appearance of accounting misstatements.  
 
Significant correlations among the independent variables are as follows. The ownership 
concentration (OWN) is positively correlated with firm age (AGE), consistent with the 
findings of Claessens et al. (2000). OWN is positively correlated with the pyramidal 
and cross-holding arrangement (CROSS) at the correlation coefficient of 18.5%, which 
is in accordance with the literature noting that the ultimate owners of Asian firms have a 
controlling power over the firm through the business group and the pyramidal and 
cross-holding chains (e.g. Claessens and Fan 2002; Morck et al. 2005).  
 
As far as the financial characteristics are concerned, concentrated ownership firms 
(OWN) seem to have a healthier financial position (REHAB), a lower leverage ratio 
(LEV) and less demand for external funds (NFCF and ISSUE). Family firms (FAM) are 
less likely to use Big 4 auditors (correlation coefficient of -14% with BIG) and they are 
smaller (the coefficient of -13% with LNSIZE). LEV has a positive correlation 
coefficient of 43.5% with REHAB and a negative correlation coefficient of 9.2% with 
market to book ratio (MB). These correlations are persuasive because the highly levered 
firms are more likely to face liquidity problems and the financial constraint may 
ultimately lead them to rehabilitation status and because of the poor current financial 
market position, participants can heavily discount these firms’ shares. The rehabilitation 
firms show more demand for external funding (with a positive correlation of 15.2% 
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between NFCF and REHAB). Firm size (LNSIZE) has a positive correlation coefficient 
of 20.4% with stock issuance (ISSUE), and 11.4% with the market to book ratio (MB), 
consistent with prior literature (e.g. Rajan and Zingales 1995) suggesting that larger 
firms release more information to the public than smaller firms do and that an 
information asymmetry cost is lower in large firms; consequently, larger firms are 
positively correlated with stock issuances.  
 
With regard to corporate governance factors, firm size has a positive correlation 
coefficient of 32% with the use Big 4 auditors (BIG), consistent with prior research (e.g. 
Chi and Huang 2005; Fan and Wong 2005). Stock issuances (ISSUE) are positively 
correlated with the use of a Big 4 auditor (BIG), similar to previous studies (e.g. Fan 
and Wong 2005). A surprising result is the negative correlation (-17.4%) between 
family ownership (FAM) and the pyramidal and cross-holding arrangement (CROSS). 
Further investigation indicated that 56% of the firms with pyramids or cross-holdings 
are those firms whose ultimate owner is not a single family but multiple shareholders. 
 
Although the results above may be indicative, they do not allow for potential 
conclusions for the determinants of accounting misstatements in Thai firms. The next 
subsection, therefore, reports a multivariate logistic regression analysis for the 
determinants of accounting misstatements in Thailand. 
 
6.4.3 Multivariate Results 
The analysis for the determinants of accounting misstatements employed the following 
logistic regression model (repeated for ease of reference below).  
ti,t
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where t is the current fiscal year of firm i. All variables are defined in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.6: Logistic Regressions Examining the Determinants of Accounting 
Misstatements in Thailand during 2002-2009 
VARIABLES Hypo- Predicted Model 1 Model 2 
 thesis Sign Coefficient  Odds Coefficient  Odds  
  (H)   (z-statistic)  Ratio (z-statistic)  Ratio 
OWN 1.1 + 0.0040 1.0040   
   (0.621)    
D_OWN  +   0.5931* 1.8096 
     (1.660)  
FAM 1.2 + -0.2395 0.7870 -0.1985 0.8199 
   (-0.566)  (-0.466)  
CROSS 1.3 + -0.1674 0.8459 -0.1888 0.8280 
   (-0.268)  (-0.302)  
LEV 
a 
2.1 + 1.4587** 4.3005 1.5492** 4.7078 
   (2.320)  (2.366)  
ISSUE 2.2 + 0.5057 1.6581 0.5399 1.7158 
   (1.403)  (1.494)  
NFCF 2.3 + 1.2328** 3.4307 1.1974** 3.3114 
   (2.575)  (2.569)  
MB 2.4 + 0.1060 1.1119 0.0932 1.0977 
   (1.039)  (0.938)  
REHAB 2.5  +/- -0.1415 0.8680 -0.0962 0.9082 
   (-0.211)  (-0.146)  
BIG 3.1 - -1.1128** 0.3286 -1.0841** 0.3382 
   (-2.285)  (-2.214)  
AUDCHG 3.2  +/- 0.8658** 2.3769 0.8738** 2.3960 
   (2.331)  (2.335)  
DUAL 3.3 + 1.1317*** 3.1008 1.1853*** 3.2715 
   (2.974)  (2.948)  
LNSIZE   +/- -0.2211 0.8016 -0.2417 0.7853 
   (-1.196)  (-1.317)  
AGE   +/- 0.0041 1.0041 0.0038 1.0038 
   (0.235)  (0.216)  
Constant   -3.5303** 0.0293 -3.8969** 0.0203 
   (-2.224)  (-2.395)  
Industry dummies  Included  Included  
Year dummies   Included  Included  
Observations   2351  2351  
McFadden's pseudo R
2
 0.2960  0.3000  
Model chi-square 269.5  273.2  
Degrees of freedom 26  26  
p-value   <0.0001  <0.0001  
Number of clusters (firms) 387   387   
  
141 
 
Table 6.6 presents logistic regression results for the determinants of accounting misstatements in the 
Thai sample. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of an occurrence of an accounting 
misstatement. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 6.3. Standard errors are robust by firm-
level clustering. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (a two-
tailed test of whether the coefficient is equal to zero). 
a
 If the data are not winsorised, the leverage ratio (LEV) becomes insignificant at the 5% level (p-
value=0.956). 
 
Table 6.6 presents the regression results for the determinants of accounting 
misstatements in Thailand. The first column refers back to the alternative hypotheses for 
the determinants of accounting misstatements in Thailand (see Section 5.3). The 
goodness of fit statistics is shown at the bottom of the table. Model 1 has a model Chi
2
 
of 269.5 and is statistically significant (p-value
 
< 0.0001). Therefore, there is evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis that coefficients of the independent variables are equal to 
zero (Ho: β1= β2=.... β26=0) and conclude that information about the independent 
variables allow the model to make better predictions of P(Y=1).
45
 The model Chi
2
 of the 
other model in the same table is also statistically significant at the p-value < 0.0001.  
 
In Model 1, the coefficients for LEV, NFCF, BIG, AUDCHG and DUAL, differ from 
zero at the 5% level and the signs of these coefficients are consistent with the 
expectations of this study. They indicate that an accounting misstatement is more likely 
to occur when a firm is close to the debt covenant violation (LEV), needs external 
financing (NFCF), changes auditor (AUDCHG) and has a duality position of the chief 
executive officer and chairman of the board (DUAL), but the likelihood of accounting 
misstatements reduces when the firm uses a Big 4 auditor (BIG).
46
 The coefficients of 
OWN, FAM and CROSS do not statistically differ from zero at the 0.05 level. 
                                                 
45
The diagnostic tests for this model are presented in Appendix C. The model meets all logistic regression 
assumptions except for the appearance of influential cases, which are all misstatement observations. 
Four extreme cases appear and result in large residuals. Excluding these four observations, however, 
does not change the significance of research results. In order to have the sample as close as the real 
population, these observations were maintained in the analysis. 
46
Since 1 January 2006 listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand are required to rotate their 
audit partner every five years (section 5 (6) SECT 2005b) without the possibility of renewal before two 
years have passed from the previous engagement. The observations of auditor change in Thai listed 
firms since after 2006 may be caused by this regulation (although the regulation requires only the audit 
partner rotation). To ensure the robustness of the research results, the study reran the logistic regression 
on the observations during 2002-2005 (957 observations). The result of the audit firm change 
(AUDCHG) is still significant at the 0.05 level (t-statistic of 2.24). Other significant research results 
(i.e. LEV, NFCF, BIG and DUAL) remain unchanged, except for a slight change in coefficients.  
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Therefore, there are no significant relationships between the ownership proxies (i.e. 
OWN, FAM and CROSS) and the likelihood of accounting misstatements. The 
coefficients of growth opportunities (MB), rehabilitation status (REHAB), firm size 
(LNSIZE) and firm age (AGE) are not significantly associated with the likelihood of 
accounting misstatements. Consequently, the pressure from outside parties (i.e. the 
capital market pressure, MB, and profitability regulation, REHAB) are not as important 
as expected in the sample. In the descriptive statistics (Table 6.4), means of LNSIZE, 
CROSS, ISSUE and REHAB are statistically different between the two groups, but they 
are not significant antecedents in this multiple logistic regression analysis.
47
 The 
significant result in the descriptive statistics for the rehabilitation status (REHAB) and 
the insignificant result of its coefficient in the multiple regression analysis may indicate 
that accounting misstatements are more likely to occur when firms are in this status, 
which is consistent with Tummanon (2005b), but being in such a status is not an 
important antecedent of the likelihood of accounting misstatements when other factors 
are controlled for. In regard to the MB variable, it is often not a significant determinant 
of financial misreporting in samples with more dispersed ownership (e.g. Burns and 
Kedia 2006; Burns et al. 2010). According to the odds ratio, the top three important 
antecedents of accounting misstatements in Thailand are the incentive to avoid debt 
covenant violation (LEV, odds ratio of 4.3), an ex ante financing need (NFCF, odds 
ratio of 3.43) and duality position (DUAL, odds ratio of 3.1). These determinants are 
also found in prior research into U.S. firms (Dechow et al. 1996). 
 
In Model 2, the continuous variable of OWN is replaced by a discrete variable of 
ownership concentration (D_OWN). D_OWN is positively associated with accounting 
misstatements - the coefficient differs from zero at the 10% level. The sign and 
significance levels of other variables remain unchanged (only the coefficients have 
                                                 
47
Regarding the REHAB measure, the proportion of REHAB is higher for the misstatement group in the 
descriptive statistics, but in this multiple regression analysis, the coefficient of REHAB has a negative 
sign (although the coefficient does not statistically differ from zero). This contradictory result concerns 
the researcher about a multicollinearity problem because REHAB is highly correlated with LEV (the 
correlation coefficient of 43.5% in Table 6.5). The researcher, therefore, reran the logistic regression 
analysis by excluding the LEV measure. With or without the LEV measure the coefficient of REHAB 
does not differ from zero at the 5% level in the multiple regression analyses. A diagnostic test in 
Appendix C neither signals the multicollinearity problem of the REHAB variable. Therefore, it is 
certain that there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis that there is no association between 
rehabilitation status and the likelihood of accounting misstatements. 
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slightly changed). Therefore, the likelihood of accounting misstatement increases when 
the ultimate owner has control rights over 25%. This is in accordance with a warning by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand (SECT 2005a) stating that investors 
must be aware of expropriation if a firm’s ultimate owners hold more than 25% of the 
total shares. The odds ratio of 1.8 indicates that the odds of a likelihood of accounting 
misstatements are 80% higher that a firm with high ownership concentration (i.e. >25%) 
engages in financial misreporting when compared to a firm with low ownership 
concentration. This finding supports the hypothesis of an entrenchment effect and points 
to a non-linear relationship (which will be further examined in Section 6.5.2).  
 
With regard to the industry and year dummy sets, none of the industry dummies are 
statistically associated with accounting misstatements (see details in Appendix C). 
Meanwhile, the dummy for 2004 is positively associated with the likelihood of 
accounting misstatements at the 1% level. This result is in line with Table 6.2 Panel A 
showing that the accounting misstatement cases most frequently appeared in 2004 and 
one possible reason involves a new audit team of market regulators.  
 
Accordingly, a conclusion for the hypothesis testing is that there is evidence to reject 
five null hypotheses in the sample at the conventional 5% level. In other words, the 
alternative hypotheses for the debt covenant hypothesis (H2.1), an ex ante financing 
need (H2.3), a usage of a Big 4 auditor (H3.1), an audit firm change (H3.2) and a 
duality position (H3.3) are significant determinants of accounting misstatements in Thai 
firms.
48
  
                                                 
48
A study by Ananchotikul et al.’s (2010) found that ROA and dividend payout ratio are significant and 
negatively associated with the likelihood of regulatory violation in Thailand. The measure of ROA has 
also found to be negatively associated with the likelihood of fraud in some prior studies (e.g. Brazel et 
al. 2009; Erickson et al. 2006; Perols and Lougee 2011). Consistent with the prior studies, if ROA 
(winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles) is included in the empirical model of this research, it is 
significantly associated with the likelihood of accounting misstatements (coefficient of -4.668; z-
statistic of -3.62; p-value < 0.001) and the pseudo R
2
 increases from 29.6% (Model 1 Table 6.6) to 
32.04% ; however the coefficient of audit firm change (AUDCHG) becomes not significant (z-statistic 
of 1.65) at the 5% level and the coefficient of leverage ratio (LEV) is significant at the 10% level (z-
statistic of 1.67). The ROA is highly correlated with LEV (coefficient of -29.65%) in the sample and 
this may cause the change of the result on LEV measure, similar to the problem occurred to the ROA 
and delisting pressure in Wang and Wu’s (2011) sample. Some studies, on the other hand, have found a 
positive relationship between ROA and the likelihood of fraud (e.g. Summers and Sweeney 1998). 
There is no theory suggesting the relationship of ROA and accounts manipulation. In addition, there are 
particular studies (e.g. Thomsen and Pedersen 2000) examining the determinants of ROA including 
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This paragraph compares the research findings with the existing evidence in the 
literature. The evidence to support the entrenchment effects of controlling shareholders 
in this research is weak. None of the measures of ownership structures have a 
significant relationship with the likelihood of accounting misstatements significantly at 
the 5% level; only the coefficient of the dummy variable for ownership concentration 
differs from zero at the 10% level. Previous studies of Thai firms neither find an 
association of ownership concentration with the likelihood of regulatory violation 
(Ananchotikul et al. 2010) or with discretionary accruals (Pornupatham 2006). With 
regard to the incentives, accounting misstatements in Thailand are likely to occur if Thai 
firms wish to avoid debt covenant violations and minimise the cost of capital. These 
findings are consistent with those of prior research (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996; Firth et al. 
2011). On the other hand, the incentive to maintain the capital market growth 
opportunity is not statistically significant for Thai firms. Even though the auditors in 
Thailand agree that the incentive to maintain the growth opportunity is the most 
important reason for Thai firms to manage earnings (within GAAP) (Pornupatham 
2006), when measured by GAAP violation it is not of importance. The incentive to meet 
profitability regulation (as measured by a rehabilitation status) is not as significant as 
expected, while it is of significance in Chinese listed firms (Chen et al. 2001). 
Corporate governance mechanisms have an important impact on the likelihood of 
accounting misstatements in Thai firms. The weakness of internal corporate governance 
(i.e. firms whose chief executive officer and chairman of the board are the same 
individual) increases the likelihood of accounting misstatements, consistent with the 
finding in, for example, the U.S. firms (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996; Efendi et al. 2007). Big 
4 auditors play an important role in reducing the likelihood of accounting 
misstatements, consistent with the roles of Big 4 auditors in some U.S. samples (Lennox 
and Pittman 2010) and the U.K. (Peasnell et al. 2001). An auditor change is strongly 
associated with the incidence of accounting misstatements.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
ownership structures and financial characteristics, which are the independent variables in this study. 
Due to the lack of theoretical support, ROA was excluded in this research. 
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Since the variables of auditors (BIG) and audit firm change (AUDCHG) are related, 
further investigation was conducted in order to understand and interpret how the audit 
quality in the first year of auditing varied between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. 
Overall, in Table 6.6 Model 1 the odds ratio of BIG is 0.3286. This means that the 
clients of Big 4 audit firms are 67.24% less likely to see an occurrence of accounting 
misstatements. The odds ratio of 2.3769 for AUDCHG indicates that the probability that 
financial reports are misstated is 2.37 times more likely to occur in the first year of 
auditing when compared to non-first years. Further investigation embraces the 
probability of accounting misstatements, which is varied among Big 4 and non-Big 4 
auditors, first-year and non-first years, while other variables are computed at the mean 
value.
49
 The examination shows that the odds of accounting misstatements occurring for 
Big 4 auditors by the odds of a likelihood of accounting misstatements for the non-Big 4 
auditors equals 0.3911 in the first year of audit engagement, while it equals 0.3386 in 
the non-first years. The higher proportion of the first year indicates an adverse effect of 
short-term audit tenure on financial reporting quality, consistent with Carcello and Nagy 
(2004) and Johnson et al. (2002). The proportion of 0.3911 which is less than 1 
confirms that the odds of a likelihood of accounting misstatements is less likely to occur 
in Big 4 clients than non-Big 4 clients.  
 
The thesis further tested whether the audit firm change is a part of the scheme of 
controlling shareholders (such as controlling shareholders of a misstating firm change 
their auditor in order to avoid being detected for their financial misreporting). Types of 
audit switch, guided by Lennox and Pittman (2010), were employed in this examination. 
During 2002-2009, 286 out of 2,351 firm-years (12.1%) were audited by new auditors 
(17 in the misstatement group and 268 in the non-misstatement group). The previous 
results in Table 6.4 Panel B show that the proportion of audit firm changes is 
significantly higher for the misstatement group (33.3%) than the non-misstatement 
group (11.7%) and there is a systematic variation in the auditor change between the 
samples. Following Lennox and Pittman (2010), audit firm changes were classified the 
into four groups: lateral switches (either one Big 4 firm to another or one non-Big 4 
firm to another), upgrade (from a non-Big 4 firm to a Big 4 firm), and downgrade (from 
                                                 
49
The interpretation is guided by Chen et al. (2003a). 
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a Big 4 firm to a non-Big 4 firm).
50
 The lateral switch is higher in misstatement years 
(71%) than non-misstatement years (45%) and the proportions are statistically different 
(Chi
2
df=1 = 31.5713; p-value < 0.001). A similar examination was performed in the 
upgrade and downgrade categories; however, there are no systematic variations between 
the sample and the upgrade (Chi
 2
 df=1 = 1.855 p-value = 0.173) and between the sample 
and the downgrade (Chi
 2
 df=1 = 1.6593; p-value = 0.198).   
 
The study continued examining the relation between the audit switch and the likelihood 
of accounting misstatements in a multivariate analysis. Further results are presented in 
Table 6.7. 
 
The first model in Table 6.7 is the Model 2 in Table 6.6 included for comparison.
51
 The 
second model in Table 6.7 is an analysis of the relationship between types of audit 
switch and the likelihood of accounting misstatement (the lateral switch from a Big 4 
auditor to another Big 4 auditor is the baseline of the regression). An alternative 
hypothesis is that the misstatement firms are more likely to switch from a Big 4 to non-
Big 4 (BIG_NON, downgrade), when compared with non-misstatement firm-years (e.g. 
the controlling shareholders of misstating firms change auditors in order to reduce the 
likelihood of detection of an accounting misstatement). A positive sign for the 
coefficient of BIG_NON is thus expected. The regression result shows a positive sign of 
the downgrade type (BIG_NON), but the coefficient does not statistically differ from 
zero at the 0.05 level (p-value= 0.824). Therefore, the research fails to reject the null 
                                                 
50
As found in prior studies in Asia and Thailand, Big 4 audit firms play an important role in the 
monitoring system (e.g. Fan and Wong 2005; Pornupatham 2006). Also in this research, the use of a Big 
4 audit firm is negatively associated with the occurrence of accounting misstatements. It is thus deemed 
that the Big 4 audit firms provide better audit quality and increase financial reporting quality (DeFond 
et al. 2000; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1993; Teoh and Wong 1993). Accordingly, a change from a non-Big 
4 firm to a Big 4 firm is considered an upgrade. In contrast, a change from a Big 4 firm to a non-Big 4 
firm was regarded as a downgrade. The hypothesis is that the upgrade signals an incentive of controlling 
shareholders to strengthen the monitoring system (i.e. they are governed by the auditors), while the 
downgrade shows a lower intention of controlling shareholders to provide high standard of corporate 
governance (i.e. they may govern the auditors).  
51
The dummy variable of ownership concentration exceeding 25% (D_OWN) is used here, rather than the 
continuous variable of OWN. According to Thai laws, an extraordinary general meeting can be held if a 
majority of shareholders (exceeding 25% of total outstanding shares) requests and such legal activities 
as dismissing an auditor can be done in this meeting. The research is hypothesising that controlling 
shareholders use their higher proportion of control rights to avoid the auditors’ monitoring by changing 
the auditor. Therefore, a dummy variable of D_OWN is appropriate for use in this context. 
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hypothesis that there is no relationship between the downgrade and the appearance of 
accounting misstatements. Prior studies (e.g. Lennox and Pittman 2010) do not find 
evidence for this relationship.   
 
Table 6.7: Logistic Regression Examining Types of Audit Firm Change 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Table 6.6 
Model 2 
Audit Firm 
Change 
Audit Partner 
Change 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 (z-statistic) (z-statistic) (z-statistic) 
AUDCHG 0.8738**  0.9152** 
 (2.335)  (2.349) 
BIG_NON  0.1628  
  (0.222)  
NON_NON  0.9959**  
  (2.102)  
NON_BIG  2.1657***  
  (2.942)  
PARTNER   0.2112 
   (0.554) 
D_OWN 
a 
0.5931* 0.5502 0.5997* 
 (1.660) (1.587) (1.677) 
FAM -0.1985 -0.2616 -0.1952 
 (-0.466) (-0.619) (-0.459) 
CROSS -0.1888 -0.201 -0.1846 
 (-0.302) (-0.310) (-0.295) 
LEV 1.5492** 1.5155** 1.5299** 
 (2.366) (2.328) (2.389) 
ISSUE 0.5399 0.5389 0.5475 
 (1.494) (1.461) (1.510) 
NFCF 1.1974** 1.2048*** 1.2007** 
 (2.569) (2.672) (2.572) 
MB 0.0932 0.0888 0.0923 
 (0.938) (0.898) (0.930) 
REHAB -0.0962 -0.1154 -0.0854 
 (-0.146) (-0.175) (-0.131) 
BIG -1.0841** -1.2238** -1.0873** 
 (-2.214) (-2.416) (-2.224) 
DUAL 1.1853*** 1.1679*** 1.1856*** 
 (2.948) (2.912) (2.955) 
LNSIZE -0.2417 -0.2244 -0.2433 
 (-1.317) (-1.266) (-1.330) 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Table 6.6 
Model 2 
Audit Firm 
Change 
Audit Partner 
Change 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 (z-statistic) (z-statistic) (z-statistic) 
AGE 0.0038 0.0027 0.0035 
 (0.216) (0.146) (0.203) 
Constant -3.8969** -3.8687** -3.9217** 
 (-2.395) (-2.423) (-2.396) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included 
Observations 2,351 2,351 2,351 
McFadden's pseudo R
2
 0.300 0.307 0.300 
Model chi-square 273.2 265.5 279 
Degrees of freedom 26 28 27 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Number of clusters (firms) 387 387 387 
Table 6.7 presents logistic regression results for the examinations into types of audit firm change 
(Model 2) and an audit partner change (Model 3). Model 1 is from Table 6.6, Model 2. The dependent 
variable is a dichotomous variable of an occurrence of an accounting misstatement. BIG_NON is a 
dummy variable of 1 if a firm changes its auditor from a Big 4 firm to a non-Big 4 firm (downgrade); 
0 otherwise. NON_NON is a dummy variable of 1 if a firm changes its auditor from a non-Big 4 firm 
to another (lateral switch); 0 otherwise. NON_BIG is a dummy variable of 1 if a firm changes its 
auditor from a non-Big 4 firm to one Big 4 audit firm (upgrade); 0 otherwise. PARTNER is a change 
in an audit partner from the current audit firm; 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 
6.3. Standard errors are robust by firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively (a two-tailed test of whether the coefficient is equal to zero).  
a
 The dummy variable of ownership concentration exceeding 25% (D_OWN) is used here, rather than 
the continuous variable of OWN. An auditor change must be approved by stockholders in annual 
meetings. According to Thai laws, an extraordinary general meeting can be held if a majority of 
shareholders (exceeding 25% of total outstanding shares) requests and such legal activities as 
dismissing an auditor can be done in this meeting. The research is hypothesising that controlling 
shareholders use their higher proportion of control rights to avoid the auditors’ monitoring by 
changing the auditor. Therefore, a dummy variable of D_OWN is appropriate for use in this context.  
 
The second model also tests other types of audit switch. The statistically significant 
results appear in the coefficients of lateral switch (NON_NON) and upgrade 
(NON_BIG), which are different from zero at the 5% level. Both have a positive 
coefficient. For those firms that have used a non Big 4 audit firm, the likelihood of 
accounting misstatement increases when they change their auditor (no matter who is the 
new auditor). Since the likelihood increases even in the upgrade switch, it might imply 
an inherent risk that occurs in the first year of audit engagement, rather than an intention 
of controlling shareholders in changing the auditor. A possible reason for this involves 
the loss of important client-specific knowledge (e.g. Johnson et al. 2002; Livne and 
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Pettinicchio 2011; Stanley and Todd DeZoort 2007). If this is the case then a change in 
an audit partner from the same audit firm should have a different result on the likelihood 
of accounting misstatements. 
 
The third model in Table 6.7 is then additionally presented to determine whether an 
audit partner change and an audit firm change are associated with the likelihood of 
accounting misstatements differently. If the audit risk occurs due to the loss of client-
specific knowledge, a new audit partner from the same audit firm should be less 
concerned because the client-specific knowledge remains (e.g. prior working papers and 
some members of the audit team who have experience of auditing similar clients). 
Consequently, the coefficient of the relationship between an audit partner change 
(PARTNER) and the likelihood of accounting misstatements should be smaller than that 
of the audit firm change (AUDCHG) and the likelihood of accounting misstatement. In 
Model 3, an audit partner change is positively associated with the likelihood of 
accounting misstatement, and its effect on the likelihood (the coefficient of 0.2112) is 
smaller than an audit firm change (the coefficient of 0.9152). Nonetheless, the 
coefficient of PARTNER does not statistically differ from zero at the 0.05 level. 
Therefore, the propensity of an accounting misstatement increases when new auditor 
partners come from a new audit firm (which is consistent with the original result in the 
first model), but the propensity is not affected if new audit partners come from the same 
audit firm. Some previous studies (e.g. Bamber and Bamber 2009; Livne and 
Pettinicchio 2011) suggest that a change in audit partner can bring “fresh eyes” which 
helps to increase the auditor critical capacity. If that were so then a new audit partner 
change would be negatively associated with the likelihood of accounting misstatements; 
however, this is not found in the Thai sample.  
 
To summarise, although an auditor change can signal an accounting misstatement, there 
is no significant evidence to support the view that controlling shareholders change 
auditors because they want to avoid being detected (i.e. the coefficient of downgrade is 
not significant). On the other hand, an auditor change is deemed to increase an audit risk 
to new auditors in their first year of audit. This result is consistent with prior studies 
(e.g. Carcello and Nagy 2004; Johnson et al. 2002) showing a negative relationship 
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between short-term audit tenure and quality of financial reports. An audit firm change is 
found to have a negative result on the quality of financial reports of Thai firms (i.e. the 
likelihood of accounting misstatements increases) but a change in audit partner alone 
does not.  
 
One might question the relationship between audit opinion and the propensity for 
accounting misstatements. This study has excluded this aspect in the analysis because 
an audit opinion is an output from monitors, rather than a corporate governance 
mechanism in the monitoring process. It can be incorrectly expressed if an auditor is 
incompetent. Having investigated the audit reports for the 51 misstatement firm-years, 
this study has found that only 15 observations (29%) were detected and reported by the 
auditors in their audit reports. Six auditors were suspended by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Thailand due to their audit failure. Therefore, audit opinions 
tend not to be a reliable antecedent of accounting misstatements in Thailand. The 
research, nonetheless, tested the effect of audit opinions. A dummy variable is used, 
taking the value of 1 when the auditor has a modified audit opinion; 0 otherwise. The 
proportion of firms obtaining an audit report with a modified audit opinion is 43% for 
the misstatement group and 10.17% for the control group and they are statistically 
different at the p-value < 0.01. A regression result shows a positive association between 
the appearance of modified audit opinions and the occurrence of accounting 
misstatements at the 0.05 level [the coefficient of 1.4532, robust standard error of 0.539, 
and p-value of 0.007 (two-tailed)]. While this association importantly appears in Thai 
samples, it is not statistically significant in the U.S. samples (e.g. Skousen et al. 2008; 
Skousen and Wright 2006). 
 
To summarise, this section has examined the determinants of accounting misstatements 
in Thai firms. Types of audit firm changes have also been assessed. The next section 
will present robustness tests for the research results. 
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6.5 Robustness Tests 
6.5.1 Rare Events Logistic Regression 
Since the proportion of the accounting misstatements cases (i.e. the event) to the non-
accounting misstatements observations in this study is low at 2.07% (51/2,452), which 
is considered a rare event (King and Zeng 2001a, c), a rare events logistic regression 
was estimated to assess the robustness of the results. Such analysis is necessary because 
a traditional logit models underestimates the probability of an event, P(Y=1), and 
overestimates coefficients of explanatory variables in the rare event situation. The 
estimates from rare events logit models are less biased and have a smaller mean squared 
error (King and Zeng 2001c). The possibility of a Type I error can, therefore, decrease 
and the logistic regression analysis is robust. The results of rare events logit model are 
presented in Table 6.8. 
 
Table 6.8: Rare Events Logit Model versus Traditional Logit Model 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
 Logit Relogit Logit Relogit 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
  (z-statistic) (z-statistic) (z-statistic) (z-statistic) 
OWN 0.0040 0.0041   
 (0.621) (0.567)   
D_OWN   0.5931* 0.5181 
   (1.660) (1.285) 
FAM -0.2395 -0.2223 -0.1985 -0.1855 
 (-0.566) (-0.614) (-0.466) (-0.519) 
CROSS -0.1674 -0.0589 -0.1888 -0.0758 
 (-0.268) (-0.089) (-0.302) (-0.114) 
LEV 1.4587** 1.4010** 1.5492** 1.4793*** 
 (2.320) (2.560) (2.366) (2.632) 
ISSUE 0.5057 0.5031 0.5399 0.5326 
 (1.403) (1.356) (1.494) (1.427) 
NFCF 1.2328** 1.1690** 1.1974** 1.1353** 
 (2.575) (2.383) (2.569) (2.342) 
MB 0.106 0.1102 0.0932 0.0985 
 (1.039) (1.239) (0.938) (1.135) 
REHAB -0.1415 -0.1212 -0.0962 -0.0837 
 (-0.211) (-0.196) (-0.146) (-0.133) 
BIG -1.1128** -1.0393*** -1.0841** -1.0139** 
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VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
 Logit Relogit Logit Relogit 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
  (z-statistic) (z-statistic) (z-statistic) (z-statistic) 
 (-2.285) (-2.638) (-2.214) (-2.561) 
AUDCHG 0.8658** 0.8435** 0.8738** 0.8491** 
 (2.331) (2.388) (2.335) (2.378) 
DUAL 1.1317*** 1.0634*** 1.1853*** 1.1081*** 
 (2.974) (3.363) (2.948) (3.343) 
LNSIZE -0.2211 -0.2112 -0.2417 -0.2287 
 (-1.196) (-1.346) (-1.317) (-1.470) 
AGE 0.0041 0.0045 0.0038 0.004 
 (0.235) (0.278) (0.216) (0.242) 
Constant -3.5303** -3.2735** -3.8969** -3.5626*** 
 (-2.224) (-2.516) (-2.395) (-2.627) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Observations 2,351 2,351 2,351 2,351 
McFadden's pseudo R
2
 0.296  0.300  
Model chi-square 269.5  273.2  
Degrees of freedom 26 26 26 26 
p-value <0.0001  <0.0001  
Number of clusters (firms) 387   387   
Table 6.8 compares the logistic regression results from traditional logit models with those of rare 
events logit models. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of the occurrence of an 
accounting misstatement. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 6.3. In the traditional logit 
models, standard errors are robust by firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (a two-tailed test of whether the coefficient is equal to zero). 
 
Model 1 compares the results from traditional logit model with those of a rare events 
logit model. Despite the slight changes in the magnitude of the coefficients and a 
change in the significance level of BIG variable, the main inferences remain unchanged 
after the correction. Except for the MB and AGE variables, the coefficients of 
explanatory variables in the rare events logit model become smaller and the constant is 
larger, which are in line with King and Zeng’s (2001c) arguments. Similar to the results 
in Table 6.6, the likelihood of accounting misstatements increases when a firm has a 
high leverage ratio (LEV), has a negative free cash flow (NFCF), has an audit firm 
change (AUDCHG) and has the chief executive officer serving as chairman of the board 
(DUAL), while the likelihood can be reduced if the firm uses a Big 4 auditor (BIG). 
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Model 2 compares the two models when the dummy variable of D_OWN is employed. 
The coefficient of D_OWN becomes insignificant at the 10% level in the rare events 
logit model, while other antecedents (i.e. LEV, NFCF, BIG, AUDCHG and DUAL) 
remain of significance. Therefore, there is weak evidence of the association between the 
ownership concentration and the likelihood of accounting misstatements in the Thai 
sample. 
 
6.5.2 Non-Linearity of Ownership Concentration 
Prior studies have suggested that the relationship between ownership concentration and 
financial reporting quality is non-linear. Anderson et al. (2003) found a curvilinear 
relation between the ownership concentration and financial reporting quality (assessed 
by a cost of debt). In Thailand, accounting conservatism varies with ranges of the 
ownership concentration (Boonlert-U-Thai and Kuntisook 2009). This study has, 
therefore, tested these issues by: firstly, adding a square term of the ownership 
concentration (OWN
2
) into the model; and secondly, by replacing the continuous 
variable of OWN with a set of dummy variables (i.e. OWN>25-50%, OWN>50-75%, 
and OWN>75%) for levels of the concentration. The regression results are presented in 
Table 6.9. 
 
Table 6.9: Additional Tests for Ownership Concentration 
  Ownership Concentration 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Table 6.6 
Model 1 
Curvilinear 
Relationship 
Ranges of 
Concentration 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
VARIABLES (z-statistic) (z-statistic) (z-statistic) 
OWN 0.004 0.0517  
 (0.621) (1.246)  
OWN
2
  -0.0005  
  (-1.129)  
OWN>25-50%   0.8083** 
   (2.043) 
OWN>50-75%   0.2395 
   (0.578) 
OWN>75%   -0.441 
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  Ownership Concentration 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Table 6.6 
Model 1 
Curvilinear 
Relationship 
Ranges of 
Concentration 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
VARIABLES (z-statistic) (z-statistic) (z-statistic) 
   (-0.428) 
FAM -0.2395 -0.2354 -0.2463 
 (-0.566) (-0.560) (-0.572) 
CROSS -0.1674 -0.204 -0.1758 
 (-0.268) (-0.327) (-0.292) 
LEV 1.4587** 1.4944** 1.5208** 
 (2.320) (2.371) (2.268) 
ISSUE 0.5057 0.5563 0.532 
 (1.403) (1.487) (1.474) 
NFCF 1.2328** 1.1876** 1.0663** 
 (2.575) (2.481) (2.185) 
MB 0.106 0.0938 0.0859 
 (1.039) (0.922) (0.870) 
REHAB -0.1415 -0.1452 -0.1169 
 (-0.211) (-0.215) (-0.177) 
BIG -1.1128** -1.1004** -1.1008** 
 (-2.285) (-2.303) (-2.193) 
AUDCHG 0.8658** 0.9189** 0.8843** 
 (2.331) (2.441) (2.335) 
DUAL 1.1317*** 1.1654*** 1.1673*** 
 (2.974) (2.942) (2.804) 
LNSIZE -0.2211 -0.2451 -0.2424 
 (-1.196) (-1.320) (-1.321) 
AGE 0.0041 0.0037 0.0004 
 (0.235) (0.208) (0.019) 
Constant -3.5303** -4.3797** -3.7621** 
 (-2.224) (-2.459) (-2.318) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included 
Observations 2,351 2,351 2,351 
McFadden's pseudo R
2
 0.296 0.300 0.307 
Model chi-square 269.5 255.7 260.4 
Degrees of freedom 26 27 28 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Number of clusters (firms) 387 387 387 
Table 6.9 examines whether there is a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and 
the likelihood of accounting misstatements. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of an 
occurrence of an accounting misstatement. OWN is the percentage of shares held by the ultimate 
owner. OWN
2
 is a square term of OWN. OWN>25-50% is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
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  Ownership Concentration 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Table 6.6 
Model 1 
Curvilinear 
Relationship 
Ranges of 
Concentration 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
VARIABLES (z-statistic) (z-statistic) (z-statistic) 
OWN is between 25-50%; 0 otherwise. OWN>50-75% is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
OWN equals to or higher than 50% but less than 75%; 0 otherwise. OWN>75% is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if OWN is equal to or higher than 75%; 0 otherwise. The ownership 
concentration under or equal to 25% is the baseline of Model 3. All other variables are defined in 
Table 6.3. Standard errors are robust by firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (a two-tailed test of whether the coefficient is equal to 
zero). 
 
In Model 2 the coefficient of the square term (OWN
2
) is not significant at the 5% level 
(the coefficient of -0.0005, and robust z-statistic of -1.129). Neither is the OWN 
variable significant. In Model 3, signs of the coefficients for OWN>25-50% and 
OWN>50-75% are positive, while the sign of the OWN>75% coefficient is negative but 
their coefficients are not significant at the 0.05 level. The coefficient of OWN>25-50% 
statistically differs from zero at the 5% level. Therefore, there is no evidence to support 
the non-linearity. The significant effect of the OWN>25-50% on the likelihood of 
accounting misstatements confirms the influence of the ownership concentration above 
25% (the result of D_OWN measure in Section 6.4.3). The significant antecedents of 
accounting misstatements in Thailand (i.e. LEV, NFCF, BIG, AUDCHG and DUAL) 
remain unchanged. Consequently, the research results in the previous section seem 
robust, while there is no significant evidence to support the non-linear influence of 
ownership concentration on the likelihood of accounting misstatements in Thailand. 
 
To conclude, the financial incentives and the weaknesses of corporate governance 
mechanisms are important determinants of accounting misstatements in Thailand, while 
the ownership structure is not.  
 
 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented the main results for the models of determinants of 
accounting misstatements in Thai companies. The main findings are as follows. There is 
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no strong evidence to indicate that the controlling shareholders exploit their control 
rights or complex structure to expropriate outside investors’ benefits. However, the 
expropriation may occur when the proportion of the control rights that the ultimate 
owner holds is above 25%. The incentives of Thai firms to misstate financial reports 
include the closeness to debt covenant violation and the minimisation of the cost of 
capital. On the other hand, the pressures from outside parties, such as equity investors’ 
expectation and profitability regulation, are not important determinants of accounting 
misstatements in the Thai listed companies. Corporate governance mechanisms have an 
important effect on the appearance of financial misreporting. The likelihood of 
accounting misstatements has been shown to increase when the chief executive officer 
is also chairman of the board and the auditors are newly appointed, but the likelihood 
reduces when a firm uses a Big 4 auditor. Although the audit switch has an impact on 
the propensity of an accounting misstatement, there is no significant evidence to state 
that the controlling shareholders govern the auditors. The audit risk of auditors in their 
first year of audit tends to occur due to an inherent risk (such as a loss of client-specific 
knowledge). 
 
The research findings contribute to the literature on the antecedents of financial 
misreporting for firms in concentrated ownership systems. Firstly, the significant effects 
of the corporate governance and debt-related incentives are in accordance with the 
characteristics of the firms in these systems, where financial systems are primarily 
based on debt and corporate governance is relatively weak (La Porta et al. 1997; Rajan 
and Zingales 1995; Salacuse 2006; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The important factors 
that have been found in this study are similar to those of the studies in dispersed 
ownership firms (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996). This consistency, therefore, supports the 
validity of agency problems that can occur when monitoring activities are weak (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Jiambalvo 1996). Secondly, although the controlling shareholders 
are suspected of exploiting the high proportion of voting rights, there is no significant 
evidence to support this argument in cases where accounting misstatements occur and 
firms have changed their auditors.  
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The next chapter will assess the economic consequences of accounting misstatements in 
Thailand.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCOUNTING 
MISSTATEMENTS IN THAILAND 
 
7.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented the empirical results for the antecedents of accounting 
misstatements in Thailand. They include an incentive to avoid debt covenant violations, 
an incentive to minimise the cost of capital, and the weaknesses of corporate 
governance mechanisms. Ownership concentration does not significantly affect the 
incidence of accounting misstatements in Thai firms; however, the likelihood of an 
accounting misstatement increases when ultimate owners hold controlling rights of 
more than 25%. The investigation in this chapter will extend the research by examining 
the economic consequences for misstating firms after their accounting misstatements 
have been detected and revealed.  
 
An accounting misstatement signals a low quality financial reporting process. Prior 
empirical research has found an adverse effect of the announcement of accounting 
misstatement on the misstating firm’s cost of capital (Graham et al. 2008; Hribar and 
Jenkins 2004). If this is the case then the amount of external funds that misstating firms 
receive after the announcement should be smaller than the amount in a typical period. 
This chapter will, therefore, examine the dynamics of capital from external financing 
activities for the misstating firms around the misstatement year. As set out in 
Hypothesis 4 (see Chapter 5 Section 5.3.4), a smaller amount of external funds in the 
post-announcement period is expected.   
 
This chapter has five sections, the first of which is this introduction. Section Two 
discusses the research sample for the analysis of economic consequences. Section Three 
describes the method of analysis and the definitions of the variables. Sections Four and 
Five, which are the two last sections, describe the empirical results of the financing 
activities for the misstating firms after the announcement of accounting misstatements 
  
159 
 
has been made, which will be compared to the financing activities which has occurred 
in other periods.   
 
 
7.2 The Final Sample for the Analysis of the Consequences of 
Accounting Misstatements 
As stated in Chapter 5, this study hypothesises that an announcement of accounting 
misstatements is likely to have an adverse effect on the external financing activity of 
misstating firms in the years t+1 and t+2. This study will, therefore, focus on the 
external financing activity that has occurred to the misstating firms in these two years, 
which will then be compared with the other years. Recall the timeline for the period of 
accounting misstatement, as previously shown in Figure 5.2 (which is repeated below): 
 
 Pre-misstatement period Misstatement 
Year(s) 
Announcement 
 
Post-misstatement period  
        
        
 year t-2 year t-1 year t year t+1 year t+2  
Timeline 
 
The accounting misstatement observations in Chapter 6 are the fiscal years of financial 
reports that contain at least one accounting misstatement (they are year t in the 
timeline). In this chapter, since the interest is in the announcement, the year t will range 
since the misstatement years until the accounting misstatement has been detected and 
revealed. The financing activities that occur in the first two fiscal years after the 
revelation of misstatements (year t+1 and t+2) are of interest. 
 
Because years t+1 and t+2 are the focus of attention in this study, misstating firms need 
to have subsequent financial reports at least one year after the announcement (year t+1). 
This requirement means that three misstating firms with eight firm-year observations 
are lost because these firms were involved in a litigation processes since the revelation 
of the accounting misstatements and they did not prepare their financial reports 
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properly. The final sample, consequently, reduced from 2,503 firm-years (see Table 6.1 
Panel C) to 2,495 firm-years, 175 of which were observations in the misstatement 
periods that this research will shed light on. The details are shown in Table 7.1.  
 
Table 7.1: The Final Sample for the Analysis of Economic Consequences Imposed 
on Thai Firms during 2001-2009 
Panel A: Total Observations 
Total Sample Number    
of Firms 
Number of  
Firm-years 
Misstatement 
Periods 
(t-2 to t+2) 
Regular  
Periods 
Misstating firms 30
52
 238 175 63 
Non-misstating firms           355 2,257 - 2,257 
           385 2,495 175 2,320 
 
Panel B: Observations Around the Misstatement Year 
 Misstatement Periods Total 
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2  
 
Misstatement 
 
22 
 
29 
 
66 
 
30 
 
28 
 
175 
Table 7.1 reports the final observations for the examination of economic consequences of an 
accounting misstatement. The number of observations reduces from 2,503 firm-years (see Table 6.1 
Panel C) to 2,495 firm-years. The reason for this is explained in the Section. 
 
Panel A shows the total of 2,495 observations. They are composed of 30 misstating 
firms with 238 firm-years and 355 non-misstating firms with 2,257 firm-years. Of the 
238 firm-years of the misstating firms, 175 firm-years were the financial reports around 
the misstatement year (ranging from t-2 to t+2). The rest of 2,320 firm-years are 
considered to be the control group. The firm-years of the control group are sometimes 
                                                 
52
As suggested by Roberts and Sufi (2009), each misstatement-year observation should not experience 
another misstatement in the 12 quarter window (i.e. 3 years) surrounding the event in order to clearly 
identify the effect of the original accounting misstatement. In the research sample there is only one firm 
(i.e. Nippon Pack Plc, see Appendix B) which experienced two misstatements and the second 
misstatement occurred three years after the first. Therefore, the sample is qualified in the light of 
Roberts and Sufi’s (2009) advice. There are many firms that have more than one year of misstated 
financial reports (i.e. CIRKIT, DTM, PICNIC, POWER, ABICO, NFC), but these fiscal years are 
adjacent and only one time of the misstatement year window (year t) was counted.  
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referred to as ‘regular periods’ in this research. It is noteworthy that the analysis period 
in this Chapter ranges from 2001 to 2009, while it was 2002-2009 in the analysis of the 
determinants in the previous chapter. This has been done for two reasons. Firstly, the 
analysis in Chapter 6 was limited to the problem of perfect failure determination and the 
2001 observations were excluded (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3). Secondly, one of the 
investigations into the economic consequences in this chapter involves the flows of 
capital in the years before the misstatement year. The earliest year when accounting 
misstatement occurred is 2002 (see Table 6.2 Panel A), so the observations for the year 
2001 are necessarily included. 
 
The 175 observations involving misstatements are separately presented by periods in 
Panel B. There are two points that need to be clarified for the number of observations in 
Panel B. First, there are 30 misstating firms generating 44 misstated firm-years of 
financial reports (44 out of 51 of the sample in Chapter 6). As stated earlier, period t 
starts from the misstatement year and lasts until the year when accounting 
misstatements were revealed (see the timeline above). Therefore, the number of firm-
years during the year t is 66 firm-years. Secondly, the number of observations in year t-
1 is 29 rather than 30 because one firm misstated its financing reports in the first year of 
trading in the stock exchange and, therefore, the datum of its market value in year t-1 
was unavailable. This firm was not eliminated from this study because a purpose of the 
main analysis is to assess the economic consequences in the post-announcement period. 
 
 
7.3 The Assessment of Economic Consequences of Accounting 
Misstatements 
This section discusses an empirical model used to assess the impact of an announcement 
of accounting misstatements on the external financing activities of misstating firms 
(Hypothesis 4 of the research described in Section 5.3). 
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7.3.1 Multiple Linear Regression Model 
This thesis assesses economic consequences imposed on misstating firms; particular 
interest is given to subsequent amounts of external financing activities after the 
announcement of accounting misstatements.  
 
The determinants of agency problems were examined in the previous chapter. This 
chapter will assess how incentive conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside 
investors (presumed to occur when an accounting misstatement occurs and is detected) 
affect external financing activities of the misstating firms. The research design and 
theoretical background of the analysis in this chapter follows Roberts and Sufi (2009), 
who assess the corporate financial policies on net debt issuance activities after firms 
violate debt covenants. According to the Framework for the Preparation and 
Presentation of Financial Statements (IASB 2010b), the objectives of financial reports 
are to provide useful information regarding corporate financial position and 
performance and to assess management’s stewardship. It is affirmed that financial 
reports are important to equity investors (Francis et al. 2004) and creditors (Holder-
Webb and Sharma 2010). Investors are usually aware of an inherent risk of 
opportunistic financial reporting (Bardos et al. 2011; Teoh et al. 1998). They discount 
this risk at a certain level of cost of capital and impose debt covenants to mitigate 
agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
 
When investors perceive that the financial reports are misstated (i.e. accounting items 
are not correctly presented) they are more concerned with the integrity of the firm’s 
financial reporting, which may be reflected in  a higher rate of cost of equity (Hribar 
and Jenkins 2004), tightened debt covenants and a higher rate of interest (Graham et al. 
2008). Consequently, it can be seen that the quality of financial reports has an influence 
on the decisions of investors, who react negatively to low quality financial reports. An 
announcement of accounting misstatements should have an impact on the decisions of 
capital providers. The economic aspect of the capital supplied by the investors will be 
examined in this thesis.  
 
  
163 
 
This research maintains two assumptions for the examination into the supplied capital. 
First, the demand for external funds is assumed fixed and fulfilled by the supply from 
investors in the same year, but the net amount is allowed to vary. To predict the demand 
of funds, this research uses an empirical model introduced by Almeida and Campello 
(2010). The net amount of supplied capital is a product of the fixed demand of funds 
and the discount rate required through cost of capital. Since this research does not 
measure the cost of capital due to data limitations, a second assumption needs to be 
made. This relies on the empirical findings of Hribar and Jenkins (2004) and Graham et 
al. (2008) affirming that the cost of capital imposed on restating firms is higher for the 
post-announcement period than other periods. When the fixed demand for funds (1
st
 
assumption) is discounted by the higher discount rate in the post-announcement period 
(2
nd
 assumption), the net amount of capital that misstating firms receive should be lower 
for the post-announcement period than regular periods. Data for non-misstating firms 
(i.e. 2,257 firm-years) are also included in the analysis in order to increase the power of 
the test.
53
  
 
An empirical model by Almeida and Campello (2010) was selected for forecasting the 
external financing needed by a firm in a year. All of the explanatory variables in their 
model are regarded as control variables in this research. A dummy variable of the 
announcement is thus added into the model in order to measure the effect of the 
announcement on the misstating firm’s financing activity in the post-announcement 
period (i.e. years t+1 and t+2). This dummy variable is compared with the other firm-
years that have not experienced an announcement. The empirical model of Almeida and 
Campello (2010) was selected for use in this study for two important reasons. Firstly, 
their model focuses on two financing choices (i.e. debt and equity) and the measures for 
financing alternatives are the amount of net proceeds and net borrowing from the 
statement of cash flows. All these items are in accordance with this study’s interest and 
the prior studies examining a firm’s financing need (e.g. Seifert and Gonenc 2010). The 
data are also available for the Thai samples. Secondly, there is consistency between the 
                                                 
53
If the analysis includes only misstating firms, then the null hypothesis (Hypothesis 4, Chapter 5) on the 
adverse effect of the announcement can be rejected at the 0.10 level; however, the parameter estimates 
are likely to be less reliable because the sample size is 238 observations while the model has 24 
explanatory variables. 
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determinants of capital structure choices in the body of literature (e.g. Rajan and 
Zingales 1995; Titman and Wessels 1988) and those in Almeida and Campello (2010), 
which include: the firm’s internal wealth, growth opportunity, current capital structure 
and firm size. Using the Almeida and Campello (2010) model allows the researcher to 
specify a firm’s external financing need (which is assumed to be fixed) and analyses  
whether the net amount of capital a misstating firm gets in the post-announcement 
period is shifted by an announcement of accounting misstatements.  
 
Consequently, the empirical model of this research comprises these following variables. 
The treatment variable is a dummy variable of 1 for the first two fiscal years after an 
announcement of accounting misstatements (year t+1 and t+2) in order to assess 
whether the announcement has affected the external financing activities of misstating 
firms for those two years. The determinants of demand for external financing, suggested 
by Almeida and Campello (2010), include internal wealth, existing debt, share 
performance and firm size (i.e. variables of OCF, CASH, INV, PPE, LEVC, Q and 
LNSALES). In addition, two extra variables to control for the cost of debt (INT) and 
investment demand (INVEST) are added. As in Roberts and Sufi (2009), the cost of 
debt is regarded in the model in order to control for the potential affect of the cost of 
debt on the amount of external financing. Since the data of actual interest rates are 
unavailable in Thai samples, this study uses the average interest rate (INT) instead. This 
is the proportion of interest expenses to the average of total debt, following the example 
of Francis et al. (2005). With regard to the investment demand, suppose two firms have 
the same size, same levels of internal funds, and the same growth opportunities. The 
demand for external funds between the two firms may be unequal if one firm does not 
need to invest in any property (e.g. machines) while the other does. Therefore, the 
investment demand can vary the amount of external funds needed. The calculation of 
investment demand follows the example of a number of prior studies (e.g. Chen et al. 
2009; Kedia and Philippon 2009), the net capital expenditures scaled by the beginning 
of period net property, plant and equipment. Similar to the logistic regression model for 
the determinants in Chapter 6, this linear regression model for the economic 
consequence controls for fixed effects of firm-level character (industry dummies and 
clustered robust standard errors) and time effects (year dummies). 
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Linear regression model: 
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where  
τ (i):   The misstatement year for firm i  
t:   The current fiscal year for firm i. 
EXFIN: The flow of external funds flown into the firm described in annual cash 
flow statements divided by total assets. 
AFTER: The measure for a consequence of an announcement of accounting 
misstatements in the post-announcement period. It is a dummy variable, 
taking the value of 1 for the first two fiscal years after the announcement 
(t+1 and t+2). 
OCF: The availability of internal funds in terms of profitability, measured by 
the amount of cash flow from operations in cash flow statements to total 
assets. 
CASH: The availability of internal funds in terms of liquid assets, measured by 
the beginning balance of cash and cash equivalence to total assets. 
INV: The availability of internal funds in terms of liquid assets, measured by 
the beginning balance of accounts receivables and inventories to total 
assets. 
PPE: The availability of the assets for collateral, measured by beginning 
balance of gross property, plant, and equipment to total assets. 
LEVC: The capital structure, measured by the (corrected) amount of total debt to 
total assets. 
Q: Growth opportunities of the firm, calculated from market value of total 
assets to book value of the assets; where market value =[(total assets + 
market capitalisation - common equity – deferred tax)/total assets]. 
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LNSALES: A control variable for firm size, measured by a natural logarithm of sales 
in income statements. 
INT: Cost of debt, measured by the ratio of annual interest expenses to the 
average total debt. 
INVEST: Capital investment demand, scaled by beginning of period net property, 
plant and equipment; where capital investment demand = capital 
expenditure-proceeds from sales of property, plant and equipment.  
IND: An array of seven industry dummies, where each firm falls into one of 
the seven categories of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (Agro and Food, 
Consumer Products, Industrials, Property and Construction, Resources, 
Services, and Technology; Agro and Food industry dummy being 
arbitrarily omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity). 
YEAR: An array of nine fiscal year dummies 2001 to 2009; year 2001 dummy 
being arbitrarily omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity.  
: The regression residual. 
 
7.3.2 Description of Variables  
This subsection (Table 7.2) presents again the description of the variables used in the 
analysis of whether an announcement of accounting misstatements affects the flow of 
capital from external financing in the post-announcement period. All numerical data for 
the analysis in this chapter were corrected numbers (i.e. the numbers after restatement 
for the accounting items that have been misstated).  
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Table 7.2: The Variables for Examining Consequences of Accounting 
Misstatements 
Proxy Measure Abbre-
viation in 
Model 
Calculation Expected 
Sign 
Dependent variable 
The magnitude of external 
financing activity 
a
 
 
PROCEED Total net proceeds from share 
issuances and repurchases disclosed 
in cash flow statements divided by 
total assets  
 
 STDEBT Net short-term debt borrowing and 
repayment disclosed in cash flow 
statements divided by total assets  
 
 LTDEBT Net long-term debt borrowing and 
repayment disclosed in cash flow 
statements divided by total assets  
 
 DEBT The net total capital from borrowing 
activity (STDEBT+ LTDEBT)    
 
 EXFIN The summation of all external 
financing activities (PROCEED+ 
DEBT)   
 
Treatment variable 
The event 
period when 
an accounting 
misstatement 
occurs 
The pre-
misstatement 
period  
BEFORE 1 for the two fiscal years before the 
misstatement year (years t-1 and t-2) 
 
The 
misstatement 
year 
DURING 1 for the misstatement year lasting 
until the announcement year (year t) 
 
The post-
misstatement 
period 
AFTER 1 for the first two fiscal years after 
the announcement year (years t+1 
and t+2) 
- 
Control variables 
1. Internal 
wealth 
Cash flow from 
operations 
OCF Operating cash flow to total assets - 
 Pre-existing 
cash  
CASH Beginning cash and cash equivalence 
to total assets 
- 
 Pre-existing 
other working 
capital 
INV Beginning accounts receivables and 
inventories to total assets 
- 
 Collateral  PPE Beginning gross property, plant and 
equipment to total assets 
+ 
2. Capital 
structure 
Pre-existing 
leverage ratio 
LEVC Beginning total debt to total assets - 
 
3. Investment 
opportunity 
Market value of 
total assets 
Q
 
Market value of total assets to book 
value of assets; where market value = 
(total assets + market capitalisation 
b
 
- common equity – deferred tax)/total 
assets 
+ 
 
 
 
4. Size Size effect LNSALES 
c 
Natural logarithm of total sales + 
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Proxy Measure Abbre-
viation in 
Model 
Calculation Expected 
Sign 
5. Cost of debt Interest rate INT 
 
Interest expense to the average total 
debt 
- 
 
6.Investment 
demand 
Capital 
investment 
INVEST Capital investment, scaled by 
beginning of period net property, 
plant and equipment; where capital 
investment = capital expenditure-
proceeds from sales of property, 
plant and equipment 
+ 
7. Industry 
effect 
Industry 
dummies 
IND Dummy variable  
8. Year effect Year dummies YEAR Dummy variable 
 
a
 The research results are unchanged if the denominator is lagged total assets (used in Roberts and Sufi 
(2009)) rather than time t total assets. 
b
 Some firms were suspended from trading during a rehabilitation period and, consequently, their market 
values were unavailable during this time. This study, therefore, uses the firms’ last market value before 
the suspension in order to maintain the observations of the treatment group. However, the result for the 
effect of the announcement is the same if the model excludes these observations.
 
c 
In Chapter 6 the firm size (LNSIZE) was measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (LNTA). An 
unreported model was estimated if the LNTA was used. The goodness of fit is actually better: the adjust 
R
2 
increases from 48.9% (when the natural logarithm of sales, LNSALES, was used) to 49.1%; the 
coefficient of LNTA is significant at a smaller p-value of <0.001, while the p-value of LNSALES is 
0.002; and, other parameter estimates are not sensitive to the choice between LNTA or LNSALES as an 
indicator for size. Nevertheless, the research maintains the measure of LNSALES for comparability with 
prior studies.
 
 
 
7.4 Empirical Results 
This section contains the empirical results of the data analysis of an economic 
consequence of an announcement of accounting misstatements. This analysis was 
conducted in four steps (presented in four subsections), which are: exploration of the 
location and central tendency of data, examine correlations among variables, descriptive 
statistics for the dynamics of net capital around the misstatement year, and a 
multivariate regression analysis of whether an announcement of accounting 
misstatements affects the flow of capital.  
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7.4.1 Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics of financing activities of all samples are illustrated in Table 7.3. 
The statistics for dependent variables are presented in Panel A, while those of control 
variables are in Panel B. In order to show the movements of accounts, the observations 
around the misstatement year are separately presented by period (i.e. t-2, t-1, t, t+1 and 
t+2). The regular period refers to the financial reports that do not fall into any of the five 
misstatement periods. Except for sales (which was transformed using the logarithm 
function), all continuous variables are winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
 
Panel A, Table 7.3 describes the descriptive statistics of dependent variables. In regular 
periods, average net proceeds (PROCEED) from share issuances are approximately 
1.2% of total annual assets. The average of net proceeds for misstating firms gradually 
increases from 3% in year t-2 to 3.9% in year t. However, after announcing an 
accounting misstatement, the amount of net proceeds for the misstating firms falls to 
0.4% in year t-1. In the same vein, an average amount of external funds from short-term 
borrowing activity (STDEBT) is higher for the misstating firms during the pre-
announcement periods (0.5%-2%) than an average of the regular periods (0.4%). With 
regard to long-term debt (LTDEBT), on average, the amount of debt repayment is 
higher than the amount of new borrowing and, therefore, the external funds from long-
term debt becomes negative. The negative balance on net long-term debt is higher for 
the misstatement periods (a range of -0.9% to -2.2%) than regular periods (-0.4%). In 
total, the average external funds (EXFIN) for the misstating firms are higher than the 
average regular periods in the pre-announcement period and lower in the post-
announcement period.  
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Table 7.3: Summary Statistics of Variables  
Panel A: Dependent Variables       
Variable 
a 
Statistics  Regular Misstatement Periods Total 
  Periods t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2  
    (n=2320) (n=22) (n=29) (n=66) (n=30) (n=28) (n=2495) 
Net Proceeds Mean 0.012 0.030 0.033 0.039 0.004 0.014 0.013 
(PROCEED) Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 SD 0.047 0.075 0.091 0.089 0.017 0.063 0.050 
 Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Max 0.338 0.224 0.338 0.338 0.094 0.330 0.338 
         
Net Short- Mean 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.020 -0.004 0.001 0.004 
Term Debt Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
(STDEBT) SD 0.069 0.032 0.063 0.059 0.041 0.038 0.068 
 Min -0.224 -0.076 -0.179 -0.095 -0.121 -0.058 -0.224 
 Max 0.234 0.100 0.234 0.203 0.090 0.101 0.234 
         
Net Long- Mean -0.004 -0.012 -0.018 -0.009 -0.022 -0.018 -0.005 
Term Debt Median 0.000 -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 -0.010 -0.016 0.000 
(LTDEBT) SD 0.059 0.052 0.075 0.085 0.071 0.050 0.060 
 Min -0.209 -0.144 -0.209 -0.209 -0.209 -0.096 -0.209 
 Max 0.222 0.153 0.182 0.222 0.160 0.129 0.222 
         
Total Mean 0.013 0.023 0.032 0.052 -0.023 -0.003 0.014 
External Median 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.011 -0.023 -0.019 0.000 
Funds SD 0.101 0.085 0.127 0.118 0.071 0.091 0.101 
(EXFIN) Min -0.241 -0.088 -0.184 -0.103 -0.220 -0.126 -0.241 
 Max 0.397 0.263 0.397 0.397 0.197 0.397 0.397 
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Table 7.3 continued)        
Panel B: Independent Variables       
Variable
 a 
Statistics Regular  Misstatement Period   Total 
  Periods t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2  
    (n=2320) (n=22) (n=29) (n=66) (n=30) (n=28) (n=2495) 
Operating  Mean 0.084 0.054 0.051 0.017 0.052 0.032 0.081 
Cash Flow Median 0.085 0.025 0.052 0.035 0.053 0.038 0.081 
(OCF) SD 0.115 0.103 0.102 0.095 0.081 0.114 0.115 
 Min -0.265 -0.116 -0.265 -0.265 -0.119 -0.265 -0.265 
 Max 0.449 0.257 0.257 0.227 0.288 0.292 0.449 
         
Beginning Mean 0.095 0.048 0.070 0.086 0.065 0.073 0.094 
Cash  Median 0.056 0.013 0.018 0.026 0.022 0.039 0.054 
(CASH) SD 0.106 0.077 0.089 0.121 0.093 0.093 0.105 
 Min 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Max 0.493 0.271 0.332 0.493 0.367 0.320 0.493 
         
Beginning Mean 0.349 0.344 0.340 0.300 0.287 0.291 0.346 
Receivables Median 0.336 0.360 0.321 0.258 0.266 0.312 0.333 
and  SD 0.216 0.190 0.215 0.190 0.169 0.155 0.214 
Inventories Min 0.002 0.025 0.020 0.015 0.005 0.002 0.002 
(INV) Max 0.862 0.766 0.772 0.801 0.605 0.543 0.862 
         
Beginning Mean 0.412 0.442 0.451 0.450 0.492 0.439 0.415 
Property, Median 0.406 0.441 0.457 0.454 0.507 0.468 0.412 
Plant, and SD 0.228 0.249 0.261 0.250 0.239 0.242 0.229 
Equipment Min 0.015 0.044 0.015 0.015 0.076 0.015 0.015 
(PPE) Max 0.916 0.916 0.906 0.916 0.897 0.916 0.916 
         
Tobin's Q Mean 1.219 1.379 1.628 1.476 1.343 1.549 1.237 
(Q) Median 1.022 1.090 1.108 1.091 0.984 0.952 1.023 
 SD 0.715 0.988 1.213 1.086 0.883 1.440 0.753 
 Min 0.410 0.649 0.673 0.424 0.606 0.577 0.410 
 Max 5.396 5.396 5.396 4.763 4.958 5.396 5.396 
         
Beginning  Mean 0.279 0.597 0.605 0.545 0.512 0.473 0.298 
Leverage  Median 0.244 0.584 0.526 0.465 0.426 0.381 0.258 
Ratio SD 0.250 0.415 0.414 0.402 0.419 0.484 0.274 
(LEVC) Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Max 1.453 1.453 1.453 1.453 1.453 1.453 1.453 
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Table 7.3 Panel B (continued) 
Variable
 a
 Statistics Regular Misstatement Periods     Total 
  Periods t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2  
  (n=2320) (n=22) (n=29) (n=66) (n=30) (n=28)   (n=2495) 
Sales Mean 12,166    2,436      2,694      3,393      3,695      3,321  11,537 
(SIZE) Median 2,049    1,097      1,637      1,368      1,445        968  2,009 
 SD 75.5*10
3 
2874.17 3001.82 4443.01 4946.18 5006.90 72.9*10
3 
 Min 3.89 31.76 23.81 37.85 17.33 70.07 3.89 
 Max   2*10
6
     9,814    12,212    20,180    19,150    21,013    2*10
6
 
         
Natural Log Mean 7.701 6.807 7.072 7.252 7.311 7.232 7.664 
Sales Median 7.625 6.987 7.401 7.221 7.276 6.875 7.605 
(LNSALES) SD 1.577 1.742 1.608 1.476 1.564 1.382 1.579 
 Min 1.358 3.458 3.170 3.634 2.852 4.249 1.358 
 Max 14.509 9.192 9.410 9.912 9.860 9.953 14.509 
         
Average Mean 0.059 0.065 0.066 0.053 0.055 0.066 0.059 
Interest  Median 0.050 0.053 0.046 0.051 0.051 0.057 0.050 
Rate  SD 0.064 0.048 0.063 0.040 0.041 0.085 0.063 
(INT) Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Max 0.480 0.174 0.237 0.202 0.206 0.480 0.480 
         
Investment Mean 0.165 0.083 0.148 0.166 0.055 0.069 0.162 
Demand Median 0.100 0.039 0.043 0.058 0.020 0.027 0.095 
(INVEST) SD 0.226 0.139 0.297 0.299 0.129 0.274 0.229 
 Min -0.245 -0.052 -0.185 -0.245 0.245 -0.245 -0.245 
 Max 1.387 0.583 1.387 1.387 0.420 1.387     1.387 
Table 7.3 reports descriptive statistics of the variables for the examination into the consequences of 
accounting misstatements. Panel A comprises summary statistics of the external financing activity 
measures, while Panel B illustrates those of the explanatory variables. All variables are defined in Table 
7.2. The descriptive statistics are presented by relevant period of the misstatements. 
a
 Except for sales, all values are reported after being winsorised. Some maximum numbers across the 
periods might therefore be identical, such as the maximum for LEVC because of the winsorisation. The 
data for sales (the measure of firm size) were transformed using the natural logarithm function.   
 
 
Panel B in Table 7.3 comprises the summary statistics for control variables. Regarding 
internal wealth (i.e. OCF, CASH, and INV), misstating firms have a lower balance of an 
average internal wealth along the five-period window. In contrast, they have a higher 
average amount of tangible assets (PPE). On average, the market value of assets 
(Tobin’s Q) is higher for misstating firms. The leverage ratios (LEVC) for the 
misstatement periods’ firms are double that of the control group. However, after the 
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announcement, the leverage ratio of misstating firms has gradually reduced from 0.545 
in year t to 0.473 in year t-2. This decline is consistent with that of the U.S. sample 
when debt covenant violations are revealed (Roberts and Sufi 2009). The misstating 
firms are smaller than the control group, when measured by sales (SALES).  
 
The average interest rate (INT) is higher for the misstating firms in the pre-
announcement periods but it becomes the lowest in the misstatement year. This incident 
appears to confirm the findings in Chapter 6 where one important incentive of Thai 
firms is to minimise cost of capital (and misstating firms obtain this benefit in the 
misstatement year). The investment demand (INVEST) of misstating firms fluctuates. 
Before the misstatement year, the average investment is lower than that of the control 
group, but it is increased and close to an average for the control group in the 
misstatement year. However, soon after announcing accounting misstatements, the 
investment demand for misstating firms suddenly reduces. This reduction is in line with 
Kedia and Philippon (2009), who find a decline in growth rate of capital expenditures in 
misstating firms after the announcement of restatements.  
 
7.4.2 Correlations 
Both Spearman’s (above the diagonal) and Pearson’s (below the diagonal) correlation 
coefficients are presented in Table 7.4. The greatest correlation coefficient is the 
correlation of INV and PPE (-61.4%, Pearson and -58.6%, Spearman). Most of the 
results for significance levels from Pearson’s and Spearman’s tests are in line, except 
for some cases (e.g. the correlations of PROCEED and CASH, STDEBT and INT, and 
LTDEBT and PPE). A major difference in the two tests appears in a positive correlation 
between INT and LEVC (3.2%, Pearson and 24.7%, Spearman) and a positive 
correlation between LNSALES and Q (2.1%, Pearson and 17.9%, Spearman). This can 
be caused by extreme outliers. A diagnostic test of multicollinearity assumption and 
robust regression analysis will be conducted after the multivariate regression results 
(Section 7.4.4) are reported. Since the variables are the ratio type of data, the analysis is 
primarily restricted to the parametric test. The following description employs the 
correlation coefficients from Pearson’s approach. 
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Table 7.4: Correlation Matrix for the Financial Characteristics of Misstating and Non-Misstating Firms  
  AFTER  LNSALES
PROCEED 0.023 0.034 * -0.026 -0.123 *** 0.059 *** -0.002 -0.089 *** 0.101 *** 0.184 *** -0.003 0.150 *** 0.151 ***
STDEBT -0.039 * -0.062 *** -0.032 -0.348 *** 0.023 -0.018 0.006 -0.047 ** 0.055 *** -0.017 0.174 *** 0.031
LTDEBT 0.040 ** -0.092 *** -0.057 *** -0.082 *** 0.138 *** 0.038 * -0.082 *** -0.258 *** 0.075 *** -0.208 *** 0.338 *** 0.039 *
AFTER -0.014 -0.013 -0.039 * -0.064 *** -0.056 *** -0.037 * 0.035 * 0.067 *** -0.002 0.022 -0.114 *** -0.035 *
OCF -0.223 *** -0.411 *** -0.147 *** -0.053 *** 0.138 *** -0.118 *** 0.149 *** -0.222 *** 0.176 *** -0.091 *** 0.189 *** 0.175 ***
CASH 0.002 -0.008 0.051 ** -0.367 * 0.097 *** -0.172 *** -0.228 *** -0.535 *** 0.122 *** -0.154 *** 0.242 *** 0.070 ***
INV -0.014 -0.015 0.013 -0.041 ** -0.106 *** -0.222 *** -0.586 *** 0.043 ** -0.131 *** -0.022 0.064 *** 0.064 ***
PPE -0.060 *** < -.0001 -0.023 0.035 * 0.131 *** -0.259 *** -0.614 *** 0.166 *** 0.019 0.053 *** -0.186 *** -0.058 ***
LEVC 0.071 *** -0.049 ** -0.149 *** 0.110 *** -0.177 *** -0.428 *** 0.010 0.165 *** 0.090 *** 0.247 *** -0.228 *** 0.157 ***
Q 0.175 *** 0.023 0.020 0.042 ** 0.087 *** 0.152 *** -0.142 *** 0.012 0.149 *** -0.046 ** 0.195 *** 0.179 ***
INT 0.027 -0.049 ** -0.078 *** 0.004 -0.028 -0.041 ** -0.048 ** 0.024 0.032 0.006 -0.149 *** -0.004
INVEST 0.145 *** 0.136 *** 0.323 *** -0.068 *** 0.072 *** 0.232 *** 0.054 *** -0.220 *** -0.170 *** 0.121 *** -0.049 ** 0.234 ***
LNSALES -0.114 *** 0.036 * 0.052 *** -0.038 * 0.191 *** -0.060 *** 0.051 ** -0.052 *** 0.056 *** 0.021 -0.056 *** 0.121 ***
LTDEBT    OCF  CASH   INT  INV   PPE   LEVC   Q  INVESTPROCEED STDEBT
 
Table 7.4 reports the correlation coefficients for Pearson (below the diagonal) and Spearman (above the diagonal). All variables are defined in Table 7.2.   
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (a two-tailed test of whether the correlation coefficient is equal to zero). 
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According to the correlation coefficients in Table 7.4, all financing activities 
(PROCEED, STDEBT and LTDEBT) are negatively correlated with the post-
announcement period (AFTER) and the correlation coefficient between LTDEBT and 
AFTER differs from zero at the 10% significance level. This is in line with the 
movements of funds across the periods in Table 7.3 Panel A. The post-announcement 
(AFTER) is negatively correlated with operating cash flow (OCF) and positively 
correlated with leverage ratio (LEVC). These correlations indicate that a financial 
constraint has occurred to the misstating firms after the announcement, which is 
consistent with prior studies (e.g. Chen et al. 2009). The post period is negatively 
correlated with investment demand (INVEST), which is similar to prior research (i.e. 
Kedia and Philippon 2009). 
 
All financing activities (PROCEED, STDEBT, and LTDEBT) are negatively correlated 
with cash flow from operations (OCF). The negative correlation between STDEBT and 
OCF is the highest (41%) among the three types of funds. This result is consistent with 
the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf 1984) which recommends that there is a 
negative relationship between profitability and external financing. On the other hand, 
except for the positive correlation of 5.1% between LTDEBT and CASH, the 
correlations between the three financing activities and the beginning balance of liquidity 
assets (CASH and INV) are not statistically correlated.   
 
The leverage ratio (LEVC) at the beginning of the year is positively correlated with 
share issuance activity (PROCEED), but it is negatively correlated with borrowing 
activities (STDEBT and LTDEBT). This can occur because highly levered firms have 
already committed to the maintenance of high debt repayments and high covenants; 
therefore, they are less likely to be able to borrow more and they shift instead to share 
issuance. The leverage ratio is also negatively correlated with the beginning cash 
balance (coefficient of -42.8%). This high coefficient may reveal a financial constraint 
in highly-levered firms. Firms with high growth opportunities (Q) are highly correlated 
with the net proceeds (coefficient of 17.5%), but they are not statistically correlated 
with borrowing. On the other hand, the average interest rate (INT) is negatively 
correlated with borrowing, but is not correlated with share issuance. These two 
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contrasting relationships can be possible. A firm with growth opportunities may prefer 
to issue shares because the higher firm value results in greater amount of proceeds (e.g. 
Rajan and Zingales 1995). Meanwhile, a firm charged a high cost of debt can decide to 
not borrow, or they can borrow lower amounts of net funds.  
 
Investment demand (INVEST) is positively correlated with all financing choices and the 
highest correlation coefficient is tied with long-term borrowing (LTDEBT) (32.3%). 
This result is consistent with prior research (e.g. Titman and Wessels 1988). It is 
reasonable to suppose that the investment demand (INVEST) is positively correlated 
with the amount of brought forward CASH (coefficient of 23.2% - the higher the cash 
is, the higher investment demand can be). Investment demand falls when a company is 
highly levered (LEVC) (correlation coefficient of -17%). Firm size (LNSALES) is 
positively correlated with borrowing and this result is consistent with the previous 
literature (e.g. Rajan and Zingales 1995; Wiwattanakantang 1999). However, firm size 
is negatively correlated with the net proceeds (though it is positive in the Spearman’s 
test). This finding is in contrast to the previous literature (i.e. Smith 1977). Overall, 
therefore, with the exception of the negative correlation between firm size and equity 
issuance, all correlations appear to be in the predicted direction. 
 
7.4.3 Dynamics of the Flow of Capital 
This section of the chapter will explore the dynamics of net capital from external 
financing activities around the misstatement year, and it will then compare these with 
the average regular periods (i.e. the observations of non-misstating firms and the 
observations of the misstating firms not falling into the five periods of the misstatement 
window).
54
 The analysis here comprises graphical analysis and comparisons of two 
means.  
 
                                                 
54
If the observations of the misstating firms that fall outside the five period window are excluded from the 
control group, the research results for this and the next subsections are unchanged. The average external 
financing funds (EXFIN) for the regular periods slightly increased from 0.0131 to 0.0135. The 
coefficient of the AFTER variable in Section 7.4.4 changed from -0.0231 to -0.0238 and it differs from 
zero at the 5% level (p-value=0.03 for a two-tailed test). 
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a) Graphical analysis 
The bar graph in Figure 7.1 helps understand the dynamics of financing activities for 
misstating firms. The vertical axis is the average amount of net capital inflow from all 
financing alternatives, scaled by total assets. The horizontal axis represents the event 
periods.  
 
Figure 7.1: Total External Funds of the Sample of Misstating Firms  
 
 
 
     
Mean  Regular Misstatement Periods 
 Periods t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 
(% of total assets) (n=2320) (n=22) (n=29) (n=66) (n=30) (n=28) 
EXFIN 1.31 2.26 3.18 5.22 -2.29 -0.34 
The table shows an average EXFIN, a summation of funds from stock issuance and borrowing for a year 
disclosed in cash flow statements divided by total assets, by period. The numbers are as same as those 
numbers shown in Table 7.3, but the numbers were rounded off in Table 7.3. 
 
In regular periods, control firm-years have an average annual net capital inflow about 
1.31% of total assets. For misstating firms, an average net cash inflow gradually 
increases from 2.26 % of the total assets in year t-2 to 5.22% in year t, which is higher 
than the average regular periods. The highest net capital inflow for the misstating firms 
is in year t. Misstating firms experience a sharp decrease in the net capital inflow 
immediately following the announcement. The financing ability falls from a positive of 
5.22 % of total assets to a negative of 2.29% in year t+1 and, therefore, the 
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announcement is associated with an approximate change in net capital flow of about 
7.51% of corporate total assets in one year. The adverse effect lasts until year t+2. Even 
though the adverse impact seems relieved in year t+2, the balance is still negative and is 
lower than the average regular periods. 
 
In summary, according to Figure 7.1 an ability of a misstating firm to get new finance 
tends to be constrained after the revelation of accounting misstatements. At the very 
least, the amount of capital inflow from share issuance and borrowing is less than the 
amount of cash outflow (e.g. debt repayment and repurchase treasury stocks).  
 
Figure 7.2: Total External Funds by Type and Period 
 
Mean  Regular Misstatement Periods 
 Periods t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 
(% of total assets) (n=2320) (n=22) (n=29) (n=66) (n=30) (n=28) 
PROCEED 1.21 3.01 3.34 3.93 0.40 1.39 
STDEBT 0.37 0.45 0.67 2.01 -0.38 0.06 
LTDEBT -0.39 -1.20 -1.79 -0.89 -2.19 -1.76 
The table specifically shows means of external funds by alternative and by period. PROCEED is a ratio 
of net proceeds from share issuance described in cash flow statements divided by total assets. STDEBT 
is a ratio of net cash flow from short-term borrowing activity shown in cash flow statements divided by 
total assets. LTDEBT is a ratio of net cash flow from long-term borrowing activity shown in cash flow 
statements divided by total assets. The numbers are as same as those numbers in Table 7.3, but the 
numbers were rounded off in Table 7.3. 
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Figure 7.2 shows more detail for the flow of capital by type of financing. In regular 
periods the magnitude of net short-term borrowing (0.37%, STDEBT) nearly equals an 
average of net long-term debt (0.39%, LTDEBT), but the balance of LTDEBT is 
negative. Share issuance tends to be an important source of funds that increases 
liquidity to a firm. On average, a firm receives net capital from share issuance of 
approximately 1.21% of total assets per year. Particularly focusing on misstating firms 
(Figure 7.2), there is an increase in the amount of net proceeds before the misstatement 
year (years t-2 to t), as well as an increase in financing need for long-term debt 
repayment. Although there is a large negative amount of long-term borrowing year t-1,  
the misstating firms earn a larger amount of capital from share issuance. The financial 
status of misstating firms appears to be the best in the misstatement year when they 
have the highest amount of capital inflow from share issuance and short-term borrowing 
and the lowest amount of cash outflow for long-term debt repayment.  
 
Suddenly after the annoucement of accounting misstatement (year t+1), however, the 
highest quickly become the lowest. There is a sharp drop in net proceeds from share 
issuance, from 3.93% to 0.40% of total assets. Also both short-term and long-term 
alternatives remain negative. The amount raised from borrowing is smaller than the 
amount available for repayment. Year t+1 tends to be a difficult time for misstating 
firms since the capital inflow from equity reduces and the borrowing capability is 
constrained. Although in the following year the situation lessens in terms of share 
issuance, the long-term debt repayment is still large. To sum up, the flow of capital 
during the post-announcement period: the net capital outflow for external financing 
activities is about 4.33 (0.38+2.19+1.76) percent of corporate total assets, while the net 
cash inflow is 1.85 (0.04+1.39+0.06) percent of total assets. Unless they have enormous 
internal wealth, misstating firms are inclined to be financially constrained after the 
annoucement of accounting misstatements. This result is in line with those of previous 
studies (e.g. Chen et al. 2009).   
 
Although Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 show the differences in financing activities around 
the event period as compared with regular periods, these differences may not be 
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statistically significant. Therefore, the next subsection tests whether these differences 
differ from zero. 
 
b) Mean difference between groups 
Results of a stastistical t-test for a difference in means between regular periods and the 
event period is reported in Table 7.5 below.  
 
Table 7.5: Mean Differences in Financing Activities between Regular and 
Misstatement Periods 
Periods REGULAR  BEFORE  DURING  AFTER 
  t-2 to t-1 t t+1 to t+2 
Statistics Mean Mean Mean Mean 
      (t-statistic)   (t-statistic)   (t-statistic) 
EXFIN 0.0131 0.0278 0.0522 -0.0135 
  (1.0342) (3.0967)*** (-2.4413)** 
PROCEED 0.0121 0.0320 0.0393 0.0087 
  (1.6890)* (2.4709)** (0.5408) 
STDEBT 0.0038 0.0058 0.0201 -0.0017 
  (0.2761) (1.9190)*  (-1.02) 
LTDEBT -0.0039 -0.0154 -0.0089 -0.0198 
  (-1.3716) (-0.4815) (-2.0249)** 
Observations n=2,320 n=51        n=66        n=58 
Table 7.5 compares means of financing activities for the misstatement periods (BEFORE, DURING 
and AFTER) with those of regular periods. T-tests are used to evaluate differences in means. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (a two-tail test of whether the 
difference in means equals to zero). All variables are defined in Table 7.2. 
 
 
In Table7.5, the observations during year t-1 and t-2 were combined into a group of the 
observations before the misstatement year (BEFORE) and the observations during year 
t+1 and t+2 were combined into a group of the observations after the misstatement year 
(AFTER).
55
 The observations during the misstatement year were named DURING. The 
alternative hypothesis for the t-tests in Table 7.5 is that the difference in means of net 
capital for regular periods and a misstatement period differs from zero.  
                                                 
55
Besides being consistent with previous studies, the combination is beneficial to the statistical analysis 
because the number of observations in year t-2 and t+2 is small (<30).  
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As presented in Table 7.5, results of the t-tests are as follows. Firstly, the total amount 
of external funds (EXFIN) for the two years before the misstatement (0.0278) is higher 
than that of the average regular periods (0.0131), but it is not statistically different at the 
0.05 level. By type of financing activity, the average net proceeds (PROCEED) is 
higher for misstating firms (0.0320) than regular periods (0.0121), but the difference is 
significant at the 10% level (two-tailed). The net capital inflows from borrowing 
(STDEBT and LTDEBT) between the two groups are not statistically different. 
Therefore, before the misstatement year there is no significant difference in the flow of 
capital of the misstating firms and the control group at the 5% level. 
 
Secondly, during the misstatement year (the DURING column) an average amount of 
total capital (EXFIN) for the misstating firms is 5.22% of total assets. This is higher 
than that of the average regular periods by 3.91% (5.22-1.31%) and the difference is 
statistically signficant at the 0.05 level. Specifically, the amounts of funds from share 
issuance (PROCEED) and short-term borrowing (STDEBT) for the misstating firms are 
significantly higher than those of the average regular periods at the 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
resepectively. The long-term debt is not statistically significant, however. Consequently, 
misstating firms receive a greater amount of capital inflow than the control group does 
in the misstatement year and this amount comes from share issuance activity.  
 
Thirdly, there seems to be a penalty from capital providers after the annoucement of 
accounting misstatements. The total amount of capital inflow to total assets (EXFIN) is 
lower for the misstating firms (-0.0135, AFTER versus +0.0131, REGULAR), and the 
difference differs from zero at the 0.05 level (t-statistic of -2.4413). Specifically, the 
significiant reduction of the capital is caused by a sharp decrease in long-term 
borrowing (t-statistic of -2.0249).  
 
A reason for the decrease in net long-term debt may be explained by the incentive 
involved in debt covenant violations. An incentive to avoid debt covenants is one of the 
causes of accounting misstatements in Thailand (see Chapter 6). When the misreporting 
is revealed, the existing creditors tend to scrutinise the finanical reports. If they find that 
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the firms actually violate the covenants then they can use their acceleration rights, 
demand immediate repayment, and refuse further credit. Meanwhile, the possibility to 
obtain finance from a new creditor is unlikely because the firm has just restated their 
financial reports. The existing evidence in the previous literature shows that borrowers 
rarely switch lenders and are unable to obtain more favourable financing from 
alternative sources after a covenant violation (Roberts and Sufi 2009). Consequently, 
the amount of long-term borrowing in years t+1 and t+2 can become extremely 
negative, as shown in the sample statistics above. 
 
In summary, before the misstatement year there is no significant difference in the 
financing activities between the misstating firms and other firms in the Thai capital 
market. During the misstatement year the misstating firms have an exceptional ability to 
get external financing (particularly from share issuance). After the revealation of 
misstatements there is an ecomomic cost imposed on the misstating firms, which can be 
measured by the flow of capital from external financing activities.   
 
The analyses in this section, however, are based on the difference in means between two 
periods; none of the other factors involving financing activities is considered. The next 
section (i.e. Section 7.4.4) will assess the impact of an announcement on the flow of 
capital for misstating firms in the first two years after the announcement in a form of 
multivariate regression analysis. Section 7.5 will re-examine the economic benefits and 
costs of accounting misstatements after controlling for other factors. 
 
7.4.4 Multivariate Analysis 
This section assesses the economic effect of an announcement of accounting 
misstatement on external financing activity as measured by the flow of capital scaled by 
total assets. A linear regression model for the analysis, which has previously presented 
in Section 7.3.1, is repeated.  
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Linear regression model: 
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where τ (i) is the misstatement year for firm i and t is the current fiscal year for firm i. 
All variables are defined in Table 7.2.  
 
The coefficient of AFTER is of interest. Creditors and equity holders are concerned 
about firms’ credibility and the reliability of their financial reporting process after an 
announcement of accounting misstatements and, therefore, the cost of capital required is 
higher (Graham et al. 2008; Hribar and Jenkins 2004). Consequently, this study predicts 
that the flow of capital that the misstating firms receive after the announcement is likely 
to be smaller than that of the other years (Hypothesis 4, Chapter 5). A dummy variable 
is thus employed to measure the effect of the announcement, which equals 1 for the first 
two fiscal years after the announcement (AFTER) and its coefficient is expected to be 
negative. The control variables are: firstly, seven determinants of the magnitude of 
external funds examined by Almeida and Campello (2010); secondly, two extra 
empirical factors added by the research (i.e. an average interest rate and investment 
demand); and thirdly, seven industry dummies and nine year dummies. The standard 
errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. 
 
Table 7.6 shows the regression results for the impact of misstatement announcements on 
external financing activities.   
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Table 7.6: Linear Regression Analysis for the Effect of an Announcement of 
Accounting Misstatements on the Flow of Capital 
  Hypo Expected Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 thesis Sign Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
   (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
Dependent    EXFIN EXFIN PROCEED DEBT 
Constant   -0.0019 -0.0020 0.0362*** -0.0406*** 
   (-0.113) (-0.114) (2.916) (-2.710) 
AFTER 
a
 4 - -0.0231**    
   (-2.267)    
FIRST  -  -0.0256** -0.0118** -0.0111 
    (-2.108) (-2.509) (-0.911) 
SECOND  -  -0.0205 -0.0048 -0.0112 
    (-1.541) (-0.540) (-0.835) 
OCF  - -0.5319*** -0.5318*** -0.0905*** -0.4258*** 
   (-20.598) (-20.580) (-6.134) (-13.803) 
CASH  - -0.1097*** -0.1097*** -0.0368** -0.0636*** 
   (-4.243) (-4.239) (-2.039) (-2.945) 
INV  - -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0163* 0.0105 
   (-0.344) (-0.342) (-1.752) (0.892) 
PPE  + 0.0421*** 0.0421*** -0.0186* 0.0623*** 
   (3.114) (3.116) (-1.916) (4.920) 
LEVC  - -0.0802*** -0.0802*** 0.0035 -0.0839*** 
   (-8.248) (-8.242) (0.528) (-8.364) 
Q  + 0.0258*** 0.0258*** 0.0108*** 0.0106** 
   (7.036) (7.028) (3.775) (2.469) 
LNSALES  + 0.0038*** 0.0038*** -0.0031*** 0.0074*** 
   (3.108) (3.107) (-3.786) (5.856) 
INT  - -0.0866** -0.0867** 0.0197 -0.1137*** 
   (-2.528) (-2.528) (0.846) (-3.333) 
INVEST  + 0.1632*** 0.1632*** 0.0326*** 0.1304*** 
   (12.419) (12.415) (3.680) (9.500) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Observations  2,495 2,495 2,495 2,495 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
 0.489 0.489 0.119 0.404 
F-test statistic 39.64 38.18 4.497 18.49 
Model degrees of freedom 24 25 25 25 
Residual degrees of freedom 384 384 384 384 
p-value for F-test <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Number of clusters (firms) 385 385 385 385 
Table 7.6 presents regression results for the analysis whether an announcement of an accounting 
misstatement is negatively associated with external financing activities of misstating firms in years t+1 
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and t+2 (Hypothesis 4 set out in Chapter 5), after controlled for other factors. EXFIN is a summation of 
net proceeds from stock issuance and net debt from borrowing for the year disclosed in cash flow 
statements divided by total assets. PROCEED is a ratio of net proceeds from share issuance described 
in cash flow statements divided by total assets. DEBT is a ratio of net cash flow from borrowing 
activity shown in cash flow statements divided by total assets. AFTER is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for the two firm-years after the announcement year (t+1 and t+2); 0 otherwise. FIRST is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the first firm-year after the announcement year (t+1); 0 
otherwise. SECOND is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the second firm-year after the 
announcement year (t+2); 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 7.2. Standard errors are 
robust by firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively (a two-tailed test of whether the coefficient is equal to zero). 
a
 If all the continuous variables are not winsorised, the significance level of an announcement of 
accounting misstatements (the AFTER variable) changes from the 5% level to the 10% level (p-
value=0.063), and the control variables, except for the beginning of receivables and inventory (INV), 
are not significant at the 5% level. 
 
In Model 1, the coefficient of AFTER is as negative as expected and it differs from zero 
at the 0.05 level. Diagnostic tests for regression assumptions and robust regression 
analysis (presented in Appendix D) indicate the goodness of fit of the model.
56
 
Therefore, the capital inflow that occurred to the misstating firms reduces for the first 
two firm-years after the announcement than in the other firm-years. The next paragraph 
presents an interpretation from the regression.   
 
In a regular period, a firm has an average net capital outflow from external financing of 
approximately 0.19% of total assets a year (e.g. the net capital outflow for debt 
repayment is higher than the net capital inflow from share issuance and borrowing). 
When a firm announces an accounting misstatement (or it is revealed), the average net 
capital outflow increases to 2.5% (0.19+2.31) of total assets. Internal funds tend to be 
used for this outflow of capital. Unfortunately, the existing internal funds of the 
misstating firms are deemed to be poor. As reported in the summary statistics of Table 
7.3, the internal wealth (i.e. OCF, CASH and INV) is lower for the misstating firms 
than the average control firm-years along the misstatement periods (year t-2 to year 
t+2). Therefore, the misstating firms seem to be financially constrained. This result is 
                                                 
56
As reported in Appendix D, since a diagnostic test of the normality of the residuals shows some extreme 
outliers, robust regression models were employed to check the research results in the presence of 
outliers. The coefficient of AFTER is -0.0213 in the M-estimator (Huber 1981) approach and is -0.0234 
in the MM-estimator (Yohai 1987) approach. The original coefficient of – 0.0231 in the Model 1 of 
Table 7.6 is close to the coefficient in the MM estimator, which is a recommended approach for robust 
regression (Verardi and Croux 2009). The research result is, therefore, robust to outliers/non-normality. 
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consistent with the results which are to be found in the previous literature (e.g. Chen et 
al. 2009).  
 
Model 2 shows the results by year. The coefficient of the first year dummy (FIRST) is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level, but the coefficient of the second year dummy 
(SECOND) is not. These indicate that there is a sharp decrease in capital inflow by 
2.56% of total assets immediately after the announcement (year t+1). In year t+2, 
although the decrease remains (a decrease of 2.05%), it does not result in a statistically 
significant difference in means of the net capital for the misstating firms and the control 
firms. The research also examined the effect on year t+3, but the coefficient of the third 
year dummy is not significant at the 0.05 level (p-value of 0.138). Therefore, there is 
unlikely to be a long term effect for an announcement of accountings misstatements. 
 
Models 3 and 4 illustrate the effect on two choices of external financing. In Model 3 the 
announcement has a significant impact on the net proceeds from share issuance, 
particularly during the first year. The amount of net proceeds reduces by a magnitude of 
1.18% of total assets for misstating firms. The net capital from borrowing activity also 
reduces in Model 4 (1.11% in the first year and 1.12% in the second year); however, the 
coefficients do not statistically differ from zero (t-statistic = -0.911 for FIRST and -
0.835 for SECOND). Referring to the determinants of accounting misstatements in 
Thailand (Chapter 6), an antecedent of important incentive for Thai firms to misstate 
financial reports is to avoid debt covenant violation. It implies that firms are afraid of 
the cost of violation (e.g. the lenders’ demand for immediate repayment or a higher cost 
of debt for future credit) and that they decide to mislead the lenders. However, in Model 
4 the reaction from lenders, measured by the flow of incoming capital, seems unaffected 
by the announcement of accounting misstatements.
57
 The antecedent and consequence 
seem to be conflict (if the debt covenant violation is costly as the firms expect, creditors 
should react negatively to the misstating firms and that the amount of incoming capital 
should be significantly reduced) in the multiple regression analysis. One explanation for 
                                                 
57
In a simple regression analysis where AFTER, industry dummies, and year dummies are the explanatory 
variables, the relationship between net debt (DEBT) and AFTER is statistically significant at the p-
value of 0.001 (the coefficient of -0.02389 and t-statistic of -3.38). However, the coefficient is not 
significant when the analysis controls for other factors. 
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this is that the creditors take no action after perceiving the misstatements; for example, 
in the U.S. sample (Roberts and Sufi 2009) 62.6% of creditors grant waivers to the 
borrowers after the covenant violations. Alternatively, the misstating firms borrow from 
other lenders. Further examination into the lender parties, details of debt contracts and 
defaults is, however, difficult for this thesis because of data unavailability.  
 
The results regarding the control variables are consistent with prior research. The 
internal wealth (OCF and CASH) is significantly negatively associated with the external 
financing; this result is consistent with the pecking order theory (Myers 1984; Myers 
and Majluf 1984). However, the beginning balance of receivables and inventories (INV) 
has no significant relationship with the external financing in the Thai sample at the 0.05 
level. The high amount of existing tangible assets (PPE) allows firms to raise more 
external financing, particularly a borrowing activity (Model 4). A pre-existing high 
leverage ratio (LEVC) impedes a firm in borrowing (Model 4), but does not affect share 
issuance (Model 3). A firm with a higher investment opportunity (Q) earns a higher 
amount of external finance. Specifically, the market-to-book value of assets (Q) is 
positively associated with both share issuance (Model 3) and borrowing activity (Model 
4). This relationship is in contrast to the results that have been found in the previous 
literature; for example, Myers (1977) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) both found that Q 
is positively associated with equity choice but negatively associated with debt choice. 
This contrast might arise because the financial system of Thai firms are bank-oriented 
(Alba et al. 2003) and equity is issued only when firms have no more debt capacity 
(Wiwattanakantang 1999). A firm may take the opportunity of having high market-to-
book value of assets (an implication of high expected future cash flows) to get a lower 
cost of debt from banks and, therefore, the Q measure can be positively associated with 
borrowing activity.  
 
Firm size (LNSALES) is positively associated with the net amount of external financing 
(Models 1 and 2) and borrowing activity (Model 4); however firm size is negatively 
associated with share issuance (Model 3), which is in contrast with both the 
expectations of this study and with the previous literature (e.g. Rajan and Zingales 
1995). Because size is based on the level of sales, it may indicate the amount of 
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internally generated funds (i.e. the more the amount of sales is, the more generated cash 
flow comes in, as in Table 7.4, firm size is +19% correlated with the operating cash 
flows). Accordingly, larger Thai firms may find it unnecessary to issue shares and so 
the negative relationship between size and external financing appears. Nevertheless, the 
effect of firm size on financial policy is still ambiguous in previous empirical studies 
(Rajan and Zingales 1995).  
 
The average interest rate (INT) is negatively associated with the net capital that is raised 
from borrowing. This is rational: the interest rate is the cost of debt, and so the higher an 
interest rate is then the lower the amount of debt a firm can raise will be. In contrast, 
although the interest rate is positively associated with the net proceeds from share 
issuance, the coefficient is not significant. These results imply that when the cost of 
debt is high a firm may shift from borrowing to equity issuance (e.g. the information 
asymmetry costs which are charged by equity investors is lower than cost of debt 
quoted by lenders), but the cost of debt does not directly affect the amount of proceeds 
from share issuance. The investment demand (INVEST) is strongly associated with the 
external financing, and this result is consistent with the previous literature (e.g. Titman 
and Wessels 1988).
58
 
 
In summary, the regression results support an alternative hypothesis (Hypothesis 4, 
Chapter 5) that there is a negative relationship between an announcement of accounting 
misstatements and external financing activity of misstating firms in years t+1 and t+2. 
After the model has controlled for certain financial characteristics, the announcement of 
                                                 
58
This thesis accepts that the cost of debt is somehow integrated in the amount of net capital (EXFIN) 
because the underlying assumption presumes that the higher cost of capital results in a lower net capital 
when the demand of funds is fixed. However, when considered separately, the interest rate is a 
significant determinant of borrowing activities (Model 4) but not of stock issuance activities (Model 3). 
This should allow this research to assure that this interest rate can be used to control the decision on the 
external financing activity choices. Having the interest rate included increases the power of the 
regression model and, therefore, it allows the research to assure the research result on the AFTER 
variable. Without adding the interest rate in the regression model, the coefficient of AFTER is still 
significant (the coefficient changes from -0.02314 to -0.02311 and the p-value changes from 0.024 to 
0.027). In the same vein, if the model contains only the empirical variables that were suggested by 
Almeida and Campello (2010) (i.e. the interest rate and investment demand measures are excluded), the 
coefficient of AFTER is significant at the p-value of 0.006 but the adjust R
2
 reduces from 48.9% 
(Model 1, Table 7.6) to 37.19%. 
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accounting misstatement has an impact on a decrease in capital inflow for the misstating 
firms in the first two years after the announcement. The decrease is about 2.13% of total 
assets below the mean of regular periods. The reduction is seen most emphatically in the 
proceeds from share issuance and the reduction is greater in the first year than in the 
second year after the announcement.
59
  
 
This section has assessed an economic cost of an announcement of accounting 
misstatements on the flow of capital. The next section is an empirical study into both 
the economic cost and benefit of an accounting misstatement. 
 
 
7.5 Economic Costs and Benefits of Accounting Misstatements  
This section aims to include both an economic benefit and cost of an accounting 
misstatement into one model. As discussed in Chapter 3, positive accounting 
researchers (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996; Rezaee 2005) believe that there is a cost-benefit 
trade-off in financial reporting decision but the empirical evidence is limited (Dechow 
et al. 2010; Wahlen 2004). The research extends the literature in terms of the net capital 
from external financing activities. The amount of capital occurred in misstating firms 
around the misstatement periods was observed. 
 
According to the analysis in the dynamics of capital of misstating firms in Section 7.4.3, 
the average capital flow (EXFIN) of misstating firms is significantly higher than that of 
the control group in the misstatement year (year t). This may signal a benefit of 
                                                 
59
One might argue that the smaller amount of capital in year t+1 may occur because misstating firms have 
had a great amount of cash from “stockpiling” at a lower cost of capital during the misstatement year 
(year t) and that they do not need funds in year t+1. This situation can happen; however, after observing 
the internal wealth and investing activities of the misstating firms, the researcher does not see so. 
Assuming that the misstating firms use incoming cash flow for investing in property, the amount of 
capital (EXFIN, net capital to total assets) and the investing activity (capital expenditure minus 
disposal, divided by total assets) in year t and t+1 are observed. On average (see Table 7.3), the 
misstating firms earned the capital (EXFIN) 5.2% of total assets in year t and used it almost in the same 
amount (5.15% of total assets) for investment (untabulated). The beginning balance of internal wealth 
(CASH and INV) in year t+1 (35.2% of total assets) is lower than that of year t (38.6% of total assets) 
(See Table 7.3 Panel B). Therefore, it does not seem that the internal wealth of the misstating firms is 
high enough that they do not need external funding in year t+1. Consequently, the research finding on 
the adverse effect of the misstatement announcement is reliable. 
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financial misreporting in the misstatement year. A dummy variable (DURING) is then 
added into the multivariate regression model in the previous section to assess whether 
the flow of capital in the misstatement year is higher than that of the other years, ceteris 
paribus. It is a proxy for an economic benefit from financial misreporting. 
 
With regard to economic costs, the dummy of AFTER is still retained to measure the 
effect of announcement on external financing in the first two years after the 
announcement. Having both the benefit and the cost of an accounting misstatement in 
one model may enable us to understand a cost-benefit trade-off in financial misreporting 
decision. The model is as follows. 
 
Linear regression model: 
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where τ (i) is the misstatement year for firm i and t is the current fiscal year. All 
variables are defined in Table 7.2. This model is similar to the multivariate linear 
regression model in the previous section, but it has the dummy variable of DURING 
added. The coefficient of DURING is expected to be positive, while the coefficient of 
AFTER is expected to be negative.  
 
It is worth noting that the inclusion of the two dummies (DURING and AFTER) does 
not differ from the model used in the study by Roberts and Sufi (2009). However, their 
interpretation in the model does not examine trading-off costs and benefits; they aim 
instead to show the change in the magnitude of net debt issuance in the quarter of 
violation and eight quarters afterwards.  
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Table 7.7: Linear Regression Analysis for Economic Benefits and Costs of an 
Accounting Misstatement, Measured by the Flow of Net Capital 
  Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Sign coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
  (t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics) 
Dependent   EXFIN EXFIN PROCEED DEBT 
Constant  -0.00246 -0.00248 0.0356*** -0.0405*** 
  (-0.143) (-0.144) (2.837) (-2.687) 
DURING + 0.01334 0.01333 0.0136 -0.0005 
  (1.342) (1.340) (1.386) (-0.041) 
AFTER - -0.02230**    
  (-2.157)    
FIRST -  -0.02467** -0.0108** -0.0111 
   (-2.006) (-2.256) (-0.892) 
SECOND -  -0.01976 -0.0041 -0.0112 
   (-1.479) (-0.464) (-0.837) 
OCF - -0.53084*** -0.53078*** -0.0894*** -0.4258*** 
  (-20.443) (-20.425) (-6.003) (-13.821) 
CASH - -0.11044*** -0.11039*** -0.0375** -0.0636*** 
  (-4.282) (-4.279) (-2.109) (-2.951) 
INV - -0.00368 -0.00366 -0.0156 0.0105 
  (-0.286) (-0.284) (-1.637) (0.878) 
PPE + 0.04229*** 0.04232*** -0.0184* 0.0623*** 
  (3.123) (3.125) (-1.878) (4.908) 
LEVC - -0.08148*** -0.08145*** 0.0022 -0.0838*** 
  (-8.429) (-8.423) (0.352) (-8.515) 
Q + 0.02573*** 0.02572*** 0.0108*** 0.0106** 
  (7.014) (7.007) (3.736) (2.475) 
LNSALES + 0.00385*** 0.00385*** -0.0030*** 0.0074*** 
  (3.157) (3.155) (-3.625) (5.825) 
INT - -0.08690** -0.08697** 0.0194 -0.1137*** 
  (-2.542) (-2.542) (0.833) (-3.334) 
INVEST + 0.16313*** 0.16313*** 0.0325*** 0.1304*** 
  (12.447) (12.444) (3.691) (9.498) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Observations  2,495 2,495 2,495 2,495 
Adjusted R
2
  0.489 0.489 0.129 0.403 
Statistics for F-test 37.98 36.62 4.268 17.1 
Model degrees of freedom 25 26 26 26 
Residual degrees of freedom 384 384 384 384 
p-value for F-test <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Number of clusters (firms) 385 385 385 385 
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Table 7.7 presents regression results for the analysis whether an accounting misstatement has an 
economic benefit to the misstating firms in the misstatement year and has an economic cost to the 
misstating firms in years t+1 and t+2, after controlled for other factors. The dependent variable is 
EXFIN, a summation of net proceeds from stock issuance and net debt from borrowing for the year 
disclosed in cash flow statements divided by total assets. PROCEED is a ratio of net proceeds from 
share issuance described in cash flow statements divided by total assets. DEBT is a ratio of net cash 
flow from borrowing activity shown in cash flow statements divided by total assets. DURING is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the misstatement year (t); 0 otherwise. AFTER is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 for the two firm-years after the announcement year (t+1 and t+2); 0 
otherwise. FIRST is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the first firm-year after the 
announcement year (t+1); 0 otherwise. SECOND is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the 
second firm-year after the announcement year (t+2); 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in 
Table 7.2. Standard errors are robust by firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (a two-tailed test of whether the coefficient is equal to zero). 
 
 
Table 7.7 shows the regression results for the empirical model of economic costs and 
benefits of accounting misstatements. In Model 1, the coefficient of 0.01334 is positive 
as expected; the flow of capital is higher for the misstating firms than the average 
regular periods; however, the robust standard error is large and, therefore, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level (t-statistic=1.342). 
Consequently, there is no evidence to support an empirical prediction that accounting 
misstatements provide economic benefits to the misstating firms in terms of a greater 
magnitude of capital inflow in the misstatement year. On the other hand, the coefficient 
of AFTER (-0.0223) differs from zero at the 0.05 level. After the announcement of 
accounting misstatement goes public, the flow of capital that the misstating firms 
receive is lower than the mean of the control group. The evidence of the economic cost 
imposed to the misstating firms remains and is consistent with the previous section. 
When combined with the constant term, the flow of capital from external financing 
activities reduces from 1.088 (-0.246+1.334) percent of total assets during the 
misstatement year preceding the announcement to -2.476 (-0.246-2.23) percent of total 
assets for the first two years after the announcement, a decline of 3.564 percent in total. 
The coefficients of control variables in all models are very similar to those in Table 7.6.  
 
Model 2 details the economic cost by year. Although the coefficient of the first year (-
0.02467) is significant at the 0.05 level, the coefficient of the second year (-0.01976) is 
not. This indicates that the penalty is strong in the first year after the announcement and 
it seems to last by two years. This result coincides with the presentation of comparative 
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financial statements. The restated item(s) is the beginning balance of the next year 
financial reports. Its appearance might not attract investors’ attention. 
 
Models 3 and 4 show the economic effect of an accounting misstatement on share 
issuance activity and borrowing activity, respectively. The coefficient of economic 
benefit (i.e. DURING) is still not significant in both models. Consequently, there is no 
significant evidence to support an economic benefit of an accounting misstatement in 
the misstatement year when assessed by the flow of capital. On the other hand, the 
misstating firms are punished by equity investors in the first year after the 
announcement of accounting misstatements, as shown by the significant negative 
coefficient of FIRST in Model 3. There is no significant evidence to support an 
economic cost for borrowing activity (Model 4). The results on the economic costs by 
type of external financing activity and by year are in line with those in Table 7.6, 
Models 3 and 4. 
 
In conclusion, in the Thai capital market environment, there is no evidence of an 
economic benefit of financial misreporting when measured by the flow of capital from 
external financing activities, but there is strong evidence of an economic cost imposed 
on the misstating firms, particularly from equity investors.  
 
The reason for the insignificant result for an economic benefit in the misstatement year 
might be found in the determinants of accounting misstatements in the Thai sample. As 
in Chapter 6, Thai companies appear to misstate their financial reports because they 
wanted to avoid debt covenant violation and minimise the cost of capital; however, both 
measures are ex ante indicators. The leverage ratio indicates the closeness to a debt 
covenant violation, not a default.
60
 As seen in this chapter, an impact of an 
announcement of accounting misstatements on the creditors’ reactions has not been of 
significance. In the same vein, the incentive to minimise the cost of capital is supported 
by the indicator of ex ante negative free cash flow (NFCF), but not by the ex post share 
issuance (ISSUE). The indicator of the ex ante NFCF from the previous year financial 
                                                 
60
This can be considered a limitation of the leverage ratio in measuring the debt covenant violation 
(Dichev and Skinner 2002).  
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status (year t-1) might not be strong enough to influence a significant increase in the 
flow of capital in the following year (year t), after controlled for other factors. Even 
elsewhere, when an incentive to minimise cost of capital is confirmed for seasoned 
equity issuers (such as through income-increasing accruals) an economic benefit from 
earning manipulation is not assured because the pre-offering manipulation is predictable 
and the analysts and investors adjust the firm’s returns in the following year after the 
offerings (Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998).  
 
In addition, the misstatements in Thailand occur due to weak corporate governance 
mechanisms (i.e. duality position, audit firm change, and the use of a Big 4 auditor). 
Although these factors absolutely impact on the quality of the financial reports, they 
might not be powerful enough to result in the economic scale of external financing.
61
 
This proposed empirical model may function more efficiently if all of the determinants 
relate to the benefits governing external financing. 
 
 
7.6 Summary 
The results in this chapter provide evidence of an economic cost that is imposed on 
misstating firms, as measured by the flow of capital. The secondary data analysis shows 
a sharp drop of external funds following an announcement of accounting misstatements. 
The adverse effect is clearly seen in the net proceeds from share issuance and in the first 
year after the announcement. These findings extend the literature; i.e., the average cost 
of capital increases for misstating firms after the announcement (e.g. Graham et al. 
2005; Hribar and Jenkins 2004) and as such the amount of capital that the misstating 
firms attain is smaller in the post-announcement period than other periods. The 
misstating firms are, therefore, likely to be financially constrained, which is consistent 
                                                 
61There is some evidence showing an impact of corporate governance on creditors’ decisions (Chang et 
al. 2009; Holder-Webb and Sharma 2010; Mansi et al. 2004) and an effect of the divergence between 
cash flow and control rights on equity investors’ decisions (Giannetti and Simonov 2006). However, in 
a context when low financial reporting quality exists neither the corporate governance variables (i.e. 
BIG, DUAL and AUDCHG) nor the ownership structure variables (OWN, FAM and CROSS) are 
statistically associated with the capital providers’ decisions when measured by the flow of capital 
(EXFIN). 
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with Chen et al.(2009). In addition, it can be seen in the analysis that the flow of capital 
for the misstating firms significantly increases during the misstatement year. This can 
signal a benefit from the financial misreporting; however, the evidence is weak in the 
statistical view. 
 
The result of an economic cost of an accounting misstatement represents an important 
contribution to the literature. Referring to the empirical model of external financing 
need by Almeida and Campello (2010); the results in this chapter provide an extension 
to their model in that besides the financial characteristics, quality of financial reports 
also affects a firm’s external financing activities. The literature is seeking an 
explanation of how financial reporting influences a firm’s decision regarding the type of 
financing choices (Armstrong et al. 2010, p. 214). This research shows that the low 
quality of financial reports has an adverse effect on external financing activities 
(measured by the magnitude of incoming capital) and the impact is greater for equity 
issuance than debt choice in the Thai samples. 
 
The next chapter will summarise the research results for the determinants (the previous 
chapter) and economic consequences of accounting misstatements in Thailand (this 
chapter). In addition, certain limitations of the research and avenues for future research 
will be discussed.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter summarises the main contributions of the thesis and discusses their 
implications. Section Two illustrates the key findings derived from the data analysis in 
Chapters 6 and 7. The contribution of the research is also discussed in Section Two. In 
Section Three, the empirical findings are set out against the background of agency 
theory, which is a fundamental theory in this research and is used to explain the 
phenomenon of accounting misstatements. Section Four describes some limitations of 
the research and makes a number of recommendations for future research. 
 
 
8.2 Key Findings and Research Contributions 
As described in the earlier chapters, this research aimed to explore and discover the 
determinants and economic consequences of accounting misstatements in Thailand. In 
addition to extending prior findings on accounting misstatements beyond developed 
markets in general, the research findings contribute to the literature on financial 
reporting in concentrated ownership systems. The following section summarises the key 
research results, ordered according to the research questions, and discusses their 
implications and contributions to the literature.  
 
8.2.1 The Occurrence of Accounting Misstatements in Thailand 
This research has documented accounting misstatement cases in Thailand, which is an 
example of a concentrated ownership system. The sample comprised 51 misstatement 
observations, compared with 2,452 non-misstatement observations during 2001-2009 in 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Coffee (2006) proposes that firms in concentrated 
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ownership systems are less likely to restate their financial reports when an error is found 
because the legal protection and enforcement action is low and corporate governance is 
less effective. His proposition, however, has rarely been examined because the reports 
for accounting misstatements (or accounting restatements) in concentrated ownership 
samples are rarely available. This thesis has been able to provide this information and 
fill this gap in the literature. Approximately, 0.27%
62
 of the financial reports annually 
released in the capital market of Thailand contain accounting misstatement items. This 
proportion is lower than that of other countries, such as 0.34-0.47% a year in U.S. 
capital markets (Beneish 1997; Burns and Kedia 2006). The smaller fraction in Thailand 
is, therefore, in line with Coffee’s (2006) viewpoint.  
 
8.2.2 The Determinants of Accounting Misstatements in Thailand 
With reference to the theoretical framework of the occurrence of accounting 
manipulation (Jiambalvo 1996) and the importance of the ownership structure (Bebchuk 
and Hamdani 2009; Coffee 2006), the determinants of accounting misstatements in 
Thailand were categorised into three perspectives: the dominant shareholders’ 
incentives, the functions of corporate governance mechanisms, and the influence of the 
concentrated ownership structure. The research results are summarised and discussed as 
follows.  
 
a) The Incentives of Controlling Shareholders 
Thai firms are more likely to misstate financial reports when they are close to a 
violation of debt covenants (as measured by the leverage ratio) and when they need 
external financing (as measured by negative free cash flow). On the other hand, neither 
an incentive to maintain the firm’s value (as measured by the market-to-book ratio) nor 
a rehabilitation status (which is a proxy for profitability regulation and financial 
distress) is an important antecedent for the financial misreporting decision. There are 
two additional points on these findings that will be discussed in light of their 
significance and contribution to the literature: 
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A ratio of 51 misstatement firm-years to 2,452 non-misstatement firm-years, which is then divided by 
nine years of the research period (2001-2009).  
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Firstly, the results of the incentives are contrary to the incentives for earnings 
management (within GAAP) in the study by Pornupatham (2006), which found that the 
auditors in Thailand disagree that the debt covenant hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986) is an important factor that enables Thai firms to manage their earnings. On the 
other hand, they agree that firms are more likely to manage earnings because the firms 
want to meet the market’s expectation. Additionally, the leverage ratio in 
Pornupatham’s (2006) sample is negatively associated with the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals, while the ratio is positively associated with the likelihood of 
accounting misstatements in this study. These conflict relationships also appear in 
Larcker et al. (2007) who found in their study that the debt-related incentive (a ratio of 
debt to market value of equity) is negatively associated with abnormal accruals in the 
U.S. firms (like Pornupatham (2006)), but it is positively associated with the likelihood 
of accounting restatements (like this research). These empirical findings might provide 
an insight to us. It may be the case that earnings management (within GAAP) occurs 
when firms want to please capital market participants (Graham et al. 2005; Leuz et al. 
2003). However, earnings management may be unnecessary for highly levered firms 
because their firm’s value is highly discounted by investors and this makes it difficult 
for them to maintain their expected value. In this case, earnings management is 
unnecessary and, therefore, the negative relationship appears. In contrast, the current 
cost of capital for highly-levered firms is already high (Maksimovic and Titman 1991), 
so they can be less concerned about the future costs (e.g. the costs occurred after 
accounts manipulation is revealed). It is thus highly possible for highly levered firms to 
engage in accounting misstatements, as shown by the positive relationship. The finding 
in this study supports the proposition by Maksimovic and Titman (1991) that highly-
levered firms are more likely to commit fraud.  
 
Secondly, the significant result on the debt-related incentive coincides with the 
institutional settings of the country and the concentrated ownership systems. The 
financial system of concentrated ownership firms (including Thai firms) is primarily 
based on debt more often than equity (Coffee 2006; Rajan and Zingales 1995) and, 
therefore, the firms are likely to be much more constrained by debt covenants. 
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Consequently, the likelihood that a firm can violate the debt covenants increases. To 
avoid the violation accounts manipulation can be used. When compared with the 
dispersed ownership systems, the debt-related incentive (measured by the leverage 
ratio) is an important antecedent in Thai firms (an example of a concentrated ownership 
system), but it is still inconclusive for dispersed ownership samples (Beneish 1997; 
Dechow et al. 2011; Dechow et al. 1996). This can happen because the financial system 
of dispersed ownership firms is primarily based on capital markets. The research thus 
contributes to the literature on how accounting quality plays a role in debt contracting 
(Armstrong et al. 2010) and in the environment of debt orientation, the debt covenant 
hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) is strongly supported.  
 
b) Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
There is evidence of weaker corporate governance in misstating firms and this 
contributes to the literature on the relationship between corporate governance and 
earnings manipulation in an Asian context, as raised by Brown et al. (2011). Previous 
studies have shown that corporate governance in concentrated ownership systems is 
weaker than dispersed ownership systems, but very few of them have assessed how 
such a weakness of the corporate governance in firms with concentrated ownership is 
associated with the incidence of accounting misstatements.  
 
Firms in less developed countries (including Thailand) have less incentive to improve 
their governance because the adoption of better governance mechanisms is expensive 
(Doidge et al. 2007). In Thailand, the adoption of corporate governance depends on a 
cost-benefit perspective (Kouwenberg 2010) and there is not substantial variation in the 
corporate governance policy among firms (Doidge et al. 2007; Kouwenberg 2010). This 
research complements these prior studies in that although the previous studies have 
found little variation in the corporate governance policy among Thai firms, there is an 
appearance of weaker corporate governance in misstating firms which results in lower 
quality financial reports. All three corporate governance proxies in this research (i.e. the 
duality position of the chief executive officer and chairman of the board, the use of a 
Big 4 firm and an audit firm change) are significantly associated with accounting 
misstatements in Thailand. The details and discussions for each proxy are separately 
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presented next. The findings on the subject of corporate governance can extend our 
knowledge on the relationship between corporate governance and the financial reporting 
quality in Asian countries, which is still limited in literature (Brown et al. 2011, pp. 
147-153).  
 
Firstly, the significant effect of the duality position on the likelihood of accounting 
misstatements is found in this research (which is an example of a concentrated 
ownership system) and it also appears in samples of diffused ownership firms (e.g. 
Dechow et al. 1996; Larcker et al. 2007; Peasnell et al. 2001; Skousen et al. 2008). 
Therefore, this evidence can serve as a reference point for policy makers to encourage 
firms to segregate the duties between the managers and monitors. A recent study has 
also shown that when the chief executive officer is involved in the board selection 
process (in addition to their role as chairman of the board) the effectiveness of the board 
is eliminated and the board has no influence on the control for financial reporting 
quality (Carcello et al. 2011). 
 
Secondly, regarding the use of Big 4 auditors, while the literature (particularly the 
studies into dispersed ownership firms) questions the role of Big 4 auditors in detecting 
accounting errors (Dechow et al. 2010), the evidence from firms in the concentrated 
ownership environment supports the important role of Big 4 auditors in detecting 
accounting misstatements. Therefore, in line with the previous studies (e.g. Fan and 
Wong 2005), the Big 4 auditors have been shown in this study to considerably influence 
financial reporting quality in the East Asia region.  
 
Thirdly, when a firm changes its auditor, there is an increasing likelihood that the 
financial reports in that fiscal year will not be fairly presented. This research has found a 
positive relationship between an audit firm change and the likelihood of accounting 
misstatements. A further investigation into types of audit firm change and the likelihood 
of accounting misstatements reveals that an increase in the likelihood of accounting 
misstatements in the first year of audit engagement tends to involve an inherent risk of 
short-term audit tenure (e.g. a loss of client-specific knowledge), rather than a scheme 
of controlling shareholders in concealing their financial misreporting. Although a 
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change in audit firm increases the likelihood of accounting misstatements, a change in 
audit partner does not. The findings in Thailand support the literature on the question of 
an adverse effect of a short-term audit tenure (e.g. less than three years) on the quality 
of financial reports (Carcello and Nagy 2004; Johnson et al. 2002). This evidence can 
be beneficial to regulators who are deciding whether they should regulate a mandatory 
audit firm rotation or not. Based on the research results, a mandatory audit firm rotation 
is unlikely to be beneficial because auditors may lack client-specific knowledge and 
there is an increasing propensity of auditors to fail to detect accounting misstatements. 
On the other hand, a mandatory audit partner change can be made possible because the 
financial reporting quality (as measured by the likelihood of accounting misstatements) 
is not affected by an audit partner change.  
 
c) The Influence of Concentrated Ownership Structures 
There is weak evidence to show an entrenchment effect of the controlling shareholders 
in the financial misreporting context. Since accounts manipulation is considered to be 
an indicator of opportunistic financial misreporting, the research expected to find 
evidence showing an expropriation of controlling shareholders through the 
characteristics of concentrated ownership structure (i.e. ownership concentration, family 
ownership, and an appearance of pyramidal and cross-holding structure). However, 
none of the ownership measures are statistically associated with the likelihood of 
accounting misstatements. Only when the controlling shareholders own a share 
ownership more than 25%, then the likelihood of accounting misstatements significantly 
increases at the significance of 10% level. Since after the prior research highlighted the 
relationship between the ownership structure and the reported earnings quality (e.g. Fan 
and Wong 2002), many empirical studies (including this study and Chen et al. (2006)) 
have expected to find the relationship between the ownership structure and the low 
quality of financial reports (i.e. GAAP violation), but the expectation was not supported 
by the empirical work. When Leuz et al. (2003) did not find a relationship between 
ownership concentration and earnings management in their cross-country sample, they 
queried that it might appear in a firm-level sample; however, this study did not find a 
relationship between the ownership concentration and the likelihood of accounting 
misstatements even when using a firm-level sample. One explanation for this is that 
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although the controlling shareholders intentionally deliver misstated financial reports, 
the reports will be audited by auditors and approved by the board of directors before 
being released. Therefore, whether they can detect the misstatements eventually 
depends on the effectiveness and competence of the monitors. Taken together with the 
other determinants of accounting misstatements (as discussed above), it can be 
concluded that although the controlling shareholders can influence the corporate 
governance policy (such as the election of chairman of the board and a change in 
auditors) through their large control rights, their controlling rights do not directly affect 
an appearance of accounting misstatements. The appearance instead depends on their 
incentives and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms.   
 
At this point, it may be useful to use the results of this research to improve financial 
reporting quality in Thailand and other countries where the country institutions are 
similar. For example, lenders should be specifically aware of the quality of financial 
reports in debt-based countries and in firms with weak corporate governance. 
Additionally, the significant result of the influence of the 25% threshold on the 
ownership concentration and the incentives of the financial statement preparers extend 
the argument by Ball et al. (2003), who posit that in four East Asian countries (i.e. 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) financial reporting quality depends on 
the financial statements preparers’ incentives rather than accounting standards. This 
study reveals two of those incentives (i.e. to avoid debt covenant violations and to 
minimise cost of capital). The accounting standards are currently principles-based (Ball 
2006), so that incentives of the preparers (who usually are the controlling shareholders 
in East Asia) are crucial and should be given attention by the stakeholders. There is also 
a policy implication of the research results for regulators. According to the found 
determinants of accounting misstatements in Thailand, monitoring activities are 
important and might be improved later (such as segregation of duties between CEO and 
chairman of the board, and the enhancement of audit quality for local audit firms).  
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8.2.3 The Consequences of Accounting Misstatements in Thailand 
This research has assessed the economic consequences of accounting misstatements to 
firms. After being controlled for certain factors that potentially impact the external 
financing activity, the regression analysis reveals an adverse effect of an announcement 
of accounting misstatements on the external financing activity for misstating firms. The 
misstating firms obtain a lower amount of incoming capital, a reduction of 2.31% of 
total assets when compared with the mean of non-misstating firms, for the first two 
years after the announcement. The adverse effect is greater in the first year than in the 
second year for the post-announcement period. The economic consequence on the 
external financing activity supports and extends the prior studies (Chen et al. 2009; 
Graham et al. 2008; Hribar and Jenkins 2004). This insight can inform the literature of 
how accounting quality influences the capital providers’ decision in the contracting 
process (Armstrong et al. 2010; Dechow et al. 2010; DeFond 2010). The capital 
providers limit their investment in firms that have ever experienced accounting 
misstatements and accounting allegations.  
 
When its impact on the sources of funds is measured separately, an announcement of an 
accounting misstatement affects the amount of capital from share issuances. In Thailand 
sample, the decreased incoming funds are more apparently seen in the share issuance 
activity than in the borrowing choice. The negative reaction from equity investors is in 
agreement with prior studies in Thailand that have used a different methodology 
(Phunnarungsi 2010; Tummanon 2005a) who find significant negative abnormal share 
returns in firms with an accounting allegation. Regarding the reaction from lenders, the 
announcement of accounting misstatements does not significantly impact the amount of 
funds provided by them. One possible reason for this involves private debt financing, 
which is frequently used by Thai firms. Charumilind et al. (2006) found that personal 
connections between Thai firms and banks benefit those firms who can obtain long-term 
debt from banks on favourable terms. The country’s richest families in their sample 
(Charumilind et al. 2006, p. 194) are the same families who are the firms’ ultimate 
owners in this research. It is, therefore, possible that the ultimate owners of the sample 
chose to raise funds from private sources (i.e. banks) and that they are less likely to be 
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concerned with lenders’ reactions.63 It also appears in the U.S. samples that firms with 
low quality financial reports have shifted to a private debt alternative (Bharath et al. 
2008; Chen et al. 2009). Collectively, the cost of equity tends to be higher than the cost 
of debt when a firm financially misreports. This is consistent with the pecking order 
theory (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984), which suggests that equity holders are 
more aware of the credibility of financial reporting because they have fewer 
opportunities to scrutinise the financial reports than the lenders.  
 
In addition to the above findings that address the research questions (see Chapter 1), this 
research has also proposed an empirical model to present both the determinants and 
economic consequences of an accounting misstatement in order to extend our 
knowledge of a cost-benefit trade-off in the financial reporting process. In the 
descriptive statistics analysis the economic benefits significantly appear in misstating 
firms (i.e. the misstating firms receive a greater amount of capital in the years preceding 
the misstatement announcement). This study then added both the economic costs and 
benefits into a multiple regression model by using the flow of capital as a measure. 
However, the cost-benefit perspective is not supported by the regression results after 
being controlled for relevant factors (i.e. the economic costs appear significant but the 
economic benefits do not). One possible reason for these results is that investors are 
aware of an inherent risk of financial reporting (such as earnings management (Teoh et 
al. 1998) and accounting restatements (Bardos et al. 2011)) and as such they already 
require rates of returns covering such a risk; therefore, any economic benefit that a firm 
gains in the misstatement year does not significantly appear. On the other hand, they 
severely punish the misstating firm for lack of financial reporting integrity. For 
instance, existing creditors demand immediate repayment (Roberts and Sufi 2009), 
while analysts and equity investors reassess management credibility and earnings 
quality (e.g. Firth et al. 2011). New capital providers also question the reliability of the 
misstating firm’s financial reports, so they are more concerned about future 
investments, such as whether to invest or not, or whether to require a higher rate of 
returns (e.g. Chen et al. 2009; Graham et al. 2008). Therefore, the misstating firms 
                                                 
63
The thesis cannot investigate into the choices of public debt and private debt because data were 
unavailable publicly. The examination was therefore conducted on the total amount of debt. 
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experience a financial difficulty in the post-announcement period. The regression results 
on the insignificant appearance of economic benefits and the significant economic costs 
provide an insight to companies that they should prepare high quality of financial 
reports (e.g. establishing effective corporate governance mechanisms to monitor the 
financial reporting process); otherwise, they will face an enormous cost if their financial 
reports are later restated. This instance shows us a significance of monitoring systems, 
which is in line with the theory of the firm and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). The next section links the research findings to the principal theory of the 
research (i.e. agency theory).  
 
 
8.3 Verification of Agency Theory 
The research conclusions from the previous section have affirmed the validity of agency 
theory. As discussed in Chapter 2, and emphasised in Chapter 5, a taxonomy of the 
theory of a firm and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) is used by this research 
to explain the phenomenon of accounting misstatements in concentrated ownership 
systems. The research findings support the views of the theory as follows. 
 
Firstly, the principal-principal agent conflict exists in concentrated ownership firms. In 
the case of Thailand, pre-existing creditors and new capital providers are more likely to 
be misled by their clients’ financial reports, particularly when the clients are close to 
debt covenant violations and when firms need external financing.  
 
Secondly, agency theory points out that opportunistic behaviour occurs when 
monitoring activities are weak. Although there is no strong evidence of an entrenchment 
effect through the concentrated ownership structure in the Thai sample, the monitoring 
mechanisms that the controlling shareholders of misstating firms have provided are 
weak and as such the likelihood of accounting statements increases. Likewise, the weak 
monitoring activities increase the likelihood of accounting misstatements in dispersed 
ownership systems. Therefore, the monitoring activities stated in agency theory are 
important and they are applicable in both systems of the ownership structure. They 
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might even more concern firms with concentrated ownership because the corporate 
governance of these firms is relatively weaker than that of widely held firms (Salacuse 
2006).  
 
Thirdly, capital providers significantly reduce their investment when a firm’s 
accounting misstatements are revealed (i.e. the reduction in net capital from external 
financing activities); this is particularly true of equity investors. This evidence supports 
the utility-maximisation of the equity investors in the post-announcement period. At the 
same time, the misstating firms confront a negative result from the inaccuracy of 
financial reporting; however, they maximised their profits in the misstatement year 
(such as from the reduced monitoring costs and/or from the benefits that they mislead 
creditors and prospective investors). One limitation of this research is to explain the 
utility-maximisation assumption of the creditors in the post-announcement period. 
Although they were misled by their clients, their reactions (as measured by the amount 
of debt offered in the post-announcement period) did not appear significant. The 
researcher cannot further investigate into this circumstance due to data limitations. This, 
therefore, opens up avenues for future research. The next section acknowledges the 
research limitations and suggests avenues for future research.  
 
 
8.4 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
Although this research was conducted on a rigorous and systematic basis, like any 
research, it suffers from a number of limitations. A significant amount of effort was 
placed on ensuring that the objectives of the study were met and the research questions 
were answered. This section describes the research limitations and makes some 
recommendations for future research. 
 
Firstly, as recently discussed in the previous section this study has found an adverse 
effect of the misstatement announcements on the capital from share issuances but not 
from borrowing, even though an incentive of the misstatements relates to lenders. It is 
possible that the misstating firms decided not to raise funds from capital markets and 
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instead borrowed directly from banks. If that is the case then the amount of net proceeds 
is drastically reduced, while the amount from borrowing cannot be affected. Further 
research using alternative methodologies could examine the occurrence of the 
borrowing activities (such as whether new loans are supplied by existing lenders or new 
lenders, or if the new loans are raised from public debt or private debt). In addition, in 
reference to the assessment of economic consequences (see Chapter 7); this research 
assumed that the demand for external financing of a firm was fulfilled by capital 
providers in the same year. There can be a case made that a misstating firm desired 
some external funds but were unable to raise them from any sources, as Chen et al. 
(2009) pointed out, or that a firm may actually prefer share issuances but because of a 
higher cost of equity it instead shifts to a borrowing choice. Since the data was 
unavailable publicly this research was restricted to answer these arguments.  
 
Secondly, it still opens for future research to extend our knowledge on the cost-benefit 
trade-off in the financial reporting process. This study and other researchers (e.g. 
Dechow et al. 1996; Rezaee 2005) believe that there is a cost-benefit trade-off in a 
decision to violate or not violate GAAP. However, this research has weak evidence to 
support the economic benefits of GAAP violation, while the economic costs are 
affirmed. Future research may extend this issue by using other economic measures or 
other research methodologies; more instances can be found in Wahlen (2004). 
 
Thirdly, the sample selection criterion covered only non-financial public firms and 
firms having fiscal years ended 31 December. In addition, the sample was restricted to 
those firms with data available. While the data captures the determinants and economic 
consequences of accounting misstatements for a large sample of firms in Thailand, it 
may not be representative of the average of the whole population of Thai listed firms.  
 
Fourthly, like most prior studies (e.g. Dechow et al. 2011; Dechow et al. 1996), this 
research did not distinguish accounting errors from fraudulent financial reporting. A 
further study might be able to do so, but researchers must be circumspect on the criteria 
used to differentiate them. There is a possible result on the causes of accounting 
misstatements if a distinction is made. For instance, both incentives and weak corporate 
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governance are likely to be important for a fraudulent group but the incentives may not 
be essential for the error group because the accounting errors are unintentional. Also, 
capital providers may react differently to the misstatements due to fraud and accounting 
errors; for example, a pioneering study by Hennes et al. (2008) discovered that errors 
and fraud affect management turnover differently. These issues might also be of interest 
for future research.  
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Appendix A: Collection Approach for Ownership Data 
 
The method to gather the data for the ownership proxy is similar to that used by the 
prior studies (e.g. Dhnadirek and Tang 2003; Wiwattanakantang 2001), and is as 
follows: 
1. SETSMART database provides the information on shareholders with 
shareholdings of at least 0.5%.  
2. The ultimate owner of each firm was identified and categorised into one of four 
groups. 
The researcher followed Wiwattanakantang (2001) in categorising the owner 
identity as:  
2.1 Individual or family; 
2.2 Foreign investors; 
2.3 Thai government; and,  
2.4 More than one ultimate owner (such as two founder families). 
3. Identifying the ultimate owner was not difficult because most Thai firms are 
family-run firms, and the family members are usually both the management and 
the shareholders. The last names of controlling shareholders were compared 
with the last name of directors and/or the management. The potential ultimate 
owner was then checked by a summation of his/her shareholdings. The 
shareholders who have the same last name were grouped together as a family.   
4. If a shareholder is a private company, a further investigation was performed into 
the list of shareholders of this private company. The list of shareholders was 
shown in Bor.Or.Jor.5 form, which was requested by the Department of 
Business Development, Ministry of Commerce. Further investigation was 
performed until the researcher could identify the ultimate owner. 
5. Annual reports or company websites were used, where necessary, as 
supplementary sources of the ownership information. 
6. The percentage of shares owned by the ultimate owner was identified. All the 
shares owned by members of the same family were included as one unit of 
owner. The research could include all the shares held by relatives of in-laws of 
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the family if this information was disclosed in Form 56-1. If not, then the 
percentage of shareholdings could be underestimated.  
7. The percentage of shareholdings in this study is voting rights and not cash-flow 
rights. This research project could not gather the data until it had satisfactorily 
received the number of cash-flow rights because of a time limit and the large 
sample size (388 firms with nine fiscal years). Instead, the research used a 
dummy variable of 1 if the firm has an ownership arrangement of pyramids 
and/or cross-holdings; 0 otherwise. Some prior studies also employed this 
dummy measure (e.g. Filatotchev et al. 2005; Wiwattanakantang 2001).   
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Appendix B: Research Sample 
 
This appendix illustrates details of the sample and an approximate amount of the impact of accounting misstatements on accounting items.   
Part A: The Accounting Misstatements That Have Been Found By the Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand (SECT) 
An allegation that is later announced as a violation of the Securities and Exchange Act section 312 is considered fraud; otherwise, it is assumed to be an accounting error. 
There are 18 misstating firms with 34 misstated firm-years for the determinant part, and 15 misstating firms for the consequence part (DAIDO, SECC, and ROYNET missing). 
Firm Company Name (Symbol) Type Year Impact Amount 
(million 
THB) 
% of 
Total 
Assets in 
year t-1 
Details of Accounting Misstatements 
1 Roynet Plc (ROYNET) Fraud 2002 -earnings 9.217 % 16.60 Personal expenses of the board of director of 2.58 and 8.38 
million THB in 2003 and 2002, respectively. 
  Fraud 2003 -earnings 7.05 12.70 Missing fixed assets of 4.47 million THB in 2003. 
2 Daidomon Group Plc (DAIDO) Fraud 2002 -earnings 21 2.29 Revenue recognition. 
Capitalised expense as assets. 
 
 
 Fraud 2003  Not 
specified 
- Forfeited documents and many items of assets lack of 
documents support. 
3 Circuit Electronics Industries Plc 
(CIRKIT) 
Fraud 2003 
2004 
2005 
-earnings 3,440 65.87 Failed to book adequate allowance for bad debt of international 
debtors and the auditor is limited to audit these receivables.  
4 Bangkok Steel Industry Plc 
(BSI) 
Fraud 2002 -investment  
-earnings 
4,393.28 
9.08 
29.14 
0.06 
Had a scheme to transfer wealth from the parent company to 
subsidiaries, which are majority owned by three executives. 
5 Datamat Plc (DTM) Error 2002 
2004 
-earnings 21.4 
(2004) 
5.48 Failed to book adequate allowance for bad debt of international 
debtors and the auditor is limited to audit these receivables. 
6 Capital Engineering Network Plc 
(CEN) 
Fraud 2004  80.1 13.17 
 
Three officers colluded in misappropriating 80.1 million THB 
from Rayong Wire Industries, an Eastern Wire subsidiary, 
through a contract for advanced procurement of raw materials 
with Union Gas and Chemicals Co., Ltd. in 2004, and made 
false representation of accounting information. 
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Firm Company Name (Symbol) Type Year Impact Amount 
(million 
THB) 
% of 
Total 
Assets in 
year t-1 
Details of Accounting Misstatements 
  Fraud 2005  500 82.18 The managing director of CEN misappropriated 500 million 
THB from the company through a loan to Siam General 
Factoring Plc. (SGF) in 2005. 
7 TCJ Asia Plc (TCJ) Error 2004 -revenue 
and 
expense 
149.61 20.36 Incorrectly recorded goodwill from acquiring a subsidiary. 
8 Loxley Plc (LOXLEY) Error 2003 -earnings 67.4 0.70 Incorrectly realised gain on disposal of investments of 85.7 
million THB. 
9 Kuang Pei San Food Products 
Plc (POMPUI) 
Error 2004 -earnings 567 45.27 Inadequately reserved allowance for doubtful account of a 
receivable who is a subsidiary. Total debt is 730.3 million THB 
and set for allowance at 163.3 million THB, while the 
receivable has deficit shareholders' equity. Thus, the company 
was required to record the whole amount of debt loss. 
10 Krisdamahanakorn Plc (KMC) Error 2004 -earnings 64.63 1.01 Inappropriately recognised unpaid sales as revenue (revenues of 
103.21 million THB and costs of goods sold of 38.58 million 
THB). 
11 Thai Film Industries Plc (TFI) Error 2004 -earnings Not 
specified 
- Required to consolidate a subsidiary, which had been sold since 
2001, the amount of 1,891 million THB, and recorded as long 
term receivables. The buyer was unable to pay and tends not to 
be able to pay. Moreover, the company still had a decision 
power over the buyer and the subsidiary. Therefore, this 
subsidiary should be included in consolidated financial 
statements. 
12 Picnic Corporation Plc (PICNIC) Fraud 2004 
2005 
-earnings 528.63 
(2004)  
267.39 
(2005) 
11.77 
 
5.95 
1. Fictitious revenue of 178 million THB. 
2. Unreasonably high transfer price to related parties for sales 
of 322 million THB in 2004 and 210 million THB in 2005. 
3. Failed to test impairment of goodwill for two subsidiaries. 
13 Power-P Plc (POWER) Fraud 2004 -earnings 29.6 25.12 Fictitious revenues. 
Fraud 2005 -revenues 22.4 19.01 Fictitious revenues. 
Fraud 2006 -earnings 102.41 86.91 Counterfeiting documents to overstate assets and failed to test 
impairment of assets. 
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Firm Company Name (Symbol) Type Year Impact Amount 
(million 
THB) 
% of 
Total 
Assets in 
year t-1 
Details of Accounting Misstatements 
14 Nippon Pack (Thailand) Plc 
(NIPPON) 
Error 2004 
2005 
+earnings 1.36(2004) 
1.17(2005) 
0.26 
0.22 
Reclassified good returns for the sales in 2004 and 2005, which 
the company has later recorded in the 2
nd
 quarter of 2009. 
Error 2005 -earnings 66.59 12.51 Failed to prepare the consolidated statements of the two 
companies. Although the percentages of holdings is less than 
50% (18.18% and 0.00%) but the company has a control power 
over those companies. 
The company also corrected the errors of inventory evaluation 
and impairment of assets in this year. 
Fraud 2008 
2009 
 179.6 26.03 The ex-CEO colluded in misappropriating 179.6 million THB. 
15 ABICO Holding Plc (ABICO) Error 2004 
2005 
2006 
-earnings 19(2004) 
277(2005) 
384.4(2006) 
1.83 
26.64 
36.96 
Failed to prepare the consolidated statements of the two 
companies. Although the percentage of holdings is less than 
50% (49%) but the company has a control power over such 
company.  
16 Tongkah Habour Plc (THL) Error 2006 -earnings 4.027 0.29 1.Underrecorded expense for production sharing to the 
Government, in violation of the agreement. 
2.Failed to disclose loan prepayment 11.6 million THB as a 
subsequent event. 
17 Yarnapund Plc (YNP) Error 2008 -earnings 61.88 0.52 Incorrectly recorded land filling and compaction payments into 
cost of building and infrastructure and that had been depreciated 
during 2006-2008. Until the detection of error, the company 
recorded the expense back to revenue amounting of 34.97 
million THB. The restatement included impairment costs of 
such assets for 34.22 million THB and reduced depreciation 
expense of 7.31 million THB. 
18 S.E.C. Auto Sales and Services 
Plc (SECC) 
Fraud 2006 
2007 
2008 
Assets Not 
specified 
- Forfeited documents of inventory purchasing. Overstating many 
items of assets and no documents support. 
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Part B: The Accounting Misstatements Found By the Companies  
There are 15 misstating firms with 17 misstated firm-years for the determinant part; 15 firms for the consequence part. 
Firm Company Name (Symbol) Type Year Impact Amount 
(million 
THB) 
% of Total 
Assets in 
year t-1 
Details of Accounting Misstatements 
1 Chai Watana Tannery Group 
Public Company Limited 
(CWT) 
Error 2004 - earnings 81.867 % 3.64 Incorrectly prepared consolidated subsidiaries, goodwill and 
earnings, which all were overstated for years. Correcting it 
this year with beginning retained earnings of 2005. 
2 Hana Microelectronics Public 
Company Limited (HANA) 
Error 2004  - earnings 15.844 0.19 Overstated sales in 2002-2004. 
3 Home Product Centre Public 
Company Limited (HMPRO) 
Error 2006 - earnings 8.1 0.09 Overstated purchase discount in year 2005, resulting an 
understated cost of goods sold and overstated earnings. 
4 Living Land Capital Public 
Company Limited (LL) 
Error 2004  - earnings 1.5 0.24 Reduced the idle capacity cost from cost of goods sold 
(61.295 million THB). 
5 Yuasa Battery (Thailand) Public 
Company Limited (YUASA) 
Error 2004  - earnings 83.9 6.81 Due to acct software change, inventory and cost of goods sold 
were incorrectly computed (2004).  
Error 2006 + earnings 17.022 1.28 Incorrectly recorded actual costs of inventory.  
6 NFC Fertilizer Public Company 
Limited (NFC) 
Error 2004  - earnings 22 0.19 Understated depreciation expenses.  
Error 2005 - earnings 155 1.33 Understated contingency liability.  
7 Quality Construction Products 
Public Company Limited 
(QCON) 
Error 2004 - earnings 6.86 0.48 Understated repair expense in year 2004, realised in 2005. 
8 SP Suzuki Public Company 
Limited (SPSU) 
Error 2005 - earnings 2.24 0.06 Incorrectly recorded depreciation expenses for previous years. 
9 Thai Textile Industry Public 
Company Limited (TTI) 
Error 2005 + earnings 10.5 0.31 Incorrectly recorded repair and maintenance as expense rather 
than property, plant and equipment. 
10 Wattana Karnpaet Public 
Company Limited (NEW) 
Error 2005 + earnings 5.89 1.61 Overstated accrued medical expenses. 
11 Malee Sampran Public 
Company Limited (MALEE) 
Error 2006 - earnings 0.86 0.04 Found in 2007 that it incorrectly recognised operating lease as 
finance lease, so reverse asset, liability and depreciation 
expenses, as well as record the rent. 
12 AJ Plast Public Company 
Limited (AJ) 
Error 2004 + earnings 9.44 0.44 Corrected operating lease to finance lease. 
13 Thai Nam Plastic Plc (TNPC) Error 2006 + equity 42.44 2.84 Adjusted gain on assets sold to related parties.   
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Firm Company Name (Symbol) Type Year Impact Amount 
(million 
THB) 
% of Total 
Assets in 
year t-1 
Details of Accounting Misstatements 
14 Universal Starch Public 
Company Limited (USC) 
Error 2006 - earnings 25.71 0.68 1. Did not test an impairment of long term investment for 
previous periods. 
2. Did not record sales of land help for development in the 
prior year. 
15 United Flour Mill Public 
Company Limited (UFM) 
Error 
 
 
2005 
 
 + 
unrealised 
gain on 
investment 
11.857 0.40 Did not adjust revaluation surplus on investments (equity). 
 
 
A Summary Table for the Average Impact Value of Accounting Misstatements 
By source of data Amount (million THB) % of total assets in year t-1 
1. Initiated by the SECT (Panel A) 417.6  
(£8.84 million) 
20.33 
2. Initiated by the company (Panel B)   29.0 
(£0.60 million) 
 1.21 
    Total 446.6 
(£9.44 million) 
 
By type of accounting misstatements 
(The third column of the Table) 
Amount (million THB) 
 
% of total assets in year t-1 
1. Fraud (n=14 firms) 684.98 
(£14.13 million) 
28.34 
2. Error (n=30 firms)   72.88 
(£1.50 million) 
5.76 
T-test for a difference in means (unequal variance), p-value (one-tailed)= 0.0062 
    Note: Follow Hennes et al. (2008), magnitudes of misstatements were computed as a proportion of total assets in year t-1. 
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Appendix C: Logistic Regression Diagnostics 
 
The following tests of the diagnostics are guided by Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000, pp. 
143-186) and the web book of UCLA Academic Technology Services (Chen et al. 
2003a). The tests were run on Stata software. All variables are defined in Table 6.3.  
 
The main model of the research is Model 1 in Table 6.6, which is as follows.  
  
 Table 6.6 
  Model 1 
 coefficient 
VARIABLES (z-statistic) 
OWN 0.0040 
 (0.621) 
FAM -0.2395 
 (-0.566) 
CROSS -0.1674 
 (-0.268) 
LEV 1.4587** 
 (2.320) 
ISSUE 0.5057 
 (1.403) 
NFCF 1.2328*** 
 (2.575) 
MB 0.1060 
 (1.039) 
REHAB -0.1415 
 (-0.211) 
BIG -1.1128** 
 (-2.285) 
AUDCHG 0.8658** 
 (2.331) 
DUAL 1.1317*** 
 (2.974) 
LNSIZE -0.2211 
 (-1.196) 
AGE 0.0041 
 (0.235) 
Consumer products -1.6824 
 (-1.269) 
Industrials 0.6984 
 (1.258) 
Property & construction -0.3055 
 (-0.513) 
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 Table 6.6 
  Model 1 
 coefficient 
VARIABLES (z-statistic) 
Resources 0.1838 
 (0.188) 
Service -1.0386 
 (-1.527) 
Technology 0.7006 
 (1.229) 
2003 -0.1717 
 (-0.292) 
2004 1.6523*** 
 (2.783) 
2005 0.7846 
 (1.279) 
2006 0.3657 
 (0.557) 
2007 -2.0169* 
 (-1.736) 
2008 -0.8158 
 (-1.115) 
2009 -2.0175* 
 (-1.771) 
Constant -3.5303** 
 (-2.224) 
Observations 2,351 
McFadden's  pseudo R
2
 0.296 
Model chi-square 269.5 
Degree of freedom 26 
Significance level of the model <0.0001 
Log-likelihood -173 
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-likelihood -246 
Number of clusters (firms) 387 
i) The model has robust standard errors clustered by firm (i.e. accounts for the possible correlation 
between observations of the same firm in different years). 
ii) Agro & Food industry is the base for industry dummies and year 2002 is the base for year dummies. 
iii)  Robust z-statistics in parentheses (firm-level clustering). 
iv)  Significance level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed). 
v) All variables are defined in Table 6.3. 
 
 
Diagnostic tests were run on this main model and results are as follows.  
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1. Goodness-of-Fit 
1.1 The Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test 
 
Logistic model for AM, goodness-of-fit test 
(Table collapsed on quantiles of estimated probabilities) 
   
Group Prob Obs_1 Exp_1 Obs_0 Exp_0 Total 
1 0.0004 0 0.1 236 235.9 236 
2 0.0010 0 0.2 235 234.8 235 
3 0.0017 1 0.3 234 234.7 235 
4 0.0029 1 0.5 234 234.5 235 
5 0.0046 0 0.9 235 234.1 235 
6 0.0074 2 1.4 233 233.6 235 
7 0.0122 0 2.3 235 232.7 235 
8 0.0212 5 3.8 230 231.2 235 
9 0.0482 8 7.5 227 227.5 235 
10 0.8315 34 34.1 201 200.9 235 
      
Number of observations = 2351 
Number of groups  = 10 
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi
2
(df=8)   = 6.05 
Prob > chi
2 
                      = 0.6414 
 
 
As in the output shown above, the fitted values are divided into 10 groups. The Hosmer-
Lemeshow chi
2
 is 6.05, df=8. The p-value of Chi
2
 statistic is 0.6414, which is larger 
than the 0.05 significance level. Therefore, there is no evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis that the model fits the data well.  
 
1.2 Classification Tables 
 
The fitted logistic regression is summarised via a classification table. The following 
classification table shows the classification at a cutpoint of 0.5.   
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 Cutoff (0.5) 
 
Logistic model for AM 
 
 -------- True --------  
Classified D ~D Total 
+ 3 3 6 
- 48 2297 2345 
Total 51 2300 2351 
 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5 
True D defined as AM != 0 
Sensitivity   Pr( +| D)      5.88% 
Specificity Pr( -|~D)    99.87% 
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)    50.00% 
Negative predictive value      Pr(~D| -)    97.95% 
False + rate for true ~D         Pr( +|~D)     0.13% 
False - rate for true D          Pr( -| D)     94.12% 
False + rate for classified +    Pr(~D| +)    50.00% 
False - rate for classified -      Pr( D| -)        2.05% 
Correctly classified                                 97.83% 
 
 
At the cutpoint of 0.5 the overall rate of correct classification is 97.83% 
[(3+2297)/2351], with 99.87% (2297/2300) of the non-misstatement group (specificity) 
and only 5.88% (3/51) of the misstatement group (sensitivity) being correctly classified. 
However, it is likely that the model can predict the non-misstatement group better than 
the misstatement group. This may be caused by the rare events sample. King and Zeng 
(2001a, c) state that a bias of parameter estimation by rare events is that the probability 
of the event (Y=1) is underestimated, and hence the probability of control group (Y=0) 
is overestimated.  
 
A graph showing the predicted probability (fitted value) from the model is presented 
below in order to understand more on the probability of the model’s fitted values.  
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As expected, there is a large portion of the fitted value equalling and close to zero. The 
cutpoint for this study tends to be a very small number. A further test on the 
classification was performed. Since the proportion of the misstatements to the non-
misstatements is about 2% (51/2351) in the research population. The researcher reran 
the test by a trial of the 0.02 cutpoint. The classification has been changed as in the table 
below. 
 Cutoff (0.02) 
 
Logistic model for AM 
 
 -------- True --------  
Classified D ~D Total 
+ 42 459 501 
- 9 1841 1850 
Total 51 2300 2351 
 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .02 
True D defined as AM != 0 
Sensitivity   Pr( +| D)      82.35% 
Specificity Pr( -|~D)    80.04% 
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)    8.38% 
Negative predictive value      Pr(~D| -)    99.51% 
False + rate for true ~D         Pr( +|~D)     19.96% 
False - rate for true D          Pr( -| D)     17.65% 
False + rate for classified +    Pr(~D| +)    91.62% 
False - rate for classified -      Pr( D| -)        0.49% 
Correctly classified                                 80.09% 
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The overall rate of correct classification is 80.09% [(42+1841)/2351], with 80.04% 
(1841/2300) of the non-misstatement group (specificity) and 82.35% (42/51) of the 
misstatement group (sensitivity) being correctly classified. The classification on the 
misstatement group is better in this scenario. Nevertheless, the cutpoint of 2% is very 
low and may be unusual when compared with the cutpoint of 50% that is commonly 
used.  
 
Another tool of the consideration for classification is the discrimination, given by the 
area under the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve. 
 
1.3 The ROC Curve 
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve plots the probability of detecting 
true signal (sensitivity) and false signal (1-sensitivity) for an entire range of possible 
cutpoints. The area under the ROC curve, which ranges from zero to one, provides a 
measure of the model’s ability to discriminate between those subjects who experience 
the outcome of interest versus those who do not.  
 
From the graph below, the cutpoint shows the optimal choice that maximises both 
sensitivity and specificity. In this sample, the cutpoint is close to the 0.02, which is 
close to the classification table in the previous subsection, where at the cutpoint of .02 
the sensitivity is about 82.35%, while the specificity is about 80.04%. They are close to 
each other and close to the scale on Y-axis.  
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The next figure presents the ROC indicating a plot of sensitivity versus 1-specificity.  
  
Logistic model for y 
 
number of observations =     2351 
area under ROC curve   =   0.8971 
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The area under curve provides a measure of discrimination which is the likelihood that 
the firm who has a misstatement will have a higher Pr(Y=1) than a firm who has no 
misstatements. The area under the ROC curve is 0.8971, which is considered an 
outstanding discrimination power of the model (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000, p. 162 ).   
 
Overall, despite the limitation of the small unusual number of the cutpoint the model 
tends to fit the data well, based on the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test, the 
calibration (classification tables) and discrimination (the ROC curve). Therefore, the 
research results from this model can be said to be reliable. The issue of the low cut-off 
probability (i.e. 0.02) is not a great concern for this research project because the 
research aims to conduct hypothesis testing rather than develop a prediction model. On 
the other hand, the coefficients of parameters are concerned. To reduce the bias of 
parameters caused by the rare events population, a rare event logistic regression has 
been employed to robust the research results. The research results (i.e. significant 
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explanatory variables) (Section 6.5.1) do not differ between the traditional logit model 
and the rare event logit model.  
 
 
2. Specification Error 
 
A linktest (in Stata), can be used to detect a specification error (e.g. the dependent 
variable is a linear combination of the independent variables, or the model includes all 
the relevant variables). The linktest uses the linear predicted value (_hat) and linear 
predicted value squared (_hatsq) as the predictors to rebuild the model. The variable 
_hat should be a significant predictor since it is the predicted value from the model. On 
the other hand, if the model is properly specified, the variable _hatsq should not have 
much predictive power. If the _hatsq is significant, it usually means that the model has 
either omitted relevant variable(s). The output from the linktest command is presented 
below. 
 
Logistic regression   Number of obs =    2351 
    LR chi
2
(2)          = 145.59 
    Prob > chi
2
        =  0.0000 
Log likelihood = -173.0182                  Pseudo R
2
         =  0.2961 
AM Coef. Std. Err.    z P>|z|    [95% Conf. Interval] 
 _hat      .9939702    .2799513      3.55    0.000      .4452758 1.542665 
 _hatsq     -.0010668 .0464132 -0.02 0.982 -.092035 .0899015 
 _cons    -.0058458 .3917683 -0.01 0.988 -.7736975 .7620058 
 
The variable _hat is significant at the 0.01 level. It confirms that the study has chosen 
meaningful independent variables. On the other hand, the _hatsq is not significant. 
Therefore, the linktest is not significant. There is no specification error. The logit 
model is, thus, properly specified and the coefficients are not biased by the 
misspecification. The coefficients of the explanatory variables in the model are robust 
and enable to indicate the antecedents of accounting misstatements.  
 
3. Multicollinearity 
 
The VIF and tolerance level are presented as follows. 
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Variable   VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R- Squared 
OWN 1.16     1.08 0.8642 0.1358 
FAM 1.13     1.07     0.8816       0.1184 
CROSS 1.14     1.07     0.8753 0.1247 
LEV 1.37     1.17     0.7304 0.2696 
ISSUE 1.13     1.06    0.8829 0.1171 
NFCF 1.07     1.03     0.9347 0.0653 
MB 1.14     1.07     0.8784 0.1216 
REHAB 1.37     1.17     0.7296 0.2704 
BIG 1.25     1.12     0.7980 0.2020 
AUDCHG 1.05     1.03     0.9505 0.0495 
DUAL 1.05     1.03     0.9492 0.0508 
LNSIZE 1.44     1.20    0.6950 0.3050 
AGE 1.14     1.07     0.8800 0.1200 
IND2 1.85 1.36 0.5410 0.4590 
IND3 2.13 1.46 0.4694 0.5306 
IND4 2.10 1.45 0.4754 0.5246 
IND5 1.60 1.26 0.6254 0.3746 
IND6 2.36 1.54 0.4238 0.5762 
IND7 1.70 1.30 0.5887 0.4113 
2003 1.98 1.41 0.5041 0.4959 
2004 1.99 1.41 0.5025 0.4975 
2005 2.11 1.45 0.4749 0.5251 
2006 2.24 1.50 0.4463 0.5537 
2007 2.35 1.53 0.4250 0.5750 
2008 2.38 1.54 0.4205 0.5795 
2009 2.43 1.56 0.4107 0.5893 
Mean VIF       1.64    
 
As a rule of thumb, a tolerance of 0.1 or less (equivalently VIF of 10 or greater) is a 
cause for concern (Chen et al. 2003a). In this study, there are no variables having a 
tolerance close to 1 [ranging from 0.4107 (YEAR2009) to 0.9505 (AUDCHG)] and the 
VIFs are less than 3. Therefore, there is no concern of the multicollinearity problem in 
this study. In addition, a multicollinearity test was performed with other models in 
Tables 6.7 and 6.9 and no concern of this assumption has been found (all VIFs are less 
than 3).  
 
 
4. Influential Observations 
 
The following tests seem to show that the model contains influential observations. 
However, all of the influential cases are those misstatement observations that could not 
be excluded in the analysis.  
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Three statistics (i.e. Pregibon leverage, Pearson residuals, and deviance residual) are 
considered to be the three basic building blocks for logistic regression diagnostics for 
the influential observations.   
 
Pregibon Leverage 
Pregibon’s dbeta provides a summary of information of how much impact of each 
observation has on parameter estimates.  
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From their experience Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000, p. 180) suggest that the influence 
diagnostic occurs when the dbeta is larger than 1.0. In this study, there are 22 
observations where the dbeta is above 1.0 (as listed below). 
No. ID ENTITY NAME YEAR AM FITTED VALUE 
1 19 Abico Holdings Public Company Limited    2006 1 .164923 
2 124 BANGKOK STEEL INDUSTRY    2002 1 .0464899 
3 290 Capital Engineering Network Public Company    2004 1 .2181844 
4 384 Circuit Electronics Industries Plc    2003 1 .0536908 
5 417 Daidomon Group Public Company Limited    2002 1 .0318497 
6 418 Daidomon Group Public Company Limited    2003 1 .0180656 
7 655 Home Product Centre Public Company Limited    2006 1 .0028302 
8 882 Loxley Public Company Limited    2003 1 .0011029 
9 936 Malee Sampran Public Company Limited    2006 1 .030497 
10 1012 NFC Fertilizer Public Company Limited    2004 1 .2481143 
11 1013 NFC Fertilizer Public Company Limited    2005 1 .2051501 
12 1051 Nippon Pack (Thailand) Plc 2009 1 .0068237 
13 1184 Picnic Corporation Public Company Limited    2004 1 .07164 
14 1185 Picnic Corporation Public Company Limited    2005 1 .0301598 
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No. ID ENTITY NAME YEAR AM FITTED VALUE 
15 1282 Quality Construction Products Plc    2004 1 .0347191 
16 1296 ROYNET PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED    2002 1 .2090188 
17 1297 ROYNET PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED    2003 1 .1386107 
18 1378 S. E. C. Auto Sales & Services Plc    2007 1 .0185959 
19 1379 S. E. C. Auto Sales & Services Plc    2008 1 .1901832 
20 1971 Thai Textile Industry Public Company Limited    2005 1 .0049392 
21 2257 Universal Starch Public Company Limited    2006 1 .0125342 
22 2336 Yarnapund Public Company Limited    2008 1 .0630815 
 
 
All these observations are the misstatement cases (22 out of 51 observations). 
 
Pearson Residuals 
Pearson residuals measure the relative deviations between the observed and fitted 
values.  
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Deviance Residual 
Deviance residual measures the disagreement between the maxima of the observed and 
the fitted log likelihood functions. 
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Both the graphs of Pearson residuals and deviance residual show a number of extreme 
values: the absolute value of the Pearson residual and deviance residual exceeds 2 
(Menard 1995, p. 74). The following table presents a list of the deviance residual data 
points that exceeds 2. 
 
No. ID ENTITY NAME YEAR AM FITTED VALUE 
1 19 Abico Holdings Public Company Limited    2006 1 .164923 
2 124 BANGKOK STEEL INDUSTRY    2002 1 .0464899 
3 290 Capital Engineering Network Plc   2004 1 .2181844 
4 291 Capital Engineering Network Plc    2005 1 .0182257 
5 384 Circuit Electronics Industries Plc    2003 1 .0536908 
6 417 Daidomon Group Public Company Limited    2002 1 .0318497 
7 418 Daidomon Group Public Company Limited    2003 1 .0180656 
8 638 Hana Microelectronics Public Company Limited 2004 1 .0199622 
9 655 Home Product Centre Public Company Limited    2006 1 .0028302 
10 773 Krisdamahanakorn Public Company Limited 2004 1 .098835 
11 797 Kuang PEI San Food Products Plc  2004 1 .0930785 
12 882 Loxley Public Company Limited    2003 1 .0011029 
13 936 Malee Sampran Public Company Limited    2006 1 .030497 
14 1012 NFC Fertilizer Public Company Limited    2004 1 .2481143 
15 1013 NFC Fertilizer Public Company Limited    2005 1 .2051501 
16 1047 Nippon Pack (Thailand) Plc 2005 1 .2076402 
17 1050 Nippon Pack (Thailand) Plc 2008 1 .0223466 
18 1051 Nippon Pack (Thailand) Plc 2009 1 .0068237 
19 1184 Picnic Corporation Public Company Limited    2004 1 .07164 
20 1185 Picnic Corporation Public Company Limited    2005 1 .0301598 
21 1214 Power-P Public Company Limited 2006 1 .069678 
22 1282 Quality Construction Products Plc    2004 1 .0347191 
23 1296 ROYNET PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED    2002 1 .2090188 
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No. ID ENTITY NAME YEAR AM FITTED VALUE 
24 1297 ROYNET PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED    2003 1 .1386107 
25 1377 S. E. C. Auto Sales & Services Plc    2006 1 .1943456 
26 1378 S. E. C. Auto Sales & Services Plc    2007 1 .0185959 
27 1379 S. E. C. Auto Sales & Services Plc    2008 1 .1901832 
28 1399 SP Suzuki Public Company Limited 2005 1 .0253309 
29 1858 Thai Film Industries Public Company Limited    2004 1 .1115907 
30 1885 Thai Nam Plastic Public Company Limited    2006 1 .1934553 
31 1971 Thai Textile Industry Public Company Limited    2005 1 .0049392 
32 2139 Tongkah Harbour Public Company Limited    2006 1 .1174594 
33 2217 United Flour Mill Public Company Limited    2005 1 .0559798 
34 2257 Universal Starch Public Company Limited    2006 1 .0125342 
35 2295 Wattana Karnpaet Public Company Limited    2005 1 .0275648 
36 2336 Yarnapund Public Company Limited    2008 1 .0630815 
37 2500 Yuasa Battery (Thailand) Company Limited      2006 1 .0526025 
 
In line with the Pregibon leverage, all above listed cases are the misstatement 
observations.  
 
Of all above 37 cases there are four cases (the below table) that are obviously seen in 
the Pearson’s residual graph. They are significantly far away from others (the Pearson’s 
residual values exceed 10).  
 
No. ID ENTITY NAME YEAR AM FITTED VALUE 
1 655 Home Product Centre Public Company Limited    2006 1 .0028302 
2 882 Loxley Public Company Limited    2003 1 .0011029 
3 1051 Nippon Pack (Thailand) Public Company Limited 2009 1 .0068237 
4 1971 Thai Textile Industry Public Company Limited    2005 1 .0049392 
 
A reason for the large residuals is that the estimated probability for these cases is less 
than 0.01, while they actually have a probability of 1. The researcher has rerun the 
logistic regression model by excluding these four observations. The regression results 
are presented in the second column compared to the original model in the first column. 
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 (1) (2) 
 
Table 6.6 
Model 1 
Excluded  
4 extreme 
cases 
 coefficient coefficient 
VARIABLES (z-statistic) (z-statistic) 
OWN 0.004 0.0078 
 (0.621) (1.202) 
FAM -0.2395 -0.1782 
 (-0.566) (-0.385) 
CROSS -0.1674 -0.0099 
 (-0.268) (-0.015) 
LEV 1.4587** 1.7319*** 
 (2.320) (2.708) 
ISSUE 0.5057 0.7124* 
 (1.403) (1.846) 
NFCF 1.2328** 1.4537*** 
 (2.575) (2.831) 
MB 0.106 0.1191 
 (1.039) (1.087) 
REHAB -0.1415 -0.3111 
 (-0.211) (-0.427) 
BIG -1.1128** -1.0247* 
 (-2.285) (-1.957) 
AUDCHG 0.8658** 1.0244** 
 (2.331) (2.496) 
DUAL 1.1317*** 1.2677*** 
 (2.974) (3.070) 
LNSIZE -0.2211 -0.3469* 
 (-1.196) (-1.774) 
AGE 0.0041 0.0001 
 (0.235) (0.007) 
Consumer products -1.6824  
 (-1.269)  
Industrials 0.6984 0.7086 
 (1.258) (1.231) 
Property & construction -0.3055 -0.315 
 (-0.513) (-0.524) 
Resources 0.1838 0.2954 
 (0.188) (0.291) 
Service -1.0386 -1.8161** 
 (-1.527) (-2.081) 
Technology 0.7006 0.7005 
 (1.229) (1.195) 
  
252 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
Table 6.6 
Model 1 
Excluded  
4 extreme 
cases 
 coefficient coefficient 
VARIABLES (z-statistic) (z-statistic) 
2003 -0.1717 -0.467 
 (-0.292) (-0.737) 
2004 1.6523*** 1.8056*** 
 (2.783) (2.776) 
2005 0.7846 0.767 
 (1.279) (1.147) 
2006 0.3657 0.3223 
 (0.557) (0.443) 
2007 -2.0169* -1.9724* 
 (-1.736) (-1.655) 
2008 -0.8158 -0.754 
 (-1.115) (-0.980) 
2009 -2.0175*  
 (-1.771)  
Constant -3.5303** -3.0794* 
 (-2.224) (-1.932) 
Observations 2,351 1,749 
McFadden's  pseudo R
2
 0.296 0.323 
Model chi-square 269.5 242.2 
Significance level of the model <0.0001 <0.0001 
Degree of freedom 26 24 
Log-likelihood -173 -146.4 
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-
likelihood -245.8 -216.3 
Number of clusters (firms) 387 333 
Model 1 is the original model from Table 6.6. Model 2 excludes the four extreme outliers. Note that in 
model 2, the variables of consumer products industry and year 2009 were omitted because there is none 
of a misstatement sample in such industry and year (predicting failure perfectly). The dependent 
variable is a dichotomous variable of an occurrence of an accounting misstatement. All variables are 
defined in Table 6.3. Standard errors are robust by firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (a two-tailed test of whether the coefficient is 
equal to zero). 
 
Compared between the model excluded four extreme outliers (Model 2) with the 
original model, coefficients for the main model (i.e. LEV, NFCF, AUDCHG and 
DUAL) are slightly larger and some of them (i.e. LEV and NFCF) are significant at a 
lower significant level. However, the coefficient of BIG is smaller and becomes 
significant at the 0.10 level. On the other hand, some variables (i.e. LNSIZE and 
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ISSUE) are significant at the 10% level in the new model. Except for the result of BIG 
variable, the coefficients and significance levels in the main research model (Table 6.6 
Model 1) are deemed to be more conservative. Consequently, a concern about the bias 
of coefficients is relieved and the research results are reliable. The study decided to 
maintain the entire sample for the analysis. 
 
5. Summary 
 
According to the tests of diagnostics, the model is properly specified. There is an 
appearance of  influential observations in the diagnostic tests. However, an exclusion of 
these cases did not change the research results. Therefore, the model is properly 
specified for examining the cuases of accounting misstatements in Thailand. Moreover, 
to reduce the bias on the coefficients due to the rare event proportion, rare events 
logistic regression model by King and Zeng (2001c) was also employed to robust the 
research results (Section 6.5.1). 
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Appendix D: Linear Regression Diagnostics 
 
The following tests are performed to test the regression assumptions, guided by the web 
book of UCLA Academic Technology Services (Chen et al. 2003b). All variables in this 
appendix are defined in Table 7.2.  
 
The main model of the research for assessing economic consequences of accounting 
misstatements (Table 7.6 Model 1) is as follows.  
  
 Table 7.6 
  Model 1 
 coefficient 
VARIABLES (t-statistic) 
AFTER -0.0231** 
 (-2.267) 
OCF -0.5319*** 
 (-20.598) 
CASH -0.1097*** 
 (-4.243) 
INV -0.0044 
 (-0.344) 
PPE 0.0421*** 
 (3.114) 
LEVC -0.0802*** 
 (-8.248) 
Q 0.0258*** 
 (7.036) 
LNSALES 0.0038*** 
 (3.108) 
INT -0.0866** 
 (-2.528) 
INVEST 0.1632*** 
 (12.419) 
Consumer products -0.0181*** 
 (-2.909) 
Industrials -0.0093* 
 (-1.719) 
Property & construction -0.0048 
 (-0.807) 
Resources 0.0205* 
 (1.660) 
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 Table 7.6 
  Model 1 
 coefficient 
VARIABLES (t-statistic) 
Service -0.0016 
 (-0.294) 
Technology -0.0105 
 (-1.457) 
2002 0.0022 
 (0.273) 
2003 0.0076 
 (0.961) 
2004 0.0051 
 (0.576) 
2005 0.008 
 (0.992) 
2006 0.0011 
 (0.150) 
2007 -0.0104 
 (-1.360) 
2008 0.0077 
 (1.042) 
2009 -0.0107 
 (-1.339) 
Constant -0.0019 
 (-0.113) 
Observations 2,495 
Adjusted R
2
 0.489 
R
2
 0.494 
Statistics for F-test 39.64 
p-value for F-test <0.0001 
Model degrees of freedom 24 
Residual degrees of freedom 384 
Number of clusters (firms) 385 
i) Robust t-statistics in parentheses (firm-level clustering). 
ii) Significance level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed). 
iii) Agro & food industry and year 2001 are bases for industry dummies 
and year dummies in the regression, respectively. 
iv) All variables are defined in Table 7.2. 
 
The diagnostics tests were run on the main model above. The examination was run on 
Stata software. 
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1. Model Specification 
 
Linktest, provided by Stata, was used to detect a model specification error. The output 
of the linktest is as follows: 
    Number of obs =    2495 
    F(  2,  2492)     = 1217.06 
Source SS df        MS Prob > F          =  0.0000 
 Model 12.6267708         2 6.31338542              R-squared        =  0.4941 
Residual 12.9270439   2492 .005187417            Adj R-squared  =  0.4937 
Total 25.5538147   2494 .010246117            Root MSE        =  .07202 
EXFIN Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
 _hat     .9961472    .0227578     43.77    0.000        .951521      1.040773 
 _hatsq     .0506728    .1360901       0.37    0.710     -.2161886       .3175341 
 _cons    -.0002129    .0015762     -0.14     0.893     -.0033037      .0028778 
 
The variable _hat is significant at the 0.01 level, while the _hatsq is not significant. 
Therefore, the model contains certain meaningful independent variables that are capable 
of predicting the dependent variable.  
 
Another test for the model specification is an omitted-variable test (ovtest in Stata). 
This test regresses on the independent variables and also the second, third and fourth 
powers of predicted y (after standardising ŷ to have mean 0 and variance 1). The result 
is as follows. 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of EXFIN 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                F(3, 2467) =     14.17 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
Although the linktest shows that the model is properly specified, the p-value of the F-
test for ovtest is small enough to reject the null hypothesis. Based on the latter test, the 
model has some omitted variables. The study assigned some interaction terms; i.e. 
LEVC*OCF, LEVC*INT, LEVC*CASH, LEVC*INV, following the variable 
specification in Roberts and Sufi (2009). The results are shown below:  
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 Table 7.6 
  Model 1 
Including Interaction 
Terms 
 coefficient coefficient 
VARIABLES (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
AFTER -0.0231** -0.0217** 
 (-2.267) (-2.478) 
LEVC*OCF  -0.5379*** 
  (-6.598) 
LEVC*INT  -0.1463 
  (-1.148) 
LEVC*CASH  0.0487 
  (0.307) 
LEVC*INV  0.032 
  (1.083) 
OCF -0.5319*** -0.3847*** 
 (-20.598) (-12.845) 
CASH -0.1097*** -0.1313*** 
 (-4.243) (-4.606) 
INV -0.0044 -0.0184 
 (-0.344) (-1.241) 
PPE 0.0421*** 0.0407*** 
 (3.114) (3.112) 
LEVC -0.0802*** -0.0511*** 
 (-8.248) (-3.356) 
Q 0.0258*** 0.0207*** 
 (7.036) (5.709) 
LNSALES 0.0038*** 0.0041*** 
 (3.108) (2.995) 
INT -0.0866** -0.0607* 
 (-2.528) (-1.910) 
INVEST 0.1632*** 0.1644*** 
 (12.419) (12.844) 
Consumer products -0.0181*** -0.0163*** 
 (-2.909) (-2.705) 
Industrials -0.0093* -0.0059 
 (-1.719) (-1.144) 
Property & construction -0.0048 -0.002 
 (-0.807) (-0.345) 
Resources 0.0205* 0.0261** 
 (1.660) (2.176) 
Service -0.0016 0.0016 
 (-0.294) (0.294) 
Technology -0.0105 -0.0092 
 (-1.457) (-1.263) 
  
258 
 
  
 Table 7.6 
  Model 1 
Including Interaction 
Terms 
 coefficient coefficient 
VARIABLES (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
2002 0.0022 -0.001 
 (0.273) (-0.104) 
2003 0.0076 0.0087 
 (0.961) (0.970) 
2004 0.0051 0.0052 
 (0.576) (0.546) 
2005 0.008 0.0075 
 (0.992) (0.837) 
2006 0.0011 0.0001 
 (0.150) (0.019) 
2007 -0.0104 -0.012 
 (-1.360) (-1.399) 
2008 0.0077 0.006 
 (1.042) (0.740) 
2009 -0.0107 -0.0114 
 (-1.339) (-1.322) 
Constant -0.0019 -0.006 
 (-0.113) (-0.359) 
Observations 2,495 2,495 
Adjusted R
2
 0.489 0.517 
R
2
 0.494 0.522 
Statistics for F-test 39.64 45.28 
p-value for F-test <0.0001 <0.0001 
Model degrees of freedom 24 28 
Residual degrees of freedom 384 384 
Number of clusters (firms) 385 385 
Model 1 is the original model from Table 7.6. Model 2 includes some interaction terms. 
The dependent variable is the net capital from external financing activities. All variables 
are defined in Table 7.2. Standard errors are robust by firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (a two-tailed test of 
whether the coefficient is equal to zero). Agro & food industry and year 2001 are the 
baseline for industry dummies and year dummies in the regression, respectively. 
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Link test for the model included interaction terms 
    Number of obs =  2495  
    F(  2,  2492)     = 1368.95 
Source SS df        MS Prob > F          =  0.0000 
 Model 13.3776608 2 6.68883038            R-squared        =  0.5235 
Residual 12.1761539   2492 .004886097            Adj R-squared  =  0.5231 
Total 25.5538147   2494 .010246117            Root MSE        =  .0699 
EXFIN Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
 _hat     .9806338    .0203903     48.09    0.000      .9406502     1.020618 
 _hatsq     .320345    .1163886      2.75    0.006      .0921167     .5485733 
 _cons    -.0015067    .0015257     -0.99    0.323     -.0044984         .0014851 
 
Omitted-variable test for the model included interaction terms 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of EXFIN 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                F(3, 2463) =     17.39 
                  Prob > F  =     <0.0001 
 
In the new model, which was included interaction terms, the coefficient of AFTER is 
still significant at the 5% level. As for the interaction terms, only the coefficient of 
LEVC*OCF is statistically significant at the p-value < 0.01. The adjusted R
2
 increases 
from 48.9% to 51.7%. However, both the linktest and omitted-variable test show a 
problem of model specification. Therefore, the model included the interaction terms 
cannot be used.  
 
Despite a change in the research results that might have occurred if other variables are 
included in the model, the original model is deemed to be satisfactory at least for two 
reasons. Firstly, the original model was built by covering all aspects of capital structure 
proxies suggested by prior studies (e.g. Almeida and Campello 2010; Hovakimian et al. 
2001; Rajan and Zingales 1995; Titman and Wessels 1988). Secondly, the regression 
results from the original model provide an answer for the research question (Hypothesis 
4, see Chapter 5). Therefore, the research maintains the main model.  
 
 
2. Checking the Normality of Residuals 
 
Many tests have been performed to check the normality of residuals. 
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The first test is a kernel density plot.   
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The second test is an inter-quartile range (IQR) test. Severe outliers consist of those 
points that are either 3 inter-quartile-ranges below the first quartile or 3 inter-quartile-
ranges above the third quartile. The presence of any severe outliers should be sufficient 
evidence to reject normality at a 5% significance level. The result of this sample is as 
below: 
   mean=  .0138            std.dev.=  .0712          (n= 2495) 
 median=  .0081      pseudo std.dev.=  .0545        (IQR=  .0735) 
10 trim=  .0104 
                                                  low         high 
                                               ---------------------------------- 
                                inner fences   -.1371       .1568 
                            # mild outliers         33          79 
                           % mild outliers     1.32%       3.17% 
 
                                outer fences   -.2473       .2669 
                         # severe outliers         4           14 
                        % severe outliers    0.16%       0.56% 
 
There are extreme outliers appearing in the residuals. 
 
Thirdly, a Shapiro-Wilk normality test was prepared.  
 
                   Shapiro-Wilk test for normal data 
 
    Variable     Obs       W                V            z       Prob>z 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r         2495    0.95788     61.065    10.543    0.00000 
 
Kernel  
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The null hypothesis of the data are normally distributed is rejected at the p-value < 0.05. 
Therefore, the residuals are not normally distributed.  
 
Fourthly, a standardised normal probability (pnorm) plot and a plot for the quantiles of a 
variable against the quantiles of a normal distribution (qnorm) were also drawn. The 
pnorm plot is sensitive to non-normality in the middle range of data and qnorm is 
sensitive to non-normality near the tails.  
 
pnorm plot 
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As the graphs show, the results from pnorm plot show indications of non-normality 
while the qnorm command shows a deviation from normal at the tails, particular in the 
upper tail.  
All the four tests in this section appear to indicate that the residuals are not close to a 
normal distribution and one cause is likely to concern outliers. To increase robustness of 
the research results, the research followed Verardi and Croux’s (2009) suggestion. 
Huber’s (1981) monotonic M-estimator (rreg in Stata) and Yohai’s (1987) high 
breakdown point MM-estimator (mmregress in Stata) are employed. The regression 
results are presented as follows.  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Table 7.6 M-Estimator MM-Estimator 
 Model 1   
  (OLS) (rreg) (mmregress) 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
VARIABLES (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
AFTER -0.0231** -0.0213*** -0.0234*** 
 (-2.267) (-2.650) (-2.821) 
OCF -0.5319*** -0.5898*** -0.6124*** 
 (-20.598) (-52.558) (-20.371) 
CASH -0.1097*** -0.0789*** -0.0580*** 
 (-4.243) (-5.196) (-3.035) 
INV -0.0044 0.0023 0.0077 
 (-0.344) (0.262) (0.893) 
PPE 0.0421*** 0.0551*** 0.0548*** 
 (3.114) (6.838) (6.243) 
LEVC -0.0802*** -0.0896*** -0.0900*** 
 (-8.248) (-17.272) (-12.119) 
Q 0.0258*** 0.0315*** 0.0363*** 
 (7.036) (18.262) (6.903) 
LNSALES 0.0038*** 0.0034*** 0.0029*** 
 (3.108) (4.200) (2.900) 
INT -0.0866** -0.0572*** -0.0571** 
 (-2.528) (-2.831) (-2.013) 
INVEST 0.1632*** 0.1911*** 0.2035*** 
 (12.419) (34.603) (11.679) 
ind2 -0.0181*** -0.0166*** -0.0129*** 
 (-2.909) (-3.367) (-3.090) 
ind3 -0.0093* -0.0105** -0.0069 
 (-1.719) (-2.437) (-1.599) 
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   (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Table 7.6 M-Estimator MM-Estimator 
 Model 1   
  (OLS) (rreg) (mmregress) 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
VARIABLES (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
ind4 -0.0048 -0.0124*** -0.0123** 
 (-0.807) (-2.754) (-2.521) 
ind5 0.0205* 0.0110* 0.0012 
 (1.660) (1.796) (0.160) 
ind6 -0.0016 -0.0031 -0.0028 
 (-0.294) (-0.709) (-0.684) 
ind7 -0.0105 -0.0169*** -0.0155*** 
 (-1.457) (-3.276) (-2.639) 
year2 0.0022 0.0055 0.0072 
 (0.273) (0.842) (1.074) 
year3 0.0076 0.003 -0.0021 
 (0.961) (0.455) (-0.329) 
year4 0.0051 0.0051 0.0024 
 (0.576) (0.786) (0.406) 
year5 0.008 0.0089 0.0036 
 (0.992) (1.409) (0.568) 
year6 0.0011 0.0033 0.004 
 (0.150) (0.544) (0.640) 
year7 -0.0104 -0.0013 -0.0006 
 (-1.360) (-0.219) (-0.099) 
year8 0.0077 0.0130** 0.0096* 
 (1.042) (2.157) (1.714) 
year9 -0.0107 -0.0014 -0.0044 
 (-1.339) (-0.240) (-0.747) 
Constant -0.0019 -0.0189 -0.0242** 
 (-0.113) (-1.595) (-1.965) 
Observations 2,495 2,495 2,495 
R
2
 0.494 0.343  
Adjusted R
2
 0.489     
Model 1 is the original model from Table 7.6. Models 2 and 3 are robust regression models. Standard 
errors in Model 1 are clustered by firm. The efficiency of the MM-estimator in Model 3 takes a 
default value of 70%, following Verardi and Croux (2009). The dependent variable is the net capital 
from external financing activities. All variables are defined in Table 7.2. Agro & food industry and 
year 2001 are the baseline for industry dummies and year dummies in the regression, respectively. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (a two-tailed test of 
whether the coefficient is equal to zero). 
a
 The R
2
 for the robust regression model was calculated based on the rregfit command in order to get 
a correct R
2 
as noted in ULCA Academic Technical Services: 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/faq/rregr2.htm (accessed 24 October 2011). 
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It can be seen in the robust regression models (Models 2 and 3) that the main research 
result was unchanged. The coefficient of the experimental variable (AFTER) remains 
significant at the p-value < 0.01. The coefficient has slightly changed from -0.0231 in 
the OLS regression to -0.213 in the M-estimator model and to -0.0234 in the MM-
estimator model. Significance levels for the control variables in Models 2 and 3 are also 
similar to the original model. Only few differences among the models appear in the 
industry and year dummies. Consequently, the research result on the adverse effect of 
an announcement of accounting misstatements is affirmed by the robust regression. 
 
3. Checking Homoscedasticity of Residuals  
 
The researcher has made standard errors robust by firm-level clustering and controlled 
time effects by using year dummies, following a suggestion by Petersen (2009). 
Therefore, the independence assumption of errors is alleviated. A graphical method, as 
shown below, is used to plot the residuals versus fitted (predicted) values.  
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There seems to be none of any pattern of heteroscedasticity. The data points were 
limited in two rims because of the winsorisation on the data. Therefore, a concern that 
the variance of residuals is not constant is relieved. 
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4. Checking for Multicollinearity 
 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) measures the impact of collinearity among the 
variables. 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
AFTER 1.05     0.948616 
OCF 1.19     0.839620 
CASH 1.85     0.540610 
INV 2.44     0.409728 
PPE 2.46     0.406461 
LEVC 1.46     0.685518 
Q 1.22     0.819311 
LNSALES 1.21     0.829334 
INT 1.17     0.854561 
INVEST 1.15     0.866242 
ind2 1.81     0.552732 
ind3 2.08     0.481017 
ind4 2.05     0.487444 
ind5 1.45     0.691202 
ind6 2.50     0.399585 
ind7 1.70     0.589138 
year2 2.32     0.431044 
year3 2.61     0.382795 
year4 2.68     0.372747 
year5 2.86     0.349906 
year6 3.03     0.330130 
year7 3.22     0.310773 
year8 3.21     0.311951 
year9 3.32     0.300800 
Mean VIF 2.09  
 
As a rule of thumb, a variable whose VIF values are greater than 10 may merit further 
investigation (Chen et al. 2003b). In this study, none of any VIF values are greater than 
10. Therefore, there is no problem of multicollinearity. In addition, a multicollinearity 
test was performed with other models in Table 7.7 and no concern of this assumption 
has been found (all VIFs are less than 4).  
 
5. Checking Linearity 
 
Checking the linearity assumption is not so straightforward in the case of multiple 
regressions. The most straightforward thing to do is to plot the standardised residuals 
against each of the predictor variables in the regression model. There is a problem of 
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nonlinearity if there is a clear nonlinear pattern. The following pictures show scatter 
diagrams between the residuals (r) and independent variables. 
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Scatter r and PPE 
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Scatter r and LNSALES 
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According to the graphs, there is unlikely to be a nonlinearity problem between the 
residuals and independent variables. 
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6. Summary 
 
Despite a diagnostic of model specification shown by an omitted-variable test (ovtest), 
the OLS regression model for analysing an economic consequence of an accounting of 
accounting misstatements (Table 7.6) meets the regression assumptions. Regarding the 
normal distribution of residuals and severe outliers, the research results were rechecked 
with a robust regression in order to reduce a bias of coefficient. The significance of the 
experimental variable (AFTER coefficient) remains unchanged. 
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